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Abstract 
 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the institutional environment prevailing in the Mexican 
coffee sector and its effect on the producers, traders and households. Specific topics we examine 
are the contract arrangements and trade performance, the factors influencing the growers´ 
willingness to join a cooperative, the effects of cooperation on price variability, the influence of 
cooperation on the growers’ welfare, and coffee producers’ response to the falling coffee price 
through their engagement in diversification activities. To accomplish the main objectives we have 
used primary and secondary data. We applied ordinarily least squares, logistic, probit and 
multivariate probit regressions in the analysis. The main findings indicate that farmers were better 
off under the quota system than they are under the free market. Results also indicate that being a 
roaster and selling cherry coffee negatively affects traders’ use of contracts, whereas being 
vertically integrated has a positive effect on contracting. On the other hand, selling cherry coffee, 
participating in a competitive environment and having contracts positively influence intermediaries’ 
performance. Other results show that some individual, family and farm factors, as well as 
variability of the coffee price at the municipal level favour cooperative affiliation; whereas housing 
conditions, the proportion of farmers in the municipality and the level of producers selling to 
intermediaries at the municipal level negatively affect prospects for cooperative membership. We 
discovered overall positive effects of cooperative participation on household welfare through an 
increase in the price and total coffee income; results also indicate that households responded to 
the low coffee price periods with an increase in diversification. 
 
Keywords: Cooperation, contract arrangements, traders´ performance, market uncertainty, 
diversification, coffee, Mexico. 
 
 Acknowledgements 
 
The work that I present in this thesis is a product of the many people who supported me with their 
company, comments, advice, information and discussions. It is also a product of my family and 
relatives; their involvement started two years before my PhD programmes, with the preparation 
and almost six years to finish this thesis. 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Kees Burger, Erwin Bulte and Ruerd Ruben for 
providing many thoughts for this thesis. Kees, you helped me from the start to the finish of this 
research. You willingly dealt with all my difficulties in understanding how good research should be 
done and taught me to think more scientifically rather than in the empirical way. Thank you so 
much for your time and valuable contribution to all my empirical chapters. I do not have enough 
words to express my gratitude towards my co-promoter Ruerd Ruben, who showed a lot of interest 
in my work and whose contribution added value to my thesis. Your confidence in my research was 
the source of strength at the beginning of my writing. My special thanks go to Erwin Bulte for his 
kindness, support and invaluable comments and suggestions during my PhD study and research. 
 
Many thanks to Arie Kuvyenhoven for accepting me as a PhD student at the Development 
Economics Group. I want to extend my gratitude to Aad van Tilburg and Liesbeth Dries, who 
reviewed and provided comment on some chapters of my thesis. Special thanks to Fernando Saenz 
for his friendship and help in developing my thesis. I want to give many thanks and recognition to 
André R. Cortés, who joined my PhD research with his master thesis. 
 
I also want to thank the entire staff of the Development Economics Group for the time we shared in 
academic events, coffee breaks and outside of the University. That was really a great opportunity 
to express our ideas and to understand the way of thinking of well-prepared Dutch people. I extend 
my thanks to Rob Schipper, Nico Heerink, Henk Moll, Rein Haagsma, Marrit van den Berg, Marijke 
D’Haese, Lei Pan and Robert Lensink. Thanks to all of you for the comments and worries about my 
progress during the research. I appreciate all the support and friendship that I received from the 
secretaries and administrators of DEC, especially Henny Hendrikx, Ingrid Lefeber, Marian Jonker 
and Dineke Wemmenhove. Your work helped me a lot to overcome many difficulties within the 
shortest time, which would otherwise have taken hours. Special thanks go to Roelfina Mihalj-Ijken, 
whose help in some administrative procedures made our lives easier here. 
 
I would like to recognize the support from some colleagues in the Development Economics Group. 
It was possible to work in a pleasant environment, not only academically but also with regard to 
social issues. I would like to thank especially my colleagues Maren Radeny, Aïfa Ndoye, Fred 
Owegi, Mesharch Katusiimeh, Rabindra Thapa, Maarten Voors, Lonneke Nillesen, Ezra Berkhout, 
Fédes van Rijn and Gonne Beekman. Thank you all for your company during part of my stay in the 
DEC group and for the help I received whenever I requested it. Alvaro Reyes and family, thank you 
so much for your great friendship and company during the time you were in the Netherlands. To 
Jaime Arana and family, for all the time we spent together talking and discussing many academic 
 
 
and Mexican issues. I remember how, whenever you were in the office, not one week passed 
without me visiting you or you visiting me in my office to share at least one thing. 
 
To John and Esperanza and family, you always were my family contact in the Netherlands and we 
had a wonderful time together; we shared many times of happiness and sadness during my five 
years in the Netherlands. Enid Tomkinson, our guide in English and family friend forever; we 
learned so many things from you. Agnes Akwero, Sharon Harris and Mariette van Staveren for 
helping in correcting the writing and editing of this thesis. Also thanks to Teo and Mari Carmen and 
family, for your friendship in this country. We appreciated so much all your support and the time 
we shared. I want to say special thanks to Martha, Frank and their daughter for their kindness from 
the beginning to the end of our stay in the Netherlands. We will not forget the parties we had 
together. Many thanks to Francisco Guevara and his family, for the friendship and companionship 
we received from them when living in the Netherlands. Thank to José Potting and Olga Lyashevska  
 for their company and kindness. My thanks also go to many other friends that I cannot list for 
space reasons, but I would like to mention my special thanks to Juana, Karla, Eira, Caucasela and 
Xochitl for their friendship and their being close to my family during my PhD studies. 
 
I cannot miss the opportunity to thank all my colleagues at the Regional Centre of Chapingo 
Autonomous University, especially Alejandro, Bernardo, Víctor, Laura, Carlos, Francisco, Fabian, 
Gervasio, Emiliano, Susana, Salvador, Esteban, Tinoco, Ernesto, Romeo, Domingo, Antonio, 
Dámaso, Zárate and Atenógenes. My special gratitude goes to Gerónimo, for all his help in the 
organization of the Coffee Census and 2005 survey databases. Your work really helped me to 
resolve a number of difficulties in my research. Special thanks go to Guillermo for all his help in the 
procedures we carried out before and during my PhD programme and for the push I always 
received from him with regard to my study. 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the heads of governmental and non-governmental 
institutions in México who provided information during my fieldwork. Also thanks to the farmers’ 
organization leaders and CEOs of the many coffee companies I talked to during the study in 
México, as well as to the staff members of the International Coffee Organization for the valuable 
information and the help I received during my visit to England. I would like to thank all the 
intermediaries and coffee processors who provided information I needed for my thesis. Special 
thanks also go to the Mexican Coffee Association for providing some of the records and databases 
that were especially useful in my analysis. 
 
My PhD programme could not start without the financial support from the Alban foundation 
(Santander Group) that provided the scholarship and tuition fees for three years. In the same vein, 
I thank the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and Technology of México for the 
financial support during part of my PhD studies. Special thanks go to Chapingo Autonomous 
University for the financial support they provided to me during my stay in the Netherlands. All this 
support allowed me to concentrate on my studies and follow a complete programme in a foreign 
country. 
 
To my father and mother (r.i.p.), many thanks for the love and all the support they gave during 
my studies; to my brothers and sisters Ernesto, Pablo, Juana, Efrén, Elena and Antonio, thank you 
for all the support and companionship during the time I was preparing and developing my PhD 
study. Special thanks to Magdaleno and Deisy and their family for all the help I received from them 
before and during the development of my PhD programme. 
 
Special thanks to my wife Roselia and daughters Rocío and Berenice; without them my life in the 
Netherlands would have been very difficult. I am indebted to them for their understanding when I 
devoted my time to my study and research. Roselia, thank you for all your support, not only in my 
personal life but also with regard to the academic issues, and for being with me wherever I am. 
 
Benigno Rodríguez Padrón 
Wageningen, the Netherlands, November 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 
List of tables ............................................................................................................... 13 
List of figures .............................................................................................................. 14 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 15 
1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 15 
1.2. The Mexican coffee sector ...................................................................................... 17 
1.3. Problem statement ............................................................................................... 19 
1.4. Research objectives and questions .......................................................................... 22 
1.5. Data collection and methods .................................................................................. 24 
1.6. Outline of the thesis ............................................................................................. 27 
Chapter 2. Characterization of the Mexican coffee sector .............................................. 29 
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 29 
2.2. Relevance of coffee in Mexico ................................................................................. 30 
2.3. Liberalization of the Mexican economy ..................................................................... 34 
2.4. Structure and organization of the coffee sector.......................................................... 35 
2.5. The past institutional arrangement .......................................................................... 38 
2.6. The institutional structure of the Mexican coffee sector from 1993 to 2004 ..................... 45 
2.7. The current institutional arrangement ...................................................................... 49 
2.8. Concluding remarks .............................................................................................. 52 
Chapter 3. The contractual choice and performance of Mexican coffee traders: The role of 
market institutions in commodity chains ......................................................... 55 
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 55 
3.2. Theoretical approach ............................................................................................ 57 
3.3. Data and methods ................................................................................................ 62 
3.4. Model specification ............................................................................................... 70 
3.4.1. Contract choices ............................................................................................ 70 
3.4.2. Traders’ performance ..................................................................................... 73 
3.5. Results ............................................................................................................... 75 
3.5.1. Determinants of contract choices ...................................................................... 75 
3.5.2. Traders’ performance ..................................................................................... 76 
3.6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 78 
Chapter 4. The driving forces and economic impact of cooperative membership: Empirical 
evidence from the Mexican coffee sector ......................................................... 81 
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 81 
4.2. Rationale for cooperative membership in the coffee production and trade ...................... 82 
4.3. Material and methods ........................................................................................... 84 
4.3.1. Intrinsic factors influencing farmers' participation in a cooperative.......................... 86 
4.3.2. Extrinsic factors influenced by cooperative participation ........................................ 90 
4.4. Results ............................................................................................................... 92 
4.4.1. Likelihood of cooperative membership ............................................................... 92 
4.4.2. Price differences between cooperative and non-cooperative coffee farmers .............. 93 
4.4.3. Factors affecting the mode of coffee selling by farmers ......................................... 95 
4.4.4. Determinants of the per capita coffee income ..................................................... 97 
4.5. Conclusions and outlook ........................................................................................ 98 
Chapter 5. Farmers' cooperatives as a response to uncertainty: Empirical findings from 
the Mexican coffee sector ............................................................................. 101 
5.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 101 
5.2. Theoretical considerations ................................................................................... 102 
5.3. Empirical approach ............................................................................................. 107 
5.4. Data and methods of analysis............................................................................... 108 
5.5. Empirical results ................................................................................................ 113 
5.5.1. Market characteristics versus cooperation ........................................................ 113 
5.5.2. Organization and the variability of local coffee prices ......................................... 114 
5.5.3. The influence of cooperation on the individual coffee price .................................. 116 
5.5.4. The effect of market variability and cooperation on the coffee income ................... 117 
5.6. Conclusions and policy recommendation................................................................. 119 
Chapter 6. Household diversification and its effect on the annual coffee income: Evidence 
from the Mexican coffee sector ..................................................................... 121 
6.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 121 
6.2. Theoretical considerations ................................................................................... 123 
6.3. Data and methods .............................................................................................. 127 
6.4. Diversification in the 2005 survey and its statistics .................................................. 130 
6.5. Models specification ............................................................................................ 136 
6.5.1. Factors influencing diversification ................................................................... 136 
6.5.2. The effect of diversification on the annual coffee income ..................................... 139 
6.6. The effect of diversification on the annual coffee income ........................................... 142 
6.6.1. Models specification...................................................................................... 142 
6.6.2. Results of factors influencing the annual coffee income ....................................... 143 
6.7. Conclusion and policy recommendation .................................................................. 145 
Chapter 7. Discussion and conclusion......................................................................... 147 
7.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 147 
7.2. Summary and discussion of the main findings ......................................................... 148 
7.3. Policy implications .............................................................................................. 157 
7.4. Main limitations and future research agenda ........................................................... 160 
References ................................................................................................................ 163 
Appendices ............................................................................................................... 173 
Appendix 1. Coffee-producing states in Mexico. ............................................................. 173 
Appendix 2. Panel regression of the local price against the international coffee price. ........... 173 
Appendix 3. Factors explaining the individual coffee price ................................................ 174 
Summary  ................................................................................................................. 175 
Samenvatting ............................................................................................................ 181 
Resumen  .................................................................................................................. 189 
Funding  ................................................................................................................... 197 
Training and supervision plan .................................................................................... 199 
Curriculum vitae........................................................................................................ 201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 2.1. Value of exported coffee within Mexico's total and agricultural exports ...................... 31 
Table 2.2. Coffee production by major producing countries .................................................... 31 
Table 2.3. Shifts of some indicators of the Mexican coffee sector from 1989 to 2008 ................. 31 
Table 2.4. The Mexican budget for programmes supporting the coffee sector from 1996 to 2003 . 47 
Table 2.5. Border from where the Mexican coffee was exported ............................................. 48 
Table 2.6. The Mexican budget for programmes supporting the coffee sector in the last years ..... 50 
Table 3.1. Characteristics of coffee per producing state in Mexico. .......................................... 63 
Table 3.2. General characteristics of the interviewed intermediaries. ....................................... 65 
Table 3.3. Classification of interviewed intermediaries .......................................................... 66 
Table 3.4. Assets owned by interviewed intermediaries ......................................................... 68 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis ....................................... 71 
Table 3.6. Having or not having a contract per type of coffee intermediaries. ........................... 72 
Table 3.7. Determinants of contract engagement (logit) ....................................................... 75 
Table 3.8. Factors explaining gross log-transformed margins (OLS) ........................................ 77 
Table 4.1. Variables for membership of a cooperative ........................................................... 86 
Table 4.2. Variables influenced by cooperative membership................................................... 91 
Table 4.3. Factors determining membership of a cooperative ................................................. 93 
Table 4.4. Price differences between cooperative and non-cooperative members ....................... 94 
Table 4.5. Likelihood estimates regarding the type of coffee sold by farmers ............................ 96 
Table 4.6. Factors determining the per capita coffee income .................................................. 98 
Table 5.1. Names and descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis ...................... 110 
Table 5.2. Summary of the various steps followed in this chapter ......................................... 111 
Table 5.3. Market factors influencing participation in coffee cooperatives ............................... 113 
Table 5.4. Factors affecting the variance of local coffee prices.............................................. 115 
Table 5.5. Market characteristics and cooperation on the individual coffee price ...................... 117 
Table 5.6. Market characteristics and cooperation on coffee income ...................................... 118 
Table 6.1. Coffee growers’ response to low coffee prices during the 2001 .............................. 126 
Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis ..................................... 129 
Table 6.3. Characteristics of diversified coffee-producing households included in the database .. 133 
Table 6.4. Changes within diversification options between 2001 and 2005 ............................. 134 
Table 6.5. Household income from the 2004 survey ........................................................... 134 
Table 6.6. Average variables of farmers/households engaged in coffee-extra and other activities in 
2005. .......................................................................................................... 135 
Table 6.7. Multivariate probit estimation for non-diversified, diversified within coffee, agricultural 
and non-agricultural groups without lagged variables. ......................................... 140 
Table 6.8. Multivariate probit estimation for non-diversified, diversified within coffee, agricultural 
and non-agricultural groups with lagged variables. .............................................. 141 
Table 6.9. Factors determining the log of the yearly coffee income ....................................... 145 
 
 
 
14 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1. Marketing channel in the Mexican coffee sector.................................................... 18 
Figure 1.2. Simplified coffee supply chain, chapters and research questions of the thesis............ 23 
Figure 1.3. Chapters and their source of information. ........................................................... 25 
Figure 1.4. Outline of the thesis ........................................................................................ 27 
Figure 2.1. Share of major crops in the Mexican agricultural export value in 2008 ..................... 30 
Figure 2.2. Production of coffee in Mexico and the international price ...................................... 32 
Figure 2.3. Destination of Mexican coffee exported in 2008 ................................................... 33 
Figure 2.4. Type of coffee exported by Mexico in 2008 ......................................................... 33 
Figure 2.5. Time line, structures and major characteristics of the Mexican coffee sector. ............ 36 
Figure 2.6. Paths of Mexican and Other Milds coffee prices .................................................... 40 
Figure 2.7. Destination of the Mexican coffee per season ...................................................... 41 
Figure 2.8. Federal budget allocated to coffee and yield in Mexico .......................................... 48 
Figure 2.9. Federal budget allocated to coffee in Mexico and Other Milds coffee prices ............... 51 
Figure 3.1. Location of coffee-producing states and selected regions in Oaxaca and Veracruz, 
Mexico. ....................................................................................................... 64 
Figure 3.2. Size of intermediaries vs. marketing .................................................................. 73 
Figure 5.1. Price margins between producing state price and Other Milds price ....................... 104 
Figure 5.2. Ways of selling coffee by any grower member of a cooperative ............................ 105 
Figure 5.3. Rural coffee price and price margins ................................................................ 109 
Figure 5.4. Time line and direction of the relationship of organization and rural prices’ variables 111 
Figure 5.5. Variance of the coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 and level of organization in 2004 ... 114 
Figure 6.1. National and international coffee prices ............................................................ 123 
Figure 6.2. Box diagram of land and labour allocation ......................................................... 124 
Figure 6.3. Graphical representation of factors and decision-making on diversification ............. 125 
Figure 6.4. Households’ options to diversify in function of land and labour. ............................ 126 
Figure 6.5. Graphical representation of sources of information used in this work. .................... 127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
15 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis intends to make a contribution to the existing coffee sector literature, by providing 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the institutional environment and policy changes and their 
effect on the coffee traders’ and households´ behaviour. Its main findings show that the 
institutional environment creates differential opportunities among partners in the coffee sector, 
making their ways of doing business in coffee substantially different. The cooperative involvement 
does not always help growers to increase their welfare, and neither does it help to reduce the 
instability of the coffee price. Households’ response with an increase in diversification during the 
low coffee price periods was evident. 
 
Coffee is the second-largest global commodity after oil, employing more than 25 million people on 
more than 5 million farms. It fills approximately 400 billion cups a year and is estimated to be 
regularly consumed by more than 40% of the world’s population (Robert and Raphael, 2001). 
During the 1962-1989 period, the international coffee market was regulated by the economic 
clauses of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). During this period, quotas were distributed to 
members of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) in order to keep the coffee prices stable. 
As a consequence of the disappearance of the economic clauses of the ICA in 1989, a dismantling 
of coffee boards and other governmental bodies operating in producer countries was started. 
According to some scholars (Milford, 2004, Ponte, 2001), the emergence of other national bodies, 
such as producer and intermediary organizations, has not been able to substitute the demised 
ones. They also argue that local exporters found it difficult to mobilize funds to compete with 
international traders. As a result, international companies have been taking control of the domestic 
market in producing countries. 
 
Just before the Mexican presidency period of 1988-1994, Mexico started a profound transformation 
of its economy. The country joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 
and signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States 
of America in 1992. By doing so, the Mexican government broke radically with previous import 
substitution policies and embarked on trade liberalization.1 These processes forced the Mexican 
state to avoid market intervention, abolish the minimum prices for basic products, and open the 
border to the import of any product and input (Bussolo et al., 2007); this policy included the coffee 
sector. During the same period, a modification took place in the system of land ownership with 
regard to the ejidal and communal properties. This entailed an adaptation of article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution in 1992, which formally ended the process of land reform in Mexico. This 
change established a legal process through which land titles were given to the land rights within 
the ejido and to operators as well. As a result, individual parcels could be sold or used as collateral. 
This latter modification affected more than half of the Mexican territory. As part of the same 
                                            
1 Trade liberalization or globalisation has been defined as the process of lowering barriers on importing and exporting goods and 
capital; it has been implemented to a degree by the signing of multinational and regional free trade agreements (Wehbe et al., 
2005). 
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economic changes, a huge reduction in the participation of the State in credit, marketing and other 
agricultural services started at the beginning of the nineteen nineties (Davis, 1999). 
 
To reduce the effect on the coffee sector of the quick decrease in direct intervention by the Mexican 
state, the federal government set up a number of subsidies and compensation programmes. Those 
programmes helped to support agricultural and livestock producers. The largest programme was 
the income support programme (Procampo), its main aim being to compensate basic grain and 
oilseed growers. The second-largest programme was the Alianza para el Campo (Countryside 
Alliance) programme, the main aim of which was to enhance agricultural and livestock productivity 
through small investment projects, financed jointly by the government and producers. The majority 
of the smallholders participated in the first one (80%), whereas in the second one only a small 
portion (12%) took part (Davis, 1999). 
 
To accomplish the main objective of this thesis, we will apply the New Institutional Economics 
theory. We will define institutions as the formal and informal rules of the game in society. Formal 
rules include constitutions, laws, property rights and other regulations (North, 1994; Williamson, 
1987; Williamson, 1998). They are also often enforced by some external authority. By contrast, 
informal institutions have unwritten codes of social conduct like shared values, norms, customs, 
ethics, and ideology: they generally operate outside of formal legislation. Such institutions evolve 
spontaneously but not deliberately through human interactions (North, 1990). Many of the rules 
refer to the transfer and protection of property rights and sanctions, which are imposed in the 
absence of agreements. Thus, both formal and informal institutions create a behavioural framework 
within which economic activities occur. 
 
Institutions constitute the “rules of the game” by which any economy operates. It is not the 
agencies or organizations that implement policies, but the agencies are influenced by the effects of 
the policies. The ultimate objective of these rules is to create an institutional environment which 
will give investors and citizens confidence; they will rely on it, which will ultimately result in 
increased wealth (North, 1994). The rules of the game in any sector are important to build a 
setting based on confidence and certainty for investors and for the general public that interacts in 
any sector (OECD, 2007). In general, institutions serve to reduce uncertainties in people’s daily 
lives (North, 1990). 
 
The Industry Representational Organization (IRO) represents all economic agents included in the 
supply chain. In the case of coffee, this includes producers and their organizations (grassroots and 
cooperatives), individual or organized intermediaries, processors who can also be included in some 
kind of organization, exporters, governmental instances and other indirect partners such as 
universities, input suppliers, credit providers and machinery producers (Gilbert et al., 1999). 
 
The existence of the IRO benefits all the actors participating in the coffee sector. The government 
can benefit because the IRO has become a means of transmitting information to farmers, firms, 
and several other agents. For coffee farmers, an industry representative is very important as it 
allows them access to services and information from the government or firms. Additionally, all the 
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other partners in the supply chain can benefit by providing national and international statistics and 
by representing the country at international debates (Gilbert et al., 1999). In the Mexican coffee 
sector, after the demise of the Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE), the industry representation 
was covered first by the Mexican Coffee Council (MCC) and then by the Coffee Product System 
(CPS). 
 
The rest of this introduction is organized as follows: in Section 1.1, we will provide a background to 
the research; in Section 1.2, we will describe some major characteristics of the Mexican coffee 
sector; Section 1.3 will provide an overview of the problem statements of the thesis; in Section 
1.4, we will describe the research objectives and questions under investigation in this research; 
Section 1.5 will comprise information concerning the data collection and methods used in this 
investigation; and in Section 1.6, we will provide an outline of the thesis. 
1.2. The Mexican coffee sector 
 
Coffee was first introduced into Mexico in the late nineteenth century, and by 1970 this crop had 
been cultivated on 356,253 hectares. After that time, the growth increased enormously, partly as a 
result of the institutional environment established. In 1992, the total land occupied by this crop 
was 761,899 hectares. This represents an increase of over 114% in almost twenty years. During 
this period, a relatively high and stable coffee price was registered. A total of 97,716 coffee 
producers were registered in 1970. This means that coffee producers had an average of 3.55 
hectares in that year. In 1992, there were 282,593 coffee farmers with an average of 2.69 
hectares per farmer. This represented a reduction of 24.2% on the size of coffee growers from 
1970 to 1992. In Mexico, coffee orchards were located in 52 coffee-producing regions and almost 
80% of total production was exported to the United States at the beginning of the nineteen 
eighties. 
 
According to data from the last National Coffee Census (SIAP, 2008), a total of 493,497 coffee 
growers was registered in 2008, owning 764,132 hectares. This represented an average of 1.37 
hectares with coffee orchard per coffee grower. Yet, a decline of 49.2% in the average coffee farm 
size per farmer was registered from 1992 to 2008. Thus, 62.2% of the farmers had land equal to 
or less than one hectare cultivated with coffee, according to the Census updated in 2008. According 
to this Coffee Census, around 27% of the coffee growers speak an indigenous language; this can 
be compared with the national share of indigenous peoples of around 12% (Nolasco, 1985; SIAP, 
2008). The poor public services available and the indigenism present in the Mexican coffee-
producing regions give the coffee production special characteristics in terms of technology and 
culture. 
 
Coffee helps to preserve the ecological conditions. The coffee orchard has been considered as one 
of the major environmental conditions maintained for more than two hundred years. Around 98% 
of the coffee orchards in Mexico are farmed under shade trees. This provides a very important 
wood mass that favours aspects such as the protection of native fauna, with an important influence 
on the water cycle (Marban-Mendoza, 2009). Thus, the coffee production has been considered as 
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Figure 1.1. Marketing channel in the Mexican coffee sector (my own elaboration 
using proxy data for the 2008-09 harvesting season). 
one of the most important crops to preserve the landscape ecology and sociology of 52 coffee-
producing regions in this country. 
 
As a rule, at the upstream of the coffee chain there is a large number of small-scale coffee farmers, 
followed by several small-scale processors who usually live in remote areas in developing 
countries, as is the case in Mexico (see Figure 1.1). Nowadays, they face a complicated 
international trading system of which they have only very limited knowledge. Moreover, as a result 
of the free coffee market, the variability of the international coffee prices has increased. Nowadays, 
coffee prices go up and down in cycles, making it very difficult for farmers to make a decision 
about the future of their business in coffee (Milford, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The production area is located mainly in the southern region of the Mexican territory (see Appendix 
1). National bureaus list 12 coffee-producing states, but in other states very little land is actually 
cultivated with coffee (SIAP, 2008). In the 2008-09 harvesting season, the total coffee production 
in Mexico was 5,774,159 quintals.2 The amount of land planted with coffee per farmer decreased 
by almost 50% in all producing states from 1989 to 2008. In some states such as Veracruz, 
Puebla, and Colima the reduction was lower than 50%, while in other states such as Oaxaca, 
Hidalgo, and Guerrero the reduction was greater than 50%. This reduction happened in part 
because some farmers divided their land farmed with coffee among several members of their 
household. 
                                            
2 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
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Coffee has been one of Mexico’s major agricultural exports in the last three decades; it was the 
third major source of foreign revenue, only surpassed by petroleum and automobiles, and 
represented 3% of total exports, and 25% of the total agricultural exports in the nineteen nineties 
(Villaseñor, 2004). Coffee brought 413 million dollars of foreign exchange annually in the nineties 
and 230 million dollars of foreign exchange annually from 2000 to 2009 (Banco de México, 2010). 
It was estimated that coffee was the fifth in terms of shared value of total agricultural exports in 
2008. 
 
The coffee sector is still important in Mexico, even though coffee exports account for less than 4% 
of the agricultural export revenues in 2008. It provides employment and income to almost half a 
million households, while around one million workers are hired each year to harvest coffee. Mexico 
is the world’s leading producer of certified organic coffee, and together with Peru, it is one of the 
leaders of fair trade coffee production (Calo and Wise, 2005). Thus, coffee is very important in this 
country because of its economic, social and ecological aspects. 
1.3. Problem statement 
 
Coffee is grown in twelve states of Mexico, but the organization of the coffee sector in each of them 
differs in terms of institutional setting, government support and farm household responses to policy 
changes (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006). The regional organizations evolved from a major change 
in the national organization that occurred after the demise of the International Coffee Agreement in 
1989, which led to the abolishment of the INMECAFE in 1993. Since then, new organizations have 
emerged and federal and state support for the sector has been made available in various forms, at 
varying times and in differing amounts.3 
 
As a result of a relatively high coffee price during the regulated era of the coffee market, many 
Mexican coffee growers devoted almost all their land to coffee orchards. This process was 
considered necessary at that stage because the Mexican government was more interested in 
getting as much revenue as possible by exporting any raw material. This process, complemented 
with the prevailing agro-climatic and ecological conditions, led to a specialization and consequently 
to the economic dependence of many households on this crop. 
 
The freedom of the international coffee market was established at the same time that the Mexican 
economy turned to the free market. Like many other developing countries, Mexico made a change 
from a largely controlled economy before the nineteen eighties, to a largely free market at present. 
As a result, over the past decades, many new economic agents entered the coffee sector as input 
producers and output processors, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations; 
some of which have become the most important players in the national coffee supply chain (Wehbe 
et al., 2005). 
 
                                            
3 Organization refers to the established structures that deal with the coffee sector as an entire supply chain. Normally, 
organization is taken as being synonymous to the IRO. 
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Other additional changes carried out as a result of the breakdown of the ICA were the complete 
withdrawal of the state from processing and marketing coffee, the abolishment of minimum prices, 
and the removal of the export tax. As expected, a closer synchronization between domestic and 
international coffee prices was suddenly presented. This means that after the liberalization, there 
has been a closer relationship between the rural coffee prices and the Mexican export price. The 
difference between those prices was around 30 dollars per quintal during the nineteen eighties and 
around 10 dollars per quintal during the last two decades. The average grower price in Mexico was 
34, 11, and 26% lower than the composite price of the ICO in February 1989, 1999 and 2007, 
respectively. This recent figure shows that Mexican farmers receive much lower shares (by nine per 
cent points) of the world market than their colleagues in Guatemala or Costa Rica receive. 
 
The government plays a much smaller role now in the coffee sector than it had in the past. The 
highest government participation was through the INMECAFE, which was in operation until 1993, 
which took control of the coffee sector in research and the financing, processing and marketing of 
coffee. As part of the move toward a free market policy, this institute and other government 
organizations supporting the agricultural sector (including coffee) stopped at the same time.4 
Continuous changes in institutions took place, such as the establishment of the CMC in 1993 and 
its substitution by the CPS in 2004; the latter is a representative council of all the stakeholders 
participating in the coffee supply chain (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006). Thus, under the liberalized 
scenario, the public sector is redefining its role in the coffee sector. It has shifted from a very 
active role to that of a service provider and regulatory body. A clear picture is that the state is now 
a kind of mediator between the private processor and exporter companies, and the social sector of 
coffee growers and small-scale processors. 
 
In the regulated coffee sector, farmers delivered their raw coffee either to cooperatives or directly 
to government factories. Once coffee was milled and cleaned, it was delivered to the Mexican 
Coffee Marketing Board. Only then were private parties allowed to purchase the coffee through 
auction. By contrast, under the free regime, the government’s participation was mostly replaced by 
large-scale companies (Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002).5 They bought raw coffee from wholesalers 
and small-scale companies rather than directly from smallholder farmers. 
 
Currently, the Mexican government has been implementing several subsidy programmes to 
encourage crop diversification, to support the lowering of production costs, to compensate for the 
low coffee prices, to increase the processing capacity, to expand the domestic market and to 
control coffee diseases. Thus, during the last eight years, it spent almost 110 million dollars 
annually on supporting the coffee sector (SAGARPA, 2009). In addition to the national support, 
some states are supporting coffee programmes with a specific focus, such as the coffee 
                                            
4 Livestock and Agriculture National Insurance (ANAGSA), which participated by offering insurance against natural disasters, 
and the National Rural Credit Bank (BANRURAL), which participated by offering cheap credit to productive project proposals. 
5 The major companies (e.g. Kraft Jacobs-Suchard, Nestlé, Douwe Egberts Group, and Folgers Coffee) in Mexico have had an 
oligopolistic control of the coffee market in almost all coffee-producing areas since the start of the nineteen nineties (Renard, 
1999). 
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denomination of origin (Chiapas, Veracruz, and Oaxaca), income diversification (Veracruz and 
Puebla), input facilitation and consumption promotion (Veracruz). 
 
The last decades have seen a reduction in the number of farmers’ organizations, and in the number 
of traders and processors. At the start of the nineteen nineties, there were 2,671 local cooperatives 
that brought together two-thirds of all coffee growers. In addition, there were thirteen grassroots 
farmer organizations, uniting 67.5% of all coffee growers. Nowadays, there are five large 
grassroots farmer organizations, in which almost 30% of all coffee farmers took part. In addition, 
there were 1,962 agro industries to process cherry coffee and 426 to process parchment coffee in 
2001. According to the latest report of CPS, there are 867 intermediaries; only 304 of them are 
exporters and only 73 of them are also coffee producers. The majority of those intermediaries is 
located in Chiapas (300), Oaxaca (84), Puebla (113), and Veracruz (205) (AMECAFE, 2009). Thus, 
there has been a reduction in the number of intermediaries and an increase in the number of 
agents in the upstream part of the supply chain, whilst the degree of organization of the producers 
has declined. 
 
There are a number of earlier studies on the Mexican coffee sector that are related to our topic of 
interest. Avalos-Sartorio (2006b) has concluded that the liberalization reform applied in Mexico has not 
been giving the expected result in terms of efficiency. Eakin et al. (2006) found that the Mexican IRO 
is not working well to facilitate the adaptation that the coffee sector needs under the free market. Calo 
and Wise (2005) have suggested that any solution to the coffee crisis, beside the coffee subsidies to 
growers, should include a diversification of households´ livelihood. Avalos-Sartorio (2006a) has found 
that not all coffee producers are able to participate in market niches, in particular in the fair trade, 
because they do not meet the requirement established in the rules. Perez and Echanove (2006) have 
concluded that coffee growers have lost part of their income as a result of the implementation of the 
free market. Renard (1999) has found that entering into market niches, such as the fair trade, help 
producers to escape from the competition. The same author (2010) has concluded that the survival of 
the coffee cooperatives depends of their entry into the market niches. Ponette-González (2007) has 
determined that coffee is not profitable for small coffee producers. Finally, Lewis (2005) has concluded 
that the migration of coffee households´ members helps in investing in coffee production. 
 
Additionally, several researchers have studied the producers’ and traders’ response to institutional 
changes. Milagrosa (2007) analysed the industry of vegetables in the Philippines and found that 
including the social capital and culture in the institutional analysis produces better results in explaining 
market participants´ behaviour. Orr and Mwale (2001) have analysed the households’ strategies that 
link them with market liberalization in Malawi; they concluded that analysing this phenomenon 
required a variety of methods. Baffes (2003) has analysed the Tanzanian coffee sector under the 
globalized economy; he concluded that the liberalization allows producers to have a bigger share of 
the export price. Mwihia (2002) studied the liberalization process and the effect on smallholders; 
considering the case of coffee in Kenya, he found that the reform has caused an increase in the price 
volatility and that the reform has led to higher transaction costs for smallholders when they buy input 
and contract agricultural services. All these studies have produced valuable elements for a better 
understanding of the dynamics of the Mexican coffee supply chain and the growers’ response to a 
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changing institutional environment. However, not one of these authors focused on the organization 
and structure of one particular sector and the actions undertaken by the major actors included in the 
supply chain. 
 
Consequently, this study aims at evaluating the effect of institutional changes on the structure of 
the coffee sector, coffee growers´ organizations, and the coffee households´ production and 
marketing decisions. Our study aims at assessing the contractual arrangements and traders´ 
performance under the currently liberalized coffee sector; the factors determining the coffee 
growers´ willingness to cooperate and its effect on the households´ welfare; the coffee producers’ 
response to market uncertainty with regard to cooperation and the effect of cooperation on the 
market instability; and the coffee growers´ response to the low coffee price through diversification. 
1.4. Research objectives and questions 
 
The main objective of this research was to analyse the institutional environment of the coffee sector in 
Mexico and the effects of its changes on coffee traders’ and households’ behaviour. To achieve 
these main goals, the following specific objectives were addressed: 
 
1. To identify the factors explaining the contractual choices of traders engaged in the Mexican 
coffee chain, and to assess the performance of coffee traders in four coffee-producing 
regions. 
 
2. To identify the variables that contribute to joining an organization, and to examine the 
significance, relative importance and direction of some of the most important variables 
influencing the per capita coffee income. 
 
3. To evaluate farmer cooperation as a response to market uncertainty and the effect of such 
cooperation on coffee market instability. 
 
4. To analyse the coffee households’ response to the low coffee price through diversification 
and its effect on their annual coffee income. 
 
With the aim to assess the changes in the institutional environment resulting from the modification in 
the Mexican economy and the deregulation of the coffee market, in this thesis we studied the following 
main research questions: 
 
1. What are the socio-economic characteristics of coffee traders in the states of Oaxaca and 
Veracruz, Mexico? What are the main factors that affect traders’ decisions to have or not to 
have a contract with their buyers? And what are the factors that influence the performance 
of coffee traders in Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico? 
 
2. What are the characteristics of farmers who are members of the coffee cooperatives? What 
are the main factors that determine growers’ participation in coffee organizations? Do 
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Figure 1.2. Simplified coffee supply chain, chapters and research questions of the thesis. 
coffee cooperatives that are active in the Mexican coffee sector assist farmers to find a 
better market outlet and receive better coffee prices? What are the factors that influence 
the level of the per capita coffee income, and to which extend do those factors differ 
between members and non-members of cooperatives? 
 
3. What is the effect of coffee price variability on the coffee households´ willingness to 
cooperate? To what extend does the level of organization help in reducing the coffee 
market instability? Which factors determine the individual coffee prices? What role do 
market variables play to influence the level of the individual yearly coffee income? 
 
4. Do coffee growers respond to a low coffee price by increasing a particular kind of 
diversification? To what extend does a more diversified livelihood imply a higher individual 
coffee income? What are the main capitals that induce more vertical integration of coffee 
growers? What role does the institutional environment play in adopting the coffee-extra 
activities? 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the location in the supply chain of the chapters and research questions of this 
thesis. In Chapter 2, we present a general overview of the Mexican coffee sector. This information 
is useful in understanding the liberalization process experienced by the Mexican economy and the 
changes in the institutional setting and organization of the coffee supply chain. This chapter will 
take into account the whole supply chain at the national level. Here, we will include information 
about the coffee growers, how they were organized in the past and how they are organized under 
the current conditions. We will follow the way in which main agents intervene in the supply chain 
from the producers’ side to the exporters´ side; we have also included some information related to 
the international coffee market in this chapter. 
 
 
Chapter 3 will focus on the intermediaries’ side. This chapter will include information on traders, 
from the local collectors to the national intermediaries and exporters. We did not include 
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information on producers and consumers. In this chapter, we will try to answer question 1. Figure 
1.2 also shows the location of Chapter 4, in which we will try to answer question 2. To this end, we 
will mainly focus on the growers´ side, also including some information related to the other part of 
the supply chain at the domestic level. Chapters 5 and 6 will be placed mainly on the coffee 
households´ side, but here we will also thoroughly discuss variables that were obtained on the 
coffee market (at both the national and international level). Chapter 5 will answer question 3, while 
Chapter 6 will answer question 4 by constructing a database with variables at the households’, 
regional, national and international level. 
1.5. Data collection and methods 
 
Several sources of primary and secondary data were used in this thesis. We carried out field work 
in two periods. The first of these fieldwork periods took place from May to July 2008 to get 
information relating to the functioning and nature of the coffee supply chain. During this period, we 
interviewed people involved in the coffee supply chain such as policymakers, representatives of 
grassroots farmer organizations, coffee experts, researchers, and government institution 
representatives. 
 
Another period of fieldwork took place from November 2009 to February 2010, when we conducted 
interviews with coffee traders in four producing regions in Mexico. During this period, a coffee 
intermediaries’ survey was conducted as well in four coffee-producing regions, which differ by state 
and within states according to their market accessibility and altitude. First, we interviewed 
intermediaries located in the selected producing regions and then some intermediaries working 
steps downstream in the supply chain. During this fieldwork, we held meetings with local 
authorities and people involved in the National Coffee System Committees (NCSC).6 
 
We collected secondary data from research institutes and other organizations participating in the 
agricultural and coffee sectors, such as the CPS and the Mexican Coffee Association (AMECAFE, by 
its initials in Spanish), academics and statistical offices, among others. This information was used 
to provide a background on the Mexican coffee sector and to identify the major structural 
characteristics in this industry. 
 
We approached a number of national service institutions at the national level to obtain statistical 
databases relating to the coffee sector at the state and national levels (SIAP, INEGI, INCA-RURAL 
and ASERCA).7 This effort resulted in the Mexican National Coffee Census of 2002–2008 database, 
which contains technical, economic, and social data on 493,497 coffee growers (see Figure 1.3). 
Additional information was obtained from representatives of most stakeholders in Mexico City 
where the most important decisions regarding the coffee sector are made. 
                                            
6 The NCSC is the coffee IRO, constituted to serve as a platform for permanent planning, communication and consultation 
between all different actors in the coffee chain. 
7 The Service of Agricultural and Livestock Information (SIAP), the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics 
(INEGI), the National Institute of Rural Training (INCA-RURAL), Support and Services for the Marketing of Agricultural Livestock 
(ASERCA). 
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Figure 1.3. Chapters and their source of information. 
 
The ICO, which has its offices in England, as well as several Mexican institutional libraries, supplied 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning the organization of the Mexican coffee sector; this 
information relates to the market setting before and after the liberalization of the Mexican 
economy.8 Governmental and non-governmental institutions in Mexico also provided data with 
reference to the history of the institutional environment, coffee policies, and coffee farmers' 
household characteristics under both the quota system and the free coffee market. 
 
As benchmark information we used two coffee grower surveys: the 2004 survey which included 
1,396 coffee producers and the 2005 survey which included 2,294 coffee producers from the eight 
and five major coffee-producing states, respectively (see Figure 1.3). Those surveys were carried 
out by Mexican academic institutions evaluating coffee programmes applied by the federal 
government. In both surveys, similar questionnaires were administered to interview coffee 
growers. The information included in those databases relates to the organization of the coffee 
sector, coffee growers’ response to the low coffee price scenario, government policies, and 
individual, household and regional characteristics. 
 
The databases constructed with the two surveys were complemented with information included in 
the National Coffee Census. Individual, family and households characteristics of each of the coffee 
growers included in the surveys were retrieved from the Census. We also complemented the 2004 
and 2005 survey databases with information of market characteristics prevailing in each of the 
municipalities. Data from the SIAP, ICO and INEGI were included as well in those databases. By 
doing so, we were not only able to have a more complete database. We could also build a panel 
database by including the coffee prices over eight years at the municipal level and individual and 
household characteristics in 2001 (Census time) with information obtained in 2004, 2005, and 
other dates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8 The ICO was created in 1962 under the auspices of the United Nations to administer the International Coffee Agreements 
(Santoyo et al. 1994). 
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In summary, data were collected in three ways: 1) by direct information: interviews with many 
participants in the coffee supply chain, including key informants of governmental and non-
governmental institutions, grassroots farmer organizations and research centres, and a survey of 
coffee intermediaries; 2) from secondary sources: two surveys among the coffee farmers; 3) from 
statistics: archival records, databases and related studies at the state, national and international 
level. The main and complementary sources for each of the chapters are included in Figure 1.3. In 
this figure, we can also see the relationships between the chapters included in this thesis. Chapter 
2 is related with the other core chapters (3 to 6), in that the former provides a general overview of 
the whole coffee sector now and in the past. Chapter 4 is related with Chapter 5 because both of 
them are taking cooperation and its effect on the coffee growers’ welfare as a very important 
component; those chapters were done using the 2004 survey as a benchmark. Chapters 5 and 7 
are related because the latter includes some variables that where calculated in the former´s 
database. In general, Chapters 4 to 6 share a number of variables, most of them expressing the 
institutional setting at the national and international level. 
 
To answer the research questions listed above, we applied several econometric techniques and 
statistical procedures. In Chapter 3, we used a logit regression in the analysis to figure out the 
specific variables that explain the intermediary’s decision to set up contractual arrangements. In 
the same chapter, we used the gross marketing margins (the difference between selling and buying 
prices) as an indicator of traders’ performance; an ordinary least squared regression was done to 
regress price margins on a set of variables depicting trader’s socio-economic, marketing and 
institutional characteristics, so as to evaluate that performance. 
 
In Chapter 4, we used a large-scale coffee field survey, conducted in 2004, complemented with 
information from the Coffee Census database. We relied on three different procedures. First, a 
Probit model analysis was performed that identified the individual, family, farm and regional factors 
influencing the likelihood of cooperative participation. Secondly, a statistical analysis of means 
differences was performed regarding the price levels obtained for coffee marketing between 
different types of coffee delivered by farmers. This was followed by a multinomial logistic 
regression, to identify the variables that play a role in defining the type of coffee delivered by 
producers. Thirdly, we performed three ordinary least square regressions – using pooled and non-
pooled samples of organized and non-organized coffee growers, to identify the factors influencing 
the per capita coffee income and the possible differences between cooperative and individual coffee 
farmers. 
 
In Chapter 5, we used the data included in the 2004 survey. This information was complemented 
with information included in the National Coffee Census database. In addition, to measure price 
uncertainty and calculate the mean and the variance price in the 2001-2004 period, we used 
municipal data on prices for eight years, constructing a panel with data coming from the SIAP 
database (SIAP, 2010). Using these panel data, we tested for the effect of farmers’ organization on 
the price variability by applying an ordinary least square regression. This procedure contemplated 
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Figure 1.4. Outline of the thesis. 
data for the 432 municipalities listed in the Census, which included the 66 municipalities considered 
in the 2004 survey and whose prices were available in most of the eight-year period. 
 
In Chapter 6, we relied on data from the 2005 survey. We took additional village-level data from 
the National Coffee Census database retrieved from 2001 to 2008 and other databases reported by 
SIAP (2010), CMC (2005), and INEGI (2011) as another source of information. The wealth of data 
permitted the inclusion of lag variables as dynamic factors, such as past diversification, in the 
analysis of households´ decisions regarding particular types of diversification. Thus, the database 
built related to household size, assets, agricultural production, family labour, migration, market 
participation, education, organization, and programmes financed by the federal government were 
included as well. To find out which variables are involved in the decision of coffee-producing 
households to engage in coffee-extra, agricultural and non-agricultural activities, we applied the 
multivariate probit model; to relate diversification and other factors to the level of the annual 
coffee income, we executed OLS regressions. 
1.6. Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters (see Figure 1.4). Chapter 1, which is the present one, 
includes the general introduction outlining the background of the topic, the coffee context in which 
this research took place, the problem statement of the whole thesis, the research questions of this 
research and objectives followed during the investigation, the data used and methodological 
approaches applied in each chapter. It finishes with the current outline section. 
 
After this introductory chapter, in Chapter 2 we will describe the relevance of coffee in Mexico, 
headlining the value coffee generates in the whole economy. We will introduce the topic of the 
liberalization of the Mexican economy and the relationship with the agricultural sector (including 
coffee). We will also include a 
section with the institutional 
organization of the Mexican 
coffee sector and its changes, 
starting from the point of the 
liberalization of the coffee 
market and the liberalization 
of the Mexican economy. In 
one of the sections, we will 
briefly describe the structure 
prevailing in this industry. 
 
Chapter 3 will shed light on the contractual choices and performance of the coffee traders in the 
Mexican coffee sector. The traders’ decision to have a contractual arrangement with their buyer will 
be analysed by applying the New Institutional Economic theory. The performance of the 
intermediaries will be is analysed by using the gross margin of the coffee price. This chapter will 
provide information about the factors determining the traders’ decision-making process about 
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whether to have a formal arrangement, and about the main variables that play a role in the 
performance of the intermediaries in four coffee-producing regions of the states of Veracruz and 
Oaxaca. 
 
Chapter 4 will focus on the factors driving the coffee growers’ decision making on their participation 
in a cooperative; the rationality behind the willingness to cooperate will be analysed in this chapter. 
The effect of the cooperative participation on the coffee farmers’ endowment was revised. We 
performed a differentiation on the main individual, family and geographic characteristics between 
organized and non-organized farmers by using a probit model. As part of the analysis in this 
chapter, we will evaluate the effect of the cooperation on the coffee households´ welfare by 
applying OLS regressions. 
 
Chapter 5 will examine the coffee farmers’ response to uncertainty in the coffee market with 
respect to their willingness to cooperate. The effect of the local price in the long run was tested as 
a possible main force to cooperate. The variance and the mean coffee prices at the municipal level 
were considered as a potential explanation for cooperative formation. We then tested the 
relationship between the level of organization and the stabilization of the coffee market by using 
the panel data. To end with the analysis in this chapter, we did an evaluation of the individual, 
households’, regional and market factors influencing the individual yearly coffee income. 
 
In Chapter 6, we will investigate the effect of the low coffee price scenario on the coffee 
growers/households´ decision making about diversification. In this chapter, we will evaluate the 
farmers´ willingness to diversify into coffee-extra, agricultural and non-agricultural activities as a 
response to a low coffee price or to structural differences at the village level. Four dependent 
variables were included in a multivariate probit to determine the main factors (natural, human, 
physical and social capital, plus regional and lagged variables of diversification) influencing the 
households´ decision to diversify into a particular group of activities. The same group of variables, 
plus the predicted probability obtained from the prior step, were tested for their influence on the 
annual coffee income. 
 
In Chapter 7, we will present a discussion and the conclusions. This chapter will contain a general 
conclusion of the research to summarize the main findings we presented in the previous chapters. 
In this part of the thesis, we will also present a number of policy recommendations that may be 
helpful in trying to improve the Mexican coffee sector through a better understanding of the 
institutional environment. Following this, we will underline some limitations we faced in doing this 
research. The chapter finishes with some thoughts about a research agenda for the future. 
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Chapter 2. Characterization of the Mexican coffee sector 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The structures that have been in place in the Mexican coffee sector in the last two decades account 
for the participation of government representatives, firms, farmers, and other agents directly 
involved in this industry. Among them, most influential in the decision making have been the 
government and firms. Now, the question is whether the institutional arrangements that have been 
in place since the end of the nineteen eighties have been able to fill the gaps caused by the 
decreasing government participation in the coffee supply chain. 
 
The structural changes in the organization of the Mexican coffee sector took place within a broader 
national context of reform due to the liberalization of the economy. The process of liberalization 
started with the accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the middle of 
the nineteen eighties.9 As part of this procedure, the agricultural sector was unprotected 
subsequent to the closure of several governmental instances. Another influential step in liberalizing 
the Mexican economy was when the Mexican state signed the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 (Thorvald, 2004).10 
 
In addition, , there was a flight of capital out of Mexico and the country experienced a very steep 
devaluation of the Mexican peso devaluation during the first three months of 1994, as a result of 
the reduced trust in the government economy. This ended with a tremendous financial crisis in the 
economy. Because of this crisis, the interest rates rose to 90% in that year. Those things together 
led to the closure of many small- and middle-sized enterprises; the Mexican government also had 
to expend a lot of money to rescue the banks from the bankruptcy. After some years of instability 
in the economy during the nineteen nineties, Mexico has experienced a stable inflation and 
exchange rates in the last sixteen years (Avalos-Sartorio, 2006a; OECD, 2011). 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.1, we will present an introduction to the Mexican 
coffee sector; Section 2.2 describes the relevance of the Mexican coffee sector; Section 2.3 
presents a description of the liberalization process of the Mexican economy; Section 2.4 presents a 
picture of the structure and organization of the coffee sector; Section 2.5 describes the institutional 
arrangement that was in operation under the quota system; in Section 2.6, we will describe the 
structure of the Mexican coffee sector from 1993 to 2004; Section 2.7 focuses on the actual 
organization of the Mexican coffee industry; and section 2.8 contains some concluding remarks. 
                                            
9 The objective of the multilateral system for trade in goods created by GATT provided industries and business enterprises from 
different countries with a secure, stable and predictable environment in which they could trade with one another under fair and 
equitable competitive conditions (GATT, 1994). 
10 The NAFTA was signed within Mexico, Canada and the United State of America in 1992; it was done with the hope to build 
one of the biggest markets in the world. The NAFTA has brought several changes in the kind of crops and type of partners’ 
participation in the Mexican agricultural sector. Some of the most important changes were related to production inputs, 
technological innovations, pest control, farmer organizations and the administration of farms. Also, this agreement was 
intended to break down any barrier within the three countries within fifteen years (Thorvald, 2004). 
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Figure 2.1. Share of major crops in the Mexican 
agricultural export value in 2008 (my own 
elaboration with data from INEG (2010)). 
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2.2. Relevance of coffee in Mexico 
 
Coffee is the main export product for many developing nations, and at the international level, 
coffee represents the second most tradable commodity after petroleum. The production of coffee 
worldwide was 116.7 million quintals in 1989-90 and 167.98 million quintals in the 2008-09 
harvesting season.11 This represents a 44% increase in 20 years (ICO, 2009); twice more than the 
demand for the same period (IDEA, 2006). It is estimated that over 125 million people worldwide 
depend on coffee for their livelihood; coffee produces an income for millions of small growers and 
their families. The economies of some countries are highly dependent on coffee as a source of 
national income and export earnings (Fuzhi, 2007). 
 
Coffee has been farmed in Mexico for more than two centuries. This crop was originally introduced 
to Mexico in the late eighteenth century and was initially grown in large plantations. However, at 
the start of the nineteenth century, it gradually became a crop of smaller farms. Currently coffee is 
farmed in 12 of the 32 states of Mexico, five of which are major coffee producers (Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, Veracruz, Puebla and Guerrero). According to the Coffee Census database, updated in 
2008, coffee is produced in a total of 541 municipalities. Considering the geographic and 
environmental characteristics of the locations where this crop is being farmed in Mexico, the total 
land cultivated can be grouped into two coffee-producing areas: the Pacific Ocean region and the 
Gulf of Mexico region (see the map in Appendix 1). The former accounts for 75% and the latter for 
25% of the total coffee production in this country (Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
This commodity has been Mexico's most important source of agricultural export revenue for many 
decades. It is fifth in terms of geographic area cultivated (after corn, beans, wheat and sorghum). 
Coffee was one of Mexico’s major agricultural exports in the middle of the nineteen eighties; it 
accounted for 35% of the total agricultural output at that time (Wehbe et al., 2005). This crop was 
also the third major source of foreign revenue, surpassed only by petroleum and automobiles, and 
represented 3% of the total exports and 25% of the total agricultural exports in the nineteen 
nineties (Villaseñor, 2004), It brought 
in $413 million of foreign exchange 
annually in the nineteen nineties and 
$230 million  annually during the past 
decade (Banco de México, 2010). It is 
estimated that coffee was fifth in 
terms of the shared value of the total 
agricultural exports after tomatoes, 
fresh vegetables, avocados and 
peppers in 2008 (see Figure 2.1). 
 
The government intervention in the coffee sector was formally institutionalized in the nineteen 
forties. Yet, the strongest government participation started with the establishment of the Mexican 
                                            
11 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
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Table 2.1. Value of exported coffee within Mexico's total 
and agricultural exports. 
 
  Source: My own elaboration with data from Banco de México (2010). 
Year Total Agriculture Coffee % coffee in % coffee in the
export export export total export agricultural export
2001 158,779 4,446 243.91 0.15 5.49
2002 161,046 4,214 186.44 0.12 4.42
2003 164,766 5,035 182.70 0.11 3.63
2004 187,998 5,683 205.75 0.11 3.62
2005 214,233 6,008 235.98 0.11 3.93
2006 249,925 6,853 264.60 0.11 3.86
2007 271,875 7,435 305.60 0.11 4.11
2008 291,342 7,916 288.20 0.10 3.64
Nota: Value in million dollars.
Table 2.2. Coffee production by major producing countries 
(in thousands of quintals). 
 
Source: My own elaboration with information from ICO (2009). 
Country
Quantity   % Quantity   % Quantity   % 
Brazil 29,919 26 47,949 34 59,990 36
Vietnam 1,357 1 9,091 6 20,870 12
Colombia 13,752 12 14,393 10 13,696 8
Indonesia 8,830 8 9,633 7 11,267 7
Ethiopia 3,522 3 3,580 3 8,000 5
Mexico 7,827 7 6,262 4 6,065 4
Total 116,684 100 141,056 100 167,987 100
1988-89 1998-99 2008-09
Table 2.3. Shifts of some indicators of the Mexican coffee 
sector from 1989 to 2008. 
 
Source: My own elaboration with data from INMECAFE (1990) and SIAP 
(2010). 
Indicator 1989 2008 % shift
Number of farmers 276,655 493,497 78.38
Land with coffee (ha) 743,482 674,132 -9.33
Total production (Qq) 7,509,110 5,774,159 -23.10
Average hectares per farmer 2.69 1.37 -49.17
Average yield (Qq/ha) 10.10 8.57 -15.19
Coffee Institute (INMECAFE) in 1958. Through this institute’s efforts with regard to distributing 
coffee technology and credit provision and extension, coffee became an economically viable activity 
for smaller landowning farmers in Mexico in the nineteen eighties (Eakin et al., 2006). 
 
The economic relevance of the agricultural sector and coffee production in Mexico has decreased in 
the last decades. Its agricultural sector's contribution to the GDP was 4.97% in 1989, after which it 
fell to 3.67% in 1997 and to 3.40% in 2007 (INEGI, 2010). Similarly, the share of coffee value in 
the Mexican GDP was 0.25% in 1989, after which it fell to 0.20% in 1997 and to 0.08% in 2006 
(Banco de México, 2010). In particular, it was reported that the percentage of coffee's contribution 
to agricultural exports was 3.64% 
in 2008 (see Table 2.1) (Banco de 
México, 2010, Pieterse and Silvis, 
1988). Although coffee’s relative 
economic importance has declined, 
it still remains the country’s largest 
single export crop and a significant 
source of foreign income (Calo and 
Wise, 2005; Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
Even when Mexico's position as one of the major producer countries has decreased in recent years, 
it continues to be an important supplier in the world market. Mexico was the fourth-highest 
producing country in the 1988-89 harvesting season; however, in the 1998-99 harvesting season, 
it fell to the position of sixth-
highest coffee producer. According 
to information included in Table 
2.2, these changes have occurred 
not only because Mexico has 
reduced its total production, but 
also because other countries such 
as Vietnam, Ethiopia and Indonesia 
have increased their production. 
 
Some of the main indicators of 
coffee production have changed in 
the last twenty years. The land 
planted with coffee orchard was 
reduced by 9.3% from 1989 to 
2008. The production was reduced 
as well with 23% between during 
those years (see Table 2.3). These changes are presented as a result of the reduced maintenance 
of the coffee plantations and the low incentive to invest in coffee orchards. In fact, 93.7% of the 
coffee farmers owned less than five hectares of coffee orchard in 1989, while 1.9% of the coffee 
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Figure 2.2. Production of coffee in Mexico and the 
international price (my own elaboration with 
data from ICO (2009)). 
farmers owned 10 or more hectares of coffee orchard in the same year. This means there were 
many small-scale and few large-scale coffee growers. 
 
Coffee growers farm their orchards in two basic ways: under the shade of trees and out in the 
open. Of the total of 776,870 coffee plots in Mexico, 99.8% are under the shade of trees and 0.2% 
are in the open (SIAP, 2008). Shaded crops such as coffee are important because they generate 
wood masses, which protect the native fauna; this type of plantations also has a beneficial 
influence on the water cycle, in conserving environmental conditions, and on the landscape 
(Marban-Mendoza, 2009). Beside the economic importance, environmental conservation is one of 
the most important benefits of coffee production in Mexico. 
 
According to the Coffee Census database updated in July 2008, there were around 500,000 
Mexican coffee growers, which means that the same number of families depends to a certain 
degree on coffee cultivation for their sustenance. Together, growers and their relatives (1,053,713 
people) who were reported as working in coffee production activities, came to a total of 1,547,210 
people directly involved in this crop. Considering the additional people employed in harvesting, 
processing, and marketing coffee, in Mexico at least three million people depend on coffee for their 
living. In the largest major coffee-producing states, coffee provides employment to about 50% of 
the working population of the rural areas (Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
Coffee also has importance in Mexico for its relation to the type of population that works within this 
sector. Many coffee growers' mother tongue is not Spanish; this means that many coffee growers 
are indigenous people. Indeed, according to the most recent Coffee Census, 39.7% of the total of 
Mexican coffee growers speaks an indigenous tongue as their primary language. 
 
Coffee is concentrated in some of Mexico’s poorest regions. The major coffee-producing areas are 
mountainous, have poor communication and limited public services. Around 84% of the 
communities in which coffee is a primary agricultural activity have high or very high poverty rates.  
Furthermore, 60% of the Mexican coffee growers lives in extreme poverty, and more than half 
belong to one of Mexico’s 52 ethnic groups (Avalos-Sartorio, 2006a; Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
The total coffee production has 
been diminishing in the last years. 
Figure 2.2 shows a total 
production in Mexico of 4.5 million 
quintals in 1980. The biggest 
amount produced under the quota 
system was reached in 1989, 
which was higher than 7.8 million 
quintals. Thereafter, production 
declined until it reached its lowest 
level of 4.4 million quintals in 
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Figure 2.4. Type of coffee exported by Mexico in 2008 
(my own elaboration with data from 
AMECAFE (2009)). 
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Figure 2.3. Destination of Mexican coffee exported in 
2008 (my own elaboration with data from 
ICO (2009)). 
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1992. After that, a recovery in the total production was registered, reaching 8.1 million quintals in 
1999 and 6 million quintals in 2008. In part, these changes have been positively associated with 
the development of the international price (Other Milds price). 
 
Coffee prices have been recovering since 2004. The Other Milds price was $80.47 per quintal in 
2004 and $139.78 per quintal in 2008 (see Figure 2.2). Similarly, the rural coffee price has shown 
a tendency to rise in recent years; it was $35.82 per quintal in 2004 and $89.41 per quintal in 
2008. Thus, the differences in those prices were $44.65 per quintal in 2004 and $50.37 per quintal 
in 2008. 
 
Mexican coffee’s final destination has changed during the last thirty years. During the nineteen 
eighties and nineties, most of the coffee was exported while a smaller quantity was reserved for 
the internal market. The domestic market share of coffee was of 38.8% of the total production in 
1980 and 47.3% of the total production in 2008. The lowest domestic market share was registered 
in 1999, at 18.5% of the total production, while the biggest share was registered in 2008, at 
47.3% of the total production. 
 
The export markets for Mexican coffee 
have also shifted in recent years. For 
several years, the United States of 
America has been the primary export 
destination. This country received 
approximately 80% of the Mexican coffee 
exports during the nineteen nineties, but 
67% of the exports in 2008. The next 
largest markets in that year were 
Belgium and Germany (see Figure 2.3). 
However, in recent years, increasing 
quantities were also sent to Japan, Canada, Cuba and France. Approximately 75% of the coffee 
exported from Mexico is green coffee, and 25% is soluble and extracted; roasted and ground coffee 
do not figure in the export statistics (see Figure 2.4). 
 
During the last decade, the world’s 
coffee economy has undergone deep 
structural changes resulting from an 
amendment in the international 
agreement to commercialize coffee. This 
process put an end to domestic control 
in several producing and exporting 
countries. Some of these changes are 
the shift in stock control from producer 
to consumer countries, the increasing concentration of processing and exporting activities in the 
hands of a few transnational companies, and the creation of new producing regions with a higher 
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potential and lower production costs (FAO, 2007). Moreover, according to a recent ICO estimation, 
the total supply of and demand for coffee in the world has been placed around 125 million quintals 
and the price is about $125 per quintal of green washed Arabic coffee (ICO, 2009). 
2.3. Liberalization of the Mexican economy 
 
At the beginning of the second half of the last century, the agro-alimentary sector in Mexico was 
subjected to strong protection, which ended in the nineteen eighties. Thus, agriculture, allied 
services, production, processing, and marketing inputs and outputs were subjected to government 
regulations. At that time, certain crops which were part of the basic Mexican diet were regulated 
and maintained by the state institutions, which provided a system of government subsidies on 
which they depended. This kind of policy also removed the actors’ incentive for long-term investing 
and to look for ways and means of improving their competitiveness and sustainability. At the end 
of the nineteen eighties, the Mexican government began to withdraw from the agricultural sector 
and moved toward liberalizing the economy.12 This was done by providing fewer services to the 
sector and by allowing the private sector to fill this gap. 
 
In the latter half of the nineteen eighties, the Mexican government began to liberalize the 
economy. The decision to change from a rigidly controlled economy to a more flexible one was 
made to comply with recommendations coming from international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Consequently, governmental 
organizations linked to the agricultural sector were closed down, although a number of them have 
been restructured during the last two decades. In summary, the Mexican shift from a more 
controlled to a free market economy was in line with the overall tendency in world policy; by doing 
so, the Mexican government reduced their role not only in the rural sector but also in the economy 
as a whole, making room for private actors (Burger, 2011). 
 
Two major processes were key in the liberalization of the Mexican economy. The first was 
becoming a signatory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the 
second was the arrangement of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. After 
becoming a member of the GATT, Mexico abolished its import pricing policies in 1987. These 
liberalization measures also had an influence on many other policies. Thus, privatization and a 
restoration of several governmental instances took place at the beginning of the nineteen nineties; 
industries such as steel, sugar, banking, and communication were included in this process. 
 
Another step in the market liberalization was the reform of land tenure legislation, which was 
carried out in 1992. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was modified in order to give property 
rights to the owners of “ejidal” and communal land. This modification brought an end to land 
distribution in Mexico and started the creation of a land market without restrictions on the type of 
ownership. One of the goals of this reform was to capitalize agricultural activities by giving 
                                            
12 The concept of liberalization comes from neo-classical economic theory, which states that a market works better if there is 
perfect competition. Furthermore, it assumes that perfect competition is possible only if an economy is operating without any 
outside intervention (Godfrey, 2002). 
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agricultural producers access to private credit. As a result, ejidal and communal tenants are now 
able to use land ownership as collateral in the official banking system (Díaz, 2005). 
 
Privatizing the most prominent institutions throughout the entire Mexican agricultural sector meant 
the end of market restrictions. As mentors of the liberalization had been advocating, this process in 
the coffee sector signified the end of reserve formation and the end of a minimum price for 
producers (FAO, 2007). The decision to liberalize and the manner in which the liberalization 
process was implemented were the typical outcome of a mixture of domestic political pressures, 
financial imperatives and donor conditions (Gilbert et al., 1999). 
 
As a result of the liberalization and privatization of the Mexican economy, several changes have 
presented themselves in the price definition and marketing of products. In their turn, these 
changes have modified both the number of times and the way in which partners in supply chains 
have been intervening. Those modifications have influenced the structural and institutional changes 
seceded in the Mexican coffee sector. 
 
Coffee production generally takes place in isolated areas in undeveloped countries, where the 
public services are poor and the standards of living and educational levels are low. Under those 
conditions, coffee farmers only have the option of selling their product to those intermediaries who 
operate locally. As mentioned before, the liberalization of the market has not always created a 
competitive environment; under these conditions, a number of processing and exporting companies 
are normally taking much advantage in comparison to growers and small-scale intermediaries and 
processors. This in part is a result of the fact that the high costs of processing and exporting 
creates barriers to entry and difficulties for small-scale processors to remain the owner of their 
business. In addition to the poor communication in the coffee-producing regions, small- and 
medium-scale coffee farmers do not have transport facilities to search for better prices in the 
coffee market further downstream of the chain. As some authors have argued (Milford, 2004; 
Renard, 1999) an oligopolistic environment has been established in the main producing areas of 
Mexico. 
2.4. Structure and organization of the coffee sector 
 
The coffee supply chain in particular requires the participation of many economic agents (see 
Figure 1.1). To better function, these agents need good social and political conditions, which allow 
them to have optimal market arrangements (Martínez, 1996). Some institutions operating in the 
Mexican coffee sector are coffee farmer organizations, intermediaries, governments (at the federal, 
regional and municipal level), the coffee market, the input market, the extension market, the land 
market, the training market, the technical assistance market, the labour market, the land rental 
market, universities, research centres, the Coffee Product System (at the federal and regional 
level), and the formal and informal credit markets. All of these instances and institutions can be 
grouped into private, public, governmental or rural institutions. As Fafchamps (2004) has said, one 
important characteristic of the market institutions is that any improvement demands adaptation in 
the legal environment, to help intermediaries develop better exchange processes. 
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Figure 2.5. Time line, structures and major characteristics of the Mexican 
coffee sector. 
 
Following reforms since the nineteen eighties in Mexico, the government’s role in agricultural 
markets (including coffee) has changed substantially. As Avalos-Sartorio (2006a) stated, 
policymakers expected during the nineteen eighties that the move to a market-based agricultural 
economy would bring efficiency by better linking domestic and international prices. For this reason, 
it was expected that the liberalization would benefit producers and consumers by increasing the 
producer prices and reducing the consumer prices. 
 
The organization of an industry describes the way in which actions undertaken inside the economic 
system are divided between partners. Some agents engage in many different activities, while 
others engage in few. Depending on their economic capacity and their interest, some agents are 
large and others are small; some agents are working in only one area of the supply chain, whereas 
others are working in many stages of the supply chain. What we expect to understand from 
studying this kind of organization is how the industry was organized in the past, how it is organized 
now, what the main differences and benefits are in each kind of organization, which forces caused 
the changes to happen behind each one, and how these forces have changed over time (Coase, 
1988). We will analyse each of the structures (see Figure 2.5) prevailing in recent years in the 
Mexican coffee sector, by looking at the influence of the institutional environment on the reduction 
of transaction costs, on the redressing of missing markets, on building social capital, on managing 
risk and enabling collective action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from associations of various types and non-profit organizations, which in some cases are 
firms, there are also a number of governmental instances that assume some economic role, and 
many of these roles are of great importance. As Coase (1988) has stated, these kinds of agents 
should be part of the institutions dealing with industrial organizations, so it is very important to 
describe the economic activities undertaken by any governmental instances and/or associations. 
Also, an explanation of the type and combination of activities developed by private and public 
agencies is very important when analysing the structure of the supply chain. 
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Many agents are involved in the coffee sector. Some of the most important participants in the 
coffee supply chain are ministries and national government organizations, federal and state 
councils, private associations, research and extension institutes and centres, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), government instances (at the federal, regional and municipal level), 
business organizations (processors and exporters), grassroots grower organizations and farmer 
cooperatives. Other private agents participate indirectly in the coffee sector as well by providing 
services such as credit, transport and technical assistance. 
 
Between the nineteen fifties and the nineteen eighties, intervention in commodity markets relied on 
the stabilization of prices and export earnings by implementing multilateral agreements. This type 
of policy was addressed between 1954 and 1989 in a number of International Commodity 
Agreements (ICAs). These agreements applied to five products: sugar, cocoa, coffee, rubber and 
tin (Newman, 2009). As has been mentioned by some authors (Calo and Wise, 2005), in the case 
of coffee, subsequent attempts by producing countries to control the international market were 
made in 1993 and 2000, but were unsuccessful. Thus, since 1989, the ICAs have not incorporated 
economic clauses to regulate the international coffee market. 
 
The coffee sector in Mexico was regulated by the INMECAFE until 1989 (see Figure 2.5). As part of 
its closeness to the main government institution participating in coffee, the transfer of INMECAFE’s 
assets to farming organizations and its functions to other governmental instances to better service 
the coffee sector started in 1989. Under the ICAs, the institute coordinated all programmes and 
activities focused on the coffee sector; the institute also coordinated the agents (producers, 
producer cooperatives, processors, roasters and exporters) involved in the supply chain. Now the 
number of participants working in coffee is larger on the upstream side of the supply chain than it 
was during the quota era; on the other hand, a lower number of partners is observed in the 
downstream side of the supply chain at the national level than it was in the former structure. 
According to CMC (2005) and AMECAFE (2009), 440 intermediaries were registered in 2005 and 
1,035 in 2009. Indeed, many of them are working in the upstream side and few of them in the 
downstream side of the coffee supply chain. 
 
One group of participants in the coffee supply chain are the intermediaries. They can either be 
individuals or a company integrated by several investors. This group of partners includes local 
collectors, processors, retailers and exporters. Although it is now permissible for anybody to trade 
in coffee, in the last six years it has become compulsory for everyone to be registered in the 
national coffee system, run by the Mexican Coffee Association (AMECAFE). This requirement has 
been set up to operate the Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund (SCPF) and to better organize the 
coffee sector. According to this process, a registration number is allocated to each intermediary, 
which allows him or her to bill any coffee supplier. This registration also obliges intermediaries to 
declare to the Mexican Ministry of Finance any profit they make while transacting coffee. 
 
In recent decades, some growers’ organizations have emerged. Many of the producer grassroots 
organizations and farmer cooperatives have been working to create a balance between processing 
and exporting companies. Furthermore, some producer cooperatives in Mexico have been playing a 
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crucial role in the development of small farmers and in gaining access to domestic and export 
markets. The supported cooperatives are more focused on organic and fair-trade coffee. Also, 
through this participation, these kinds of farmer cooperatives have been granted credit and funding 
from some international companies and also receive economic support out of the government 
budget (Varangis et al., 2003). According to data from a recent National Coffee Census, 11% of all 
coffee producers are member of a cooperative. 
 
The type of coffee sold by producers varies from region to region. Coffee farmers sell either cherry, 
parchment, or natural dry coffee; although in some cases, depending on the natural conditions and 
the farmer’s wealth, they may sell a combination of these types of products.13 When farmers sell 
cherry coffee, delivery to a processing plant must take place within 24 hours of harvesting, to 
prevent post-harvest damage and maintain the quality. In addition, to ensure quality, processors 
have to maintain a widespread distribution of local collectors over the coffee-producing areas. 
Thus, local collectors purchase cherry coffee during the day and deliver it to the processing plants 
at night. After the coffee reaches the wet processing plants, it is processed into parchment coffee. 
Following the chain, parchment coffee can either be stored or sold on to the next stage (see Figure 
1.1). A number of wet processing plants have their own dry processing plants; in this way, wet 
processors can get green coffee before it is roasted. Therefore, the type of coffee sold by farmers 
depends to some degree on the weather conditions, the farmers’ endowment, and the level of 
support farmers have been receiving. 
 
Coffee can be purchased and processed by farmers’ cooperatives. Grower organizations can engage 
either in humid or dry processing, or both. Their characteristics are mainly the result of their 
environmental conditions and the volume produced at their particular location. The statistics show 
that 90% of the total Mexican production undergoes humid processing, whereas the remaining 
10% undergoes dry processing procedures (ICO, 1999). 
2.5. The past institutional arrangement 
 
The International Coffee Agreements (ICAs) have been set up by the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO), the organization that liaises between producing and consuming countries. Until 
1989, it imposed export quotas in order to raise the price at which member exporter countries sold 
coffee to member importing countries; the latter accepted that consumers pay a higher price to 
benefit coffee growers in developing nations. Importing countries included in these agreements 
represented approximately 90% of the total coffee import market. Export countries represented 
over 99% of the total export in the last agreement, which included the economic clauses (Bohman 
and Jarvis, 1999). The ICAs, with their economic clauses, became more effective in 1980 when, in 
addition to the export quotas, the value of stock in producing countries was also included. Thus, 
importing countries indirectly financed the storage of coffee in producing nations (Calo and Wise, 
2005). 
                                            
13 Cherry coffee is the fruit of the coffee trees without any processing; parchment coffee is the green coffee bean contained in 
the parchment skin; and natural dry is the product obtained by dry processing the fruit (cherry coffee is dried without removing 
the skin). 
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The economic clauses of the ICAs established a target price range, which was a weighted average 
of different types of coffee, and set a global export quota to achieve the desired price. By 
consensus, each exporting country received a portion of the global export quantity. In the last 
years of operation of the quota system, the international coffee prices were set from $1.20–1.40 
per pound of green coffee. When prices fell below the target range, the quota were cut in order to 
reduce the supply at that time and to push the international coffee price up. On the other hand, if 
prices remained higher than the top price for more than 45 days, exporting countries were allowed 
to boost the quantity exported until prices went down to the defined level (Bohman and Jarvis, 
1999). Even when several problems arose in this system, analysts generally agreed that the 
system was successful in raising the coffee price for producing countries and stabilizing prices in 
the world market (Ponte, 2002). 
 
The first ICA was signed in 1962, after which it was renewed at approximately six-year intervals 
until 1983, when the last one was signed. Negotiations to renew agreements to control the 
international coffee supply could not take place until July 1989, when the final contract expired. 
The agreements were not renewed because of competing interests within exporting and importing 
countries; hence, international control has not been implemented since then (Bohman and Jarvis, 
1999). 
 
In the case of Mexico, the INMECAFE was formed in 1958, in preparation for compliance with the 
economic clauses included in the ICAs. The functions of this institute were researching, planning 
the coffee development, providing incentives to coffee-producing regions, giving credit to small- 
and medium-sized coffee growers (those with less than 20 hectares), buying and selling coffee on 
the domestic and external markets, operating storage facilities, processing coffee, and managing 
the federal budget allocated to coffee (Martínez, 1996). In addition, in the nineteen eighties, the 
INMECAFE was given the responsibility to manage the export quotas and other fiscal attributes 
(FAO, 2007). 
 
Comparing the rural average coffee price with the fob price, in Figure 2.6 we can see that the 
differences were relatively large during the nineteen eighties. This means that coffee growers did 
not directly receive the possible benefits of high fob prices. Who actually received the benefits 
coming from this difference is a question that needs to be answered. Part of the difference in those 
prices was caused by the storage costs spent to manage all the regulations at the domestic level 
and to cover the administrative procedures demanded by the regulations. Other elements that may 
explain the margin were the domestic and export tax payments. 
 
According to Díaz (1996), INMECAFE owned 50 humid processing plants and 27 dry processing 
plants during the 1986-87 harvesting season, which represented 10% of the total processing 
capacity at that time. A total of 3,517 small-scale buyers, 597 medium-scale buyers, and 108 
exporters were registered at the end of nineteen seventies. Nearly 92% of coffee buyer centres 
were operated by national investors and the rest by external investors (Nolasco, 1985). Even when 
it had been reported that the purchasing and processing activities of the institute were of very high 
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Figure 2.6. Paths of Mexican and Other Milds coffee prices (my own elaboration with 
information from ICO (2009) and SIAP (2010)). 
importance, its processing capacity was not high enough to compete against the private sector 
(Martínez, 1996). 
 
 
During the nineteen seventies and eighties, the INMECAFE, as the representative of the 
government position, was the conciliator of the three major actors participating in the coffee 
sector: producers, processors and exporters (Martínez, 1996). The institute was responsible for 
applying and supervising all the regulations coming from the international agreements and the 
national settings aimed at controlling the coffee market. The INMECAFE managed to export 40% of 
the total amount of coffee exported by Mexico in the 1981-82 harvesting season. Thus, it replaced 
many traditional intermediaries (Akaki and Huacuja, 2006). 
 
Although the amount of land farmed with coffee increased over the quota system period, the 
number of Mexican coffee growers did not increase during the final decade under the ICA; the 
number of producers was 276,655 in 1989. In part as a response to the production philosophy 
associated with the Green Revolution, the total production reached its highest level of close to eight 
million quintals in the 1988-89 harvesting season. Accordingly, during the nineteen seventies and 
early eighties, large quantities of INMECAFE resources were allocated to standardizing and 
increasing the coffee production; the government did that through the diffusion of new coffee 
varieties produced in INMECAFE nurseries, the introduction of non-native shade species and the 
promotion of the frequent use of commercial fertilizers (Santoyo et al., 1994; Wehbe et al., 2005). 
 
A notable increase in private investments occurred as well in the second half of the nineteen 
seventies. As Martínez (1996) has argued, that increase occurred in response to high international 
prices and government subsidies granted to the coffee sector. During the controlled period, it was 
economically acceptable and not restricted to any producer to convert land into coffee orchards. 
However, later on this led to an overspecialization and economic overdependence on coffee by 
many producers, producers’ families and communities (Marban-Mendoza, 2009). Nevertheless, the 
highest increases in land cultivated with coffee in the last two decades of the INMECAFE era 
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Figure 2.7. Destination of the Mexican coffee per season (my 
own elaboration with information from ICO 
(2009)). 
happened on land without suitable environmental conditions to produce coffee of a good quality 
(INMECAFE, 1990). 
 
Under the quota system, coffee had to be in storage until exporter firms received authorization 
from the institute’s inspectors to proceed with the exportation of the product. To define the quota 
assigned to each exporter, a Marketing Committee was formed by representatives of several 
government institutions: the Bank of External Commerce, the INMECAFE and the producer 
organizations in place (CMPC, CNC, CNPP), as well as processor and exporter organizations 
(ANACAFE, CANACINTRA, AMEC, and BECAMEX) (Martínez, 1996).14 
 
According to some authors (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006, Lewis, 2005), INMECAFE regulated the 
domestic market by instating a minimum coffee price during all harvesting seasons and by buying 
and processing coffee. The institute’s participation as collector and processor was very important. 
The INMECAFE had 750 centres for purchasing coffee throughout the coffee-producing regions in 
1989 (Martínez, 1996). 
 
The technology of coffee production that was promoted during the quota period encouraged some 
coffee-producing communities to specialize in coffee. Indeed, INMECAFE was the primary source of 
coffee research and extension services (Nolasco, 1985). By following the institute´s instructions, 
coffee growers secured credit and other services to produce coffee (Eakin et al., 2006). Hence, this 
crop was considered one of the best agricultural options for many communities at that time. 
 
The relatively high and stable 
prices produced a strong 
expansion in land cultivated 
with coffee between 1970 and 
1989. Additionally, there was a 
huge domestic promotion of 
coffee production by the 
Mexican state (Calo and Wise, 
2005); all the services and 
supports provided by the 
institute produced enough 
economic incentive for 
producers to expand or to start 
the coffee production that increased the total production (see Figure 2.7). As a consequence, the 
Mexican coffee production grew at a yearly rate of 3.8% from 1970-71 to 1988-89. The same 
period showed an increase of 2.9% of the total land farmed with coffee (Díaz, 1996). The amount 
of coffee available in Mexico exceeded the demand in the final years of the quota system; the initial 
                                            
14 The Mexican Confederation of Coffee Producers (CMPC), the National Peasants' Confederation (CNC), the National 
Confederation of Small Producers (CNPP), the National Association of Coffee Industry (ANACAFE), the National Camera of the 
Transformation Industry (CANACINTRA), the Mexican Coffee Exporters’ Association (AMEC), and the Mexican Processing Plants 
(BECAMEX). 
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gross stock was 1.7 million quintals in the 1988-89 harvesting season and 2.3 million quintals in 
the 1989-90 harvesting season. 
 
During the quota period, the government’s main effort was devoted to small- and medium-sized 
coffee growers. It has been reported that over 157,799 producers were technically assisted by 
INMECAFE during the nineteen eighties; this number represented 85% of the total number of 
coffee growers existing at that time; these farmers owned 76% of the total land cultivated with 
coffee in Mexico (Santoyo et al., 1994; Villaseñor, 2004). Therefore, after the institute stopped 
functioning, the most affected actors were those producers who were suddenly exposed to the 
intermediaries and private service providers (CNOPC, 2007). 
 
After 1989, rather than directly intervening in the coffee market, the Mexican government 
developed a diverse array of programmes to support the coffee production and to smooth the 
effects of the coffee crisis (Eakin et al., 2005; Pérez et al., 2001). The first programme 
implemented during this period was the Special Programme to Support Coffee Production. This 
programme was designed to be in operation from 1989 to 1992; it was implemented under the 
agreement signed between grassroots farmer organizations and the Mexican government. Its main 
aim was to try to find an immediate solution to the critical situation prevailing in the coffee sector. 
Through this programme, the government provided credit to those coffee growers who owned 
more than 10 hectares of coffee orchards and who were able to pay back credit loans. Other 
support included in this agreement focused on helping farmers with maintenance and harvest 
costs. Unfortunately, those initiatives were unsuccessful because the production costs exceeded the 
coffee prices at that time (Avalos-Sartorio, 2006a). 
 
Even through those programmes, the main funding supporting the coffee sector was the National 
Solidarity Programme (NSP), which started in 1992. Its budget was derived from the National 
Development Programme (NDP), implemented in Mexico from 1989 to 1994. The NDP’s overall aim 
was to reduce extreme poverty. The NSP targeted indigenous communities and peasants with a low 
income (Martínez, 1996). Furthermore, at the beginning of the nineteen nineties, the solidarity 
programmes were the main source of fresh capital for small- and medium-scale coffee growers. 
This support aimed at providing credit and supporting the harvesting and marketing activities. The 
total amount used in these initiatives was 6.5 million Mexican pesos in 1990-91, 81.8 million in 
1991-92, 140 in 1992-93, and 223 in the 1993-94 harvesting season. Although this programme 
was designed for refunding, only around 40% of the total amount was given back by producers 
(Nolasco, 1985). 
 
It is estimated that the total amount the government allocated to support for the coffee sector was 
$331.85 million from 1989-90 to 1993-94 – an average of $66.37 million per season – (Martínez, 
1996). This support was given to around 250,000 coffee farmers who had been hit by low coffee 
prices (Coffee & Cocoa, 1992). Nonetheless, most of the programmes developed from 1989 to 
1993 were considered subsidies and not credits (CNOPC, 2007). 
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With the free domestic coffee market and the Mexican border open, foreign investment in coffee 
increased. As a result, several companies owned by national investors broke down, and many 
companies linked to the transnational firms started to work in the upstream of the coffee supply 
chain. They invested around $28.9 million in 1989, $90 million in 1990 and $209 million in 1994 in 
processing capacity (UGST, 2006). In consequence, the coffee market started to be dominated by 
large-scale firms such as AMSA (Atlantic coffee), Becafisa (Volkafe), Far-Man, J. Aron, Rothfos, 
Mercon, Tardivat, Omnicafe, and Cafés California (Neuman) (Santoyo et al., 1994). However, 
because of various difficulties in providing support to coffee producers and the high variation of 
international coffee prices, some international firms that initially invested in several coffee-
producing regions withdrew from the coffee sector (Avalos-Sartorio, 2006b; Santoyo et al., 1994). 
 
During the quota system era, some intermediary associations were also operating. The Mexican 
Association of Coffee Exporters (AMEC, by its initials in Spanish) was established in 1949 and 
incorporated large-scale producers and exporters. The National Association for the Coffee Industry 
(ANACAFE, by its initials in Spanish) was founded in 1979. These groups of industries emerged 
with the aim to represent the Mexican coffee firms collectively. The ANACAFE is an association of 
large-scale producers whose plantations are vertically integrated. They also are processors 
integrated with farmers and medium- and large-scale collectors (Martínez, 1996). 
 
The coffee export became very concentrated after the dissolution of INMECAFE. From 1989 to 
1992, the modifications in the coffee supply chain shifted the advantage to larger international 
firms. National investors and processors were hampered by their limited access to funds, while 
international companies had access to vast amounts of funds. Fifteen large-scale companies 
exported 40% of the total Mexican export, while 89 small-scale enterprises (some of them owned 
by small-scale producer organizations) exported 15% of the total exported at the beginning of the 
nineteen nineties (El Café, 1992). Therefore, the industry transformed into an oligopolistic 
structure headed by a small number of transnational firms. 
 
At the end of the nineteen eighties and the beginning of the nineteen nineties, commercial banks 
limited credit to those medium- and large-scale coffee farmers who were well known to the bank 
and who had proven to have sufficient income to classify as low-risk credit applicants. Other 
possible sources of credit were informal lenders, initial payments from processors, and some credit 
unions. Aware of this situation, a number of exporters also gave economic support to some 
national processors, enabling them to operate their machinery. This was done in exchange for 
receiving coffee at a low price. Other exporters set up various kinds of associations with national 
processors to reach the same objective. Thus, collecting, processing and exporting were highly 
concentrated in the hands of large-scale firms with external funds (Santoyo et al., 1994). 
 
The INMECAFE organized coffee farmers in UEPCs to facilitate its work. These were groups of at 
least ten small-scale coffee farmers, who began to work jointly to develop various coffee activities; 
this organization started in 1973. Through these groups, the institute provided input, technical 
assistance and partial payment in advance for the coffee (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006). These 
economic units were basic to the structure. They had access to the market, which enabled them to 
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reduce transaction costs. At the end of the institute’s term there were 3,228 UEPCs, which included 
85% of the total number of coffee farmers existing at that time (Renard, 2008). 
 
In addition to the UEPCs, medium- and large-scale coffee growers were integrated in the National 
Confederation of Rural Producers (CNPR, by its initials in Spanish) and the Mexican Coffee 
Producers Confederation (CMPC, by its initials in Spanish); the CMPC was constituted in the 
nineteen fifties. In general, farmers included in the CNPR and CMPC had small businesses. 
Furthermore, the National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations (UNORCA, by its 
initials in Spanish) was also operating in the nineteen seventies (Martínez, 1996). 
 
During the 1989–1993 period, a transformation of the farmer organizations occurred. Almost all of 
the UEPCs either disappeared or were transformed into the Solidarity Social Society (SSS, by its 
initials in Spanish), the Rural Production Society (SPR, by its initials in Spanish) and other kinds of 
grower cooperatives. These latter kinds of organizations had a legal right to get credit. Some other 
economic units were reorganized into the Local Solidarity Committee, which was entitled to funding 
from the solidarity programmes operated by the Ministry of Development. Unluckily, few of those 
committees did actually function. Many of these groups were participating in one of the main 
twelve coffee growers’ grassroots organizations existing at the start of the nineteen nineties 
(Santoyo et al., 1994). Indeed, around 190,000 of the total of 280,000 growers were participating 
in one of the grassroots organizations in 1992 (FAO, 2007). 
 
The closeness of INMECAFE and the coffee crisis, which started in 1989, forced the emergence of 
many grower organizations. In part, this process was initiated by the National Coordinator of 
Coffee Organizations (CNOC, by its initial in Spanish), which represented 54 regional producer 
organizations with more than 50 producers each in 1990. These cooperatives were marketing 
around 15% of the national production (Díaz, 1996). CNOC was a union that included regional 
autonomous organizations of small coffee producers who cultivated an average of two hectares.; It 
emerged as an independent organization in 1989 (SAGARPA, 2005). The CNOC represented the 
interests of the independent coffee sector in negotiations with the government, providing 
information and coordinating strategies in processing and marketing the product. This organization 
represented almost 70,000 small-scale coffee producers (about 35% of the national total number) 
at the beginning of the nineteen nineties (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006; Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
The federal government developed a programme to increase the producer cooperatives’ 
participation in the export issue at the end of the nineteen eighties; this programme targeted the 
advisory leaders, linking producer cooperatives with buyers and promoting contract arrangements 
(INMECAFE, 1990). One of the difficulties faced in this programme was that small- and medium-
scale growers had no information on the global coffee prices and had no knowledge of how 
domestic prices were set. For this reason, many cooperatives were unsuccessful in this respect. 
 
In response to the end of the economic clauses of the ICAs, the closing of INMECAFE was decided 
in 1989. During the following three years, public sector intervention in the Mexican coffee sector 
was limited. Much of the institute’s infrastructure was transferred to various UEPCs and other 
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farmer cooperatives (Avalos-Sartorio, 2006b). Various grower groups received warehouses and 
processing plants at reduced prices, and the majority of these were payable over ten years (Pérez 
et al., 2001). It was not easy for small-scale producer organizations to handle the infrastructure 
they received; the large-scale processing plants required consolidated groups with a high 
production level besides the necessary capital (SAGARPA, 2005). 
 
The controlling and leading role that INMECAFE had played suddenly ended after 1989. The closure 
of the institute came as a surprise for many people involved in the coffee industry. The greatest 
impact this event had was caused by the fact that it occurred during a period of lower coffee prices. 
Coffee farmers had been accustomed to receiving support from the government through INMECAFE 
for more than thirty years; thus, they were unprepared to face the new conditions. 
 
The end of the ICAs and the reduction of the institute's activities brought about a number of 
reactions in the international and domestic coffee markets. As soon as the international 
agreements to commercialize coffee broke down, an oversupply was presented, and high quantities 
of coffee were sent onto the international market. This produced a large reduction in coffee prices. 
Under this condition, the prices also became very volatile (Wehbe et al., 2005). Besides, in a free 
coffee market, the prices are not only set by the supply and demand but also by an oligopolistic 
scenery. 
2.6. The institutional structure of the Mexican coffee sector from 1993 to 2004 
 
As a representative organization of the coffee sector industry, the Mexican Coffee Council (MCC) 
was created in June 1993, and it was abolished at the beginning of 2004. The major participants in 
the coffee sector at the national level were part of this council. Members of the council were drawn 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Social Development, 
the Ministry of Finance, representatives from the state government of each of the major coffee-
producing states, representatives from industry producer organizations (CNC, CAP, CNPR, CNOC 
and CMPC) and from associations and trade organizations vested in the coffee industry (ANACAFE, 
AMEC and CANACINTRA) (Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
The MCC was an autonomous civil association with a legal presence. Additionally, regional councils 
were created in the main coffee-producing states. Although decentralized from the state 
governments, governors of producing states took control of those councils through various services 
and by directly operating programmes. Working with SAGARPA and ASERCA at the state level, 
these state councils could function in several ways to respond flexibly to the price crisis of 2001–
2004, to obtain the needed machinery quickly, and to carry out the coffee market policies (FAO, 
2007).15 Together with the state councils, the MCC formed the primary structure through which all 
                                            
15 The Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA, by its initial in Spanish) is a government office 
devoted to head the agricultural sector. It plays a regulatory role in the general policy of rural development, the formulation 
and approval of budgetary resources, and in controlling and following up on the results of programmes that comprise the coffee 
policy. Recently, it has been responsible for convening the string operators to form the CPS. At an operational level, this 
instance also participates in the distribution of budget in some states, using its territorial structure of Rural Development 
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the partners involved in the Mexican coffee industry could discuss and negotiate policies and 
programmes related to this sector. The MCC represented the coffee industry at the national and 
international levels until 2004. Under this structure, the federal and state governments and the 
grassroots organizations were key to the definition of public policy in the coffee sector (Giovannucci 
and Juárez, 2006; Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
The MCC emerged as the body to lead production and policies for the coffee industry in Mexico. The 
MCC’s objectives were to design programmes to increase productivity in the coffee sector; to drive 
the development of technology, to promote the organization of coffee producers, to better position 
Mexican coffee in the international market, to represent the interests of Mexico at international 
forums, and to coordinate all parties involved in the Mexican coffee industry (Martínez, 1996). 
Consequently, the MCC took a counselling role and thus substantially reduced direct government 
participation in the coffee sector (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006). 
 
Some of the activities developed by INMECAFE were also carried out by the MCC. The MCC started 
to be a technical agent in 1996; it means that this council was responsible for the direct operation 
of the major programmes supporting coffee (FAO, 2007). Nevertheless, this council did not take on 
several public services that were previously provided by the institute, such as extension, research, 
and technology transfer. Therefore, from 1993 on, many gaps left by the former structure had 
been taken over by other public and private institutions (Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006). The MCC 
was created not only based on government interest, but also based on the ideas and participation 
of other partners in the supply chain, including producers and exporters (Coffee & Cocoa, 1993). 
 
The gap in technical assistance for growers left by the INMECAFE was not covered by the public 
and private sectors. In 1998, the Mexican government contracted 539 technicians specialized in 
coffee to assist coffee farmers who owned less that 10 hectares. This service benefited 131,472 
coffee farmers (nearly 50% of the total at that time), but in 2002, these technicians became the 
subject of a phased privatization. After that, the rules were that coffee farmers had to gradually 
cover the technicians' salaries, starting with a payment of 25% of the technicians’ salary in the first 
year, 50% in the second year, and so on. The belief was that the coffee farmers receiving these 
technical services would be earning enough to cover the remuneration. Unluckily, this plan was 
unsuccessful because many coffee farmers did not earn enough to pay for the service, due to 
market uncertainty and a low coffee price. 
 
Various government programmes were developed during the MCC period to smooth the difficulties 
created by the price crisis. After the emergence of the armed movement in Chiapas (which itself 
was attributed in part to the low coffee prices), the Mexican government announced two 
                                                                                                                                        
Districts (DDRs, by its initial in Spanish) and Rural Development Centres (CADER, by its initial in Spanish). The role of Support 
and Services for the Marketing of Agricultural and Livestock Products (ASERCA, by its initial in Spanish) in the recent coffee 
policies has been to design, organize and integrate the National Coffee Census, which nowadays supports not only the 
operation of the Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund, but also the development of systematic planning exercises for the 
formulation of plans and programmes. In addition, ASERCA has played a decisive role in the introduction of the Price Coverage 
Programme since 2005. 
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Table 2.4. The Mexican budget for programmes supporting the coffee sector from 
1996 to 2003 (current millions of dollars). 
 
Source: My own elaboration with data from SAGARPA (2009) and Giovannucci and Juárez (2006). 
Programme 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Promotion of coffee production 10.61 9.91 11.97 10.57 17.97
Training and extension 0.69 0.60 1.87 3.99 3.70
Support for rural development 2.42 1.05 2.67 1.95 4.22
Temporary employment Programme 8.66 12.47 13.03
Productive retraining and coffee development 27.13
Fund of investment and capitalization (FINCAS) 1.23
Productive projects (wet and dry processing and others) 12.43
Promotion of coffee consumption 1.93 10.03
Control of coffee bid 0.54 0.58 0.51
Coffee census 3.53
Training 6.82
Stabilization of coffee pricing fund 111.84 81.62
Withdrawal of lower quality of coffee 2.15 0.04
Catalyzing coffee production 30.32
Special support fund for investing in coffee 38.29
Total 13.73 11.56 25.18 28.97 38.93 90.33 118.10 120.55
programmes to support the coffee sector on 1 January 1994. These programmes were in operation 
during the harvesting seasons of 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96. One programme provided direct 
financial support to growers with at least four and up to ten hectares cultivated with coffee, by 
giving them 700 Mexican pesos per hectare.16 The other programme directly supported farmers 
with more than ten hectares planted with coffee, by giving them a maximum of 4,500 Mexican 
pesos per producer (Santoyo et al., 1994). 
 
Other important programmes that were developed from 1994 to 2000 were the Promotion of 
Coffee Production, Training and Extension, Support for Rural Development, and the Temporary 
Employment Programme (see Table 2.4). From 2001 to 2003, still more programmes were 
developed to support the coffee sector. Among the most important were the Productive Retraining 
and Coffee Development, Productive Projects, the Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund, Catalysing 
Coffee Production and the Special Support Fund for Investing in Coffee (Akaki and Huacuja, 2006). 
 
The Stabilisation of Coffee Pricing Fund programme provided support to producers to a maximum 
of $20 per quintal sold (for less than 20 quintals per hectare) when the international coffee prices 
dropped to less than $70 per quintal. The total budget of this programme has not been used 
entirely because several producers did not meet the requirements established for this initiative 
(Akaki and Huacuja, 2006). Indeed, in an evaluation done by the FAO (2007), 30% of the 
interviewed coffee growers affirmed that if this programme had not been in place, they would no 
longer be producing coffee. In recent years, the amount spent by supporting coffee programmes 
has been greater than a yearly average of $100 million. 
 
The concentration of power in the hands of transnational actors created a buyer-driven supply 
chain in which producers, local traders and governments were marginalized in the decision making 
regarding coffee (Ponte, 2002). According to some scholars (ICO, 1999; Pérez et al., 2001), there 
were 230 coffee exporters working in Mexico during the 1997-98 harvesting season, but 15 
transnational companies shared 67% of the total coffee exported by Mexico at that time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
16 In 1994, a dollar was equal to 3.50 Mexican pesos. 
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Table 2.5. Border from where the Mexican coffee was 
exported. 
  
Source: My own elaboration with data from SAGARPA (2005) and 
AMECAFE (2010). 
          Volume          Volume 
       (quintals)        (quintals)
Veracruz, Veracruz 1,407,620 23.57 2,145,373 59.28
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas 4,207,210 70.44 1,258,562 34.78
Manzanillo, Colima 1,491 0.02 88,098 2.43
Ciudad Hidalgo, Chiapas 8,408 0.14 31,454 0.87
Mexico, D.F. 30,289 0.84
Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán 12,070 0.33
Toluca, Estado de México 11,353 0.31
Mazatlán, Sinaloa 10,531 0.29
Mexicali, Baja California Norte 27,034 0.45 10,045 0.28
Tijuana, Baja California Norte 26,546 0.44 6,410 0.18
Subteniente López, Quintana Roo 5,159 0.14
Matamoros, Tamaulipas 3,629 0.10
Salina Cruz, Oaxaca 282,377 4.73 2,663 0.07
Others 11,735 0.20 3,510 0.10
Total 5,972,421 100.00 3,619,148 100.00
Border
1996 2008-09
% %
 
Figure 2.8. Federal budget allocated to coffee and yield in 
Mexico (my own elaboration with information 
from SAGARPA (2009) and SIAP (2010)). 
The market was dominated by a few multinational coffee roasters during the the MCC era. The 
most influential transnational companies operating in Mexico were Far-Man, J. Aron, Rotphos, 
Becafisa, Omnicafe, AMSA, Sara Lee, Nestlé, TIASA and Expogranos (Akaki and Huacuja, 2006; 
Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006; Pérez et al., 2001). Those companies exerted considerable control 
in collecting and marketing coffee in producing regions. Since the nineteen nineties, the majority of 
the dry processing plants had been owned by the ten largest companies. They had  control of 63% 
of the total exports during the nineteen nineties, while 197 smaller enterprises, some of them 
owned by smallholder and producer cooperatives, had control of the remaining 37% of the total 
export (Pérez et al., 2001; Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006). Thus, the intermediation grew, and the 
only option that many coffee growers had was to sell their product at the price fixed by the 
exporters in each producing region (Santoyo et al., 1994). 
 
Even with the various programmes 
supporting coffee, there is no clear 
evidence of a recovering yield and 
production. The average yield 
dropped from 10.6 quintals per 
hectare in 2000 to 7.5 quintals per 
hectare in 2008 (see Figure 2.8) 
(Akaki and Huacuja, 2006; SIAP, 
2010). In accordance with the 
information of SIAP (2010), during 
the 1993–2003 period, the total 
production in Mexico was registered as between 5.4 and 8.1 million quintals. The highest level was 
registered in 1999 and the lowest in 2003. 
 
The primary exporting borders and 
how coffee was exported changed 
over the second half of the 
nineteen nineties. This was in part 
as a result that many national 
investors working in the coffee 
industry disappeared from the 
market at the end of the nineteen 
nineties. After that, the most 
important brokers went into various 
producing regions and changed the 
borders they use to export the 
product (SAGARPA, 2005; Nolasco, 
1985). 
 
The bulk of the Mexican coffee had been exported through commissioners located on the Nuevo 
Laredo border. As we can see from Table 2.5, Nuevo Laredo was the most important border from 
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which coffee was exported in 1996. It accounted for more than 70.4% of the total export in that 
year. The second most important one was the Veracruz border, from which 23.6% of the total 
coffee export took place at that time. 
2.7. The current institutional arrangement 
 
Currently, the Coffee Product System (CPS) is the organization in charge of this industry at the 
national and state level. The CPS has been the IRO in place since 2004.17 It was created as a result 
of the Sustainable Rural Development Law, which made it mandatory for primary crops to be thus 
organized. Although the law was passed in 2001, the CPS was not established until years later. The 
delay in the CPS’s creation was because the Mexican Coffee Council and state Coffee Councils were 
already operating. The CPS’s main goals are to synchronize public policy and coffee programmes 
with the participation of all the partners of the coffee chain. Additionally, one of its functions is to 
represent the coffee industry at the national and international level. 
 
The Mexican Coffee Association (AMECAFE, by its initials in Spanish) was created with a direct link 
to the CPS, providing it with the legal capacity to receive and apply the budget assigned to the 
coffee sector. The AMECAFE is a non-governmental organization; it is financed with its own 
resources, which mainly come from one share of the programmes it supervises. This institution is a 
civil association that operates with representatives of the main partners in the coffee industry 
(AMECAFE, 2010). 
 
The CPS and AMECAFE have been the direct substitute of the MCC since 2004. They are charged 
with the implementation of all the legislative and governmental regulations related to coffee. They 
are also responsible for supervising almost all of the federal programmes that support the coffee 
sector. Both instances are headed by the same person (AMECAFE, 2010). 
 
The integration of the CPS and AMECAFE led to the configuration of the new institutional framework 
outlined in the Rural Development Law. With this process, several functions were transferred from 
the MCC to the CPS/AMECAFE, including the responsibility to act as a technical agent (FAO, 2007). 
The creation of the CPS at the federal level has also been followed by the creation of a similar 
structure at the state level. In some cases this has been done by abolishing the existing state 
council and instituting the CPS in its place, and in other cases by creating the CPS as a collateral 
body of the former state council. 
 
Since the demise of the INMECAFE, the government has reduced its research and technical 
assistance in the coffee sector. Currently, one of the main research centres for the Mexican 
                                            
17 A product system is the sharing of elements and concurrent agents of productive processes of an agricultural product, 
including the provision of technical equipment, inputs and services to the primary production, collection, transformation, 
distribution, and marketing (Article 3, Section XXXI of the Sustainable Rural Development Law). 
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Table 2.6. The Mexican budget for programmes supporting the coffee 
sector in the last years (current millions of dollars). 
 
Source: My own elaboration with data from SAGARPA (2009). 
Programme 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Productive retraining and coffee development 34.39 38.95 47.26 41.50 46.22 48.80
Fund for investment and capitalization (FINCAS) 1.18 1.23 1.22 4.79 23.29 14.79
Productive projects (wet and dry processing and others) 2.35 10.55 14.10 17.70 9.92
Promotion of coffee consumption 0.78 0.92 1.83 3.66 6.52 4.81
Price coverage 4.97 11.92 6.41 5.59 8.14
Coffee plantations renewal 5.36 16.36
Control of coffee bid 2.90 1.46 6.50 7.65 5.26 2.59
Coffee census 0.78 1.78 2.06 1.85
Training 0.46 0.73 1.92 1.76 2.96
Stabilization of coffee pricing fund 66.95 2.91 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.74
Withdrawal of lower quality of coffee 0.02
Emerging programmes 13.80
Total 106.23 67.05 81.19 82.21 114.23 110.95
agricultural sector is the INIFAP, but it has conducted few research projects on coffee.18 Research 
on coffee has also been done by the ECOSUR, UACh, CP and UNAM.19 These institutions have 
provided technical assistance, advice and skills to technical assistants and coffee farmers, but not 
to the same degree as the INMECAFE. Other gaps in this respect are being covered by the private 
sector through individual advisors, groups of advisors, NGOs and coffee firms, but few farmers can 
afford the cost of these services. Even though technical assistance is very important in coffee 
production, as it is in other crops, only 9.6% of the total number of coffee farmers included in the 
recent National Coffee Census reported to be receiving some kind of technical assistance. More 
than two-thirds of them were receiving it from public institutions, and a small number from private 
sources or a combination of both. 
 
As we can see in Table 
2.6, a large amount of 
resources was 
dedicated to the coffee 
sector at the end of the 
2000 decade. Two 
programmes have 
been most important in 
supporting the coffee 
sector in Mexico in the 
last few years. One is 
the Stabilization of 
Coffee Pricing Fund, started in 2002, and the other is the Productive Retraining and Coffee 
Development, that started in 2003 (see Table 2.4). The latter provides direct payment to any 
coffee producer who is registered in the Coffee Census and who proves that he/she sold coffee in 
the previous season. The Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund has been the mechanism with which 
the money given to coffee growers when the coffee price was very low could be recovered. To 
regulate this process, the Recovering Coffee Trust (FIRCAFE, by its initials in Spanish) was 
established in 2004. Its operation has been the responsibility of AMECAFE since 2007 (FAO, 2007). 
 
There was a negative correlation between the federal budget allocated to coffee and the Other 
Milds coffee price. It seemed that when the international price went up, the Mexican government 
felt less pressure to support the coffee sector. Figure 2.9 shows that during periods of crisis (from 
2001 to 2004), the amount of federal funding allocated to support coffee was high. This is an 
indication that the Mexican government is responding to the coffee growers´ need. 
 
                                            
18 The National Institute for Forestry, Agricultural and Livestock Research (INIFAP, by its initials in Spanish). It is a 
governmental centre that aims to resolve the major requirement in term of apply research related to agriculture, including 
coffee. 
19 College of the South Border (ECOSUR, by its initials in Spanish), Chapingo Autonomous University (UACh, by its initials in 
Spanish), Postgraduate College (CP, by its initials in Spanish), the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM, by its 
initials in Spanish). 
Characterization of the Mexican coffee sector 
51 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Federal budget allocated to coffee in Mexico and 
Other Milds coffee prices (my own elaboration with 
data from ICO (2009) and SAGARPA (2009)). 
According to the CMC (2005), a total of 867 intermediaries (traders and exporters) were registered 
in 2005. They were located mainly in the major coffee-producing regions in Mexico. Some of these 
firms were strategically established in different areas than the producing states. In this way, they 
could easily reach consumers or 
buyers in either domestic or 
external markets. Of those 
intermediaries, 394 were 
registered as exporters, and 73 
were involved in coffee 
production as well. Similarly, a 
total of 1,035 coffee 
intermediaries were registered 
in 2009, and 92% of them were 
located in coffee-producing 
states (AMECAFE, 2009). 
 
Currently, the National Association of the Coffee Industry (ANACAFE) integrates 32 of the most 
important companies in the Mexican coffee sector; these firms produce soluble, roasted, ground, 
and decaffeinated coffee. Some members of this association also do humid and dry processing. The 
firms included in the ANACAFE generally do business through intermediaries located in several 
coffee-producing regions. The ANACAFE’s firms process an average of 4.17 million quintals of 
coffee annually. This represents 76.2% of the total Mexican production. These companies are 
responsible for 100% of the green coffee processed in Mexico to produce soluble coffee, 80% of 
the roasted and ground coffee, 52% of the total amount of green coffee exported, and 100% of the 
soluble, roasted, and green decaffeinated coffee exported by Mexico (ANACAFE, 2010). Some of 
the members of this association are also large-scale, vertically integrated coffee growers, while 
others are industries integrated with producers and medium- and large-scale collectors placed in 
various producing regions (Martínez, 1996). 
 
Nowadays, the basic buying price for coffee in every producing area is defined by owners of the 
large-scale firms who inform commissioners about the rising and lowering of the coffee price. 
Commissioners are obligated to change their buying price as soon as they receive the information 
from their buyers or contractors. One important element that is taken into account to set the daily 
price in producing regions is to be aware of what competitors are doing in the same region. 
Sometimes, the strategy is to set the price a little higher than the competitors do, to buy a high 
quantity of coffee or to get other buyers out. But as soon as a buyer is alone in a certain region, he 
or she can bring down the price indiscriminately (Santoyo et al., 1994). According to the theory, in 
this case we will observe opportunistic behaviour that allows competitors to reduce buying prices 
and to increase their profits. 
 
The number of growers who are included in any of the coffee organizations represents 11% of the 
total included in the Census database updated in 2008; that percentage accounts for around 
68,000 growers. The most important kinds of grower organizations are the Society of Social 
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Solidarity (SSS) and the Working Group. They are mainly interested in improving their production 
and in adding value to their product. Nevertheless, several organizations have been receiving 
machinery, equipment and subsidies from the government and NGOs to improve their production, 
processing and marketing capacities. 
 
Farmer cooperatives and grassroots organizations engage in several activities. These kinds of 
organizations help producers with negotiating resources from the government budget, connecting 
and negotiating relations with a number of international agencies, and providing several kinds of 
services to improve farmers’ competitiveness (technical assistance, quality improvement, and 
building infrastructure to process the product). Hence, in this way producer organizations are filling 
some gaps caused by the disappearance of the institute. 
 
The processing capacity owned by farmers is limited. As mentioned by Renard (2008), farmer 
cooperatives owned 12% of the industrial processing capacity in 2007. Through their cooperatives, 
coffee growers exported 6% of the total amount of coffee exported by Mexico. Several grower 
enterprises that used to export disappeared from the market and the majority that succeeded in 
this regard have been related to fair trade and organic schemes. Yet, according to the National 
Coffee Census, the most important types of coffee that farmers were selling were parchment 
(50%) and fresh cherry coffee (27%). 
2.8. Concluding remarks 
 
Mexico carried out a sudden structural adjustment to the institutions overseeing its coffee sector. 
The starting point was the collapse of the international coffee agreements to control the coffee 
supply in 1989. This process caused a break in the services to the coffee industry, the most 
important of which were financing small-sized and medium-sized coffee growers, providing 
extension advice, organizing growers, maintaining the infrastructure to process coffee, collecting 
coffee, marketing coffee, controlling the coffee quality, and keeping a minimum price in every 
coffee-producing region. The reduction of government participation in the coffee sector led to 
several gaps, which until now have not been completely covered by other agents already involved 
in this industry. 
 
As has been mentioned by Avalos-Sartorio (2006a), several services at the community level were 
and still continue to be inadequate in meeting coffee farmers’ needs. Changes in the provision of 
agricultural extension, research, market information and physical infrastructure (roads) have been 
taking place since the liberalization of the coffee sector. In recent years, private agencies have 
provided the majority of services needed in the coffee sector (e.g. firms and informal lenders), 
non-governmental organizations and some public institutions (e.g. research centres and 
universities). 
 
Since the beginning of the free market, the financing of small producers first was in the hands of 
the Pronasol, and subsequently has been partially taken up by development and commercial banks 
as well as by other funding sources such as intermediaries, exporters and informal lenders. The 
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modifications in these services have brought an increase in the production costs that make farmers 
ask for higher coffee prices. In contrast, under the quota system, coffee producers were well 
provided with almost all the services they needed. Even when they received a coffee price 
relatively lower than current prices, they relied on coffee as the best and most profitable crop, but 
nowadays many coffee growers keep coffee orchards as a secondary income source. 
 
The current organization of the Mexican coffee sector generates an unbalanced distribution of 
power among the main actors participating in this industry. On the one hand, there is the growers’ 
sector, which is not well organized and lacks information and capital. On the other hand, there is 
the industry, mainly represented by ANACAFE, which is a very prominent organization that is well 
informed and has a high level of capital. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the recent 
programmes supporting coffee are designed to include the voice of all the actors participating in 
the coffee sector, or only the voices of the most prominent ones. Perhaps the most prominent 
participants in this supply chain are creating institutional and political conditions to benefit from. 
Thus, in order of importance, the government, the transnational coffee firms and farmer 
organizations have become the major players in the supply chain. 
 
Under the current market characteristics, any intermediary is free to set the coffee price according 
to product quality, market conditions and suppliers´ characteristics, among other things. Generally, 
intermediaries use the international commodity price defined each working day in the New York 
and London markets as a starting point for setting their daily coffee price. Then, intermediaries 
subtract from the international price any expenses incurred between the farmers’ delivery point 
and their export point. Maybe as a result of the introduction of a number of programmes 
supporting coffee, especially the Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund, this margin has increased. In 
order to avoid this kind of reaction, in concordance with the proposal made by the OECD (2007), 
support to the rural sector is required but does not necessarily have to be directly linked to any 
crop. 
 
The paths of and differences in the coffee prices have varied from period to period. The average 
rural, international and fob coffee prices have shown different figures between and within the 
various institutional settings operating in the Mexican coffee sector during the last decades. After 
the Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund programme began operating, a break occurred in the 
difference between fob and Other Milds coffee prices as well. This suggests that perhaps processors 
and exporters have been indirectly discounting part of the government subsidies given through this 
programme. In this respect, the question is to what extent the money given to growers is 
generating more economic benefit to large-scale processors and exporters than to growers. 
 
Contrary to what theory tells us, the transaction cost (understood as the difference between the 
fob and the rural coffee prices) was reduced from what it was in the controlled era since the advent 
of the free market, and it has been much lower in recent years. Even so, it seems that the coffee 
producers have not benefited much, as they now receive a relatively higher coffee price but do not 
receive many of the other services the government used to provide during the regulated period. 
 
Chapter 2 
54 
 
The current market arrangements are more diversified than those under the quota system. Under 
the government marketing board, not many varieties of market arrangements existed. At that 
time, intermediaries relied on state agencies to buy coffee. By contrast, under the free market, the 
relationships between transactors are more diverse. Firms have been establishing any type of 
market arrangement that allows them to have control of producing, processing and exporting the 
product. In this way, firms have been the most dynamic actor in filling the gaps left by the 
institute. 
 
Two main reasons to start with the structural changes in the coffee sector were the breakdown of 
the quota system and the changes in Mexican economic policy. According to our theory, one reason 
for closing down the main institution governing the coffee sector and creating the successive ones 
was to align the industry with the liberalization process of the Mexican economy. After more than 
twenty years since the start of those processes, the coffee sector now has a new structure. This 
has been established as a response to the government´s general organization of the agricultural 
sector. In this sense, other active partners, such as producers and intermediaries, have being 
adjusting to what is happening in the primary sector of the Mexican economy. 
 
The liberalization of the Mexican coffee sector and the resulting impact have brought either 
drawbacks or benefits to all the major players. Large-scale processors and exporters have adapted 
well to the current institutional environment. Small- and medium-scale farmers, on the other hand, 
have been losing the ability to compete and participate in the coffee market, as they now face 
many more constraints than they used to face in the past. 
 
The current government participation in the coffee sector focuses on deregulating the market and 
allowing agents involved in the supply chain to participate freely. For this reason, it is necessary for 
the government to work on the provision of public goods and the development of clear rules with 
which to govern the free market. If a good institutional environment and the most needed public 
services are provided, the coffee market will be less uncertain. So, as the theory suggests, more 
impartial government participation and specific economic support aimed at rural areas are 
desirable to improve the coffee sector. 
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Chapter 3. The contractual choice and performance of Mexican coffee traders: The role of 
market institutions in commodity chains 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Middlemen play an important role in a commodity chain. They perform many of the activities 
required to bring goods from producer to consumer, and their productivity has a strong impact on 
the performance of the chain as a whole and the welfare of the agents involved (Sexton and 
Lavoie, 2001). Differences in the behaviour of middlemen can be explained by economic and 
cultural factors. The way intermediaries interact can then give information about the environment 
in which they make their transactions and vice versa. 
 
Coffee has been an important agricultural commodity in the last two centuries. Its importance 
relies on the fact that millions of people around the world are final consumers of this product. In 
order to meet this demand, several countries are engaged in producing, processing, transporting 
and marketing this product. Particularly, coffee can attain such relevance for a country or region 
that it can constitute a substantial part of social and economic policy. Around 25 million people 
around the world are coffee producers, most of whom are considered smallholder farmers, while 
this product is pivotal for exports income in some coffee-producing countries (Lewin et al., 2004). 
 
Relationships and the environments in which intermediaries act are not static; they evolve over 
time. Agricultural commodity markets, for example, have undergone significant changes over the 
past twenty years, changes that at the same time affect the behaviour of agents within a 
commodity chain. This is the case for the coffee chain, too. The major change occurred at the end 
of the nineteen eighties and early nineties, when the coordinated marketing system under the 
International Coffee Agreement was abandoned. In many countries, including Mexico, this led to a 
withdrawal of the government from the sector, creating scope for private parties and their 
organizations. Since then, the degree of state interference has fluctuated; private sector 
organizations or public-private initiatives have come and gone. In this paper, we look at a 
particular aspect of the institutional arrangements, namely the use of sales contracts by the agents 
who buy coffee from the farmers or from other buyers. 
 
Until the end of the nineteen eighties, the world market for coffee was controlled by a quota 
system resulting from the economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreements (ICAs), signed 
by the main producing and consuming countries. These ICAs were first put into action in the early 
nineteen sixties. The agreements stated that producing countries had the responsibility to control 
their coffee exports in order to affect world prices (Gilbert, 1987). The best way to do this was by 
means of direct government intervention in the producing, processing and marketing of coffee. This 
is why, under this controlled regime, most of the producing countries had marketing boards 
controlled by the state. These public institutions had the monopoly of the coffee trade and some of 
them were also in charge of technical assistance and financial support to coffee growers (Akiyama, 
2001). 
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In the Mexican case, the government created the Mexican Coffee Institute (Instituto Mexicano del 
Café, INMECAFE) to control and promote coffee production and sales. The Institute sponsored this 
crop as a remunerative alternative for peasants via its different support programmes (Santoyo et 
al., 1994). Given that coffee-producing areas were growing and spreading, the Institute had to 
make sure these regions remained under the control of the government. Hence, officials were sent 
and infrastructure was built in several producing regions (Pérez et al., 2001). While the INMECAFE 
and ICAs were working fully, there was no need for local or regional partner organizations, since 
every actor in the coffee supply chain relied on the effectiveness of the institutional environment 
until 1989. 
 
Yet, at the end of the nineteen eighties, the ICAs’ economic clauses broke down. This meant that 
the quota system was out, replaced by the free market. At the same time, liberalization policies 
were spreading throughout Central and Latin American countries, and Mexico was no exception. 
New coffee policies focused on reducing the size of the government and its expenditures, 
prioritizing regulation and macroeconomic stability, and abandoning interventions in commodity 
markets. For the Mexican coffee sector this meant INMECAFE had to disappear (Snyder, 1999). The 
Institute was then dismantled between 1989 and 1992, creating a void in the coffee chain; a void 
that was to be filled by private agencies. In the absence of the state’s marketing boards and direct 
involvement in the coffee market, new local, regional and national traders appeared. 
 
Nowadays, we can have a variety of channels in the Mexican coffee supply chain; within these 
there is a variety of steps through which coffee transits from producer to consumer. The simplest 
one is the product sold directly from the producer to the consumer. In this case, the product is sold 
at the regional, local or national market. Yet, the most common channel is the one starting from 
the producers who sell to the local collectors; then there are the regional collectors, and after that 
there are the state buyers; after this, the coffee is transported to the border to be sent to other 
countries by exporters. From then on, the product is taken over by processors (roasters) of 
consumer countries. This description implies that there are five steps in the supply chain. 
 
Studies show that the relationships with middlemen can be crucial for the performance of the 
commodity chain (Gabre-Madhin, 1999). These relationships are closely related to the level and 
quality of market institutions present in the Mexican context. By knowing Mexican coffee 
intermediaries’ behaviour, we may acquire a better view of the coffee markets of this country, and 
shed some light for future policies in the sector. Therefore, in this chapter we will investigate the 
behaviour shown by coffee traders in the free coffee market and the performance of the Mexican 
coffee agents. We will focus on two important coffee-producing states, Oaxaca and Veracruz. In 
addition, this study tries to characterize the market conditions facing intermediaries and to indicate 
how these conditions shape traders’ performance and network. 
 
This study centres on the Mexican coffee sector. Mexico is presently the seventh coffee-producing 
country in the world. There are more than 760 thousand hectares of coffee orchards in the country, 
distributed over around 500 thousand coffee growers. The sector is responsible for three million 
direct and indirect jobs (Escamilla et al., 2005). This shows that any action taken that affects 
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coffee has an impact on many stakeholders. The Mexican coffee value chain is composed of various 
actors who interact with each other for economic gain. As coffee is a tradable good and nowadays 
the coffee market in Mexico is almost free, the sector and its members are exposed to national and 
global changes in the institutional environment of this commodity. 
 
More in particular, the objectives of this work are: to identify and explain the contractual sales 
arrangements of traders in the Mexican coffee chain and to assess the performance of coffee 
traders in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico. In order to reach these objectives, the 
following research questions need to be answered: what are the socio-economic characteristics of 
coffee traders in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico? What are the main factors that affect 
whether traders have a contract with their buyers? And what are the factors that influence the 
performance of coffee traders in Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico? 
 
The data used in our analysis were obtained by conducting face-to-face interviews with 53 
intermediaries in 4 coffee-producing regions of the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz. Additionally, we 
held meetings with local authorities and people involved in the National Coffee System. The New 
Institutional Economics theory was used as a theoretical approach to include the notions of 
institutions, transaction costs and market performance when analysing the interactions among 
Mexican coffee middlemen. We used the gross marketing margins (the difference between selling 
and buying prices) as an indicator of traders’ performance. We employed a logit regression in the 
analysis to identify specific variables that could explain the intermediary’s contractual 
arrangements, and an ordinary least squared regression was done to regress gross margins on a 
set of variables depicting traders’ socio-economic, marketing and institutional characteristics to 
evaluate the performance. 
 
The results indicate that being a roaster, having wet processing facilities and selling cherry coffee 
negatively affect traders’ use of contracts, whereas having dry processing facilities has a positive 
effect on their use of contracts. The results also suggest that experience, selling cherry coffee, 
participating in a competitive environment and having contracts positively influence intermediaries’ 
performance, while being a roaster and being registered in the National Coffee System have a 
positive effect on the gross margin. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in 
Section 3.2, we will depict the theoretical approach; in Section 3.3, we will present the data and 
methods used to analyse the information; in Section 3.4, we will present the model specification; 
Section 3.5 will include the results; in the Section 3.6, we will present the conclusion. 
3.2. Theoretical approach 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides us with the proper theoretical approach to include the 
notions of institutions, transaction costs and market performance when analysing the interactions 
among Mexican coffee middlemen. It also allows us to delimit the study at the levels of social 
analysis explained by Williamson (1998). According to this structure, levels 2 and 3 are the 
institutional environment and the governance structures, respectively. Translated to our study, it 
Chapter 3 
58 
 
means that we need to analyse the rules of the game for the coffee intermediaries, the way these 
actors relate with each other in terms of contracts and the way they perform as well. 
 
Why are the institutions so important for understanding contractual choices and the performance of 
traders in chains? According to North (1989), every process in which an exchange is performed has 
some costs involved. In the case of the Mexican coffee sector, one can think of many costs. The 
commercialisation of agricultural goods involves transaction costs along the coffee chain. These are 
related to activities varying from the search for market information, finding farmers who sell 
coffee, inspecting the quality and transporting the product to arranging contracts between the 
agents who perform the mentioned activities (Jabbar et al., 2008). Contracts arise as facilitators of 
these interactions; they provide the possibility of doing business at low costs and thus influence the 
efficiency along the commodity chain. 
 
As established by Coase (1988), “the most important adaptation to the existence of transaction 
costs is the emergence of the firm. The fact that it costs something to enter these transactions 
means that firms will emerge to organise what would otherwise be market transactions whenever 
their costs are less than the costs of carrying out the transactions through the market.” Transaction 
cost economic theory predicts that under high asset specificity and high uncertainty, the firms will 
embrace a highly integrated channel in all cases (Shervani et al., 2007). 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) helps to understand how agents decide to run their business 
given the environment in which they execute their activities. Some traders may choose to buy and 
sell coffee without adding much value to the product they market, as costs and uncertainty are 
high. Others will choose to vertically integrate and sell more downstream in order to tackle these 
costs. Some agents turn to contractual agreements in order to reduce these costs (Williamson, 
1979). 
 
Transaction cost theory can explain the relation that households and sellers have with the market; 
it shows how the price paid by the buyers increases and how the price effectively received by the 
farmers decreases. Finally, for some farmers it did make it impossible to buy or to sell – buy inputs 
and sell outputs – without their earnings turning into losses (Key et al., 2000). If transaction costs 
are low, economic actors will favour spot markets, but if transaction costs are high, they will favour 
contracting or vertical integration to lower these costs (Ruben et al., 2007a). Additionally, De 
Janvry et al. (1991) have argued that the existence of transaction costs might explain why 
households are not entering a certain agricultural market. 
 
Two parts are involved in the transaction costs. One part is the ex-ante cost, which includes 
searching for potential exchange agents (consumers or wholesalers who offer the best price), the 
screening of potential agents, and bargaining (Key et al., 2000). The second part consists of the 
ex-post costs that take into account the transfer of property rights and the monitoring compliance 
of any transaction (Ruben et al., 2007b). Three principle attributes of transactions has been 
defined: the frequency with which transactions recur, the specificity of the assets necessary to 
come to a transaction, and the degree and type of uncertainty of transactions. 
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Another dimension into which NIE gives important insights is the role of social relationships in 
economic transactions. When markets are far from representing the ideal situation portrayed in 
economic textbooks, variables like trust, reputation and informal rules gain in importance 
(Fafchamps, 2002). As Gabre-Madhin (1999) observes, “in the absence of formalized market 
institutions that deter dishonest behaviour, such as credit bureaus, trade inspection services, and 
commercial tribunals, what institutions arise that promote trade among unknown parties?” These 
social relationships then have an effect on contractual decisions and on trader performance. If 
there is trust between agents, formal agreements may not be needed (Fafchamps and Minten, 
1999). Furthermore, these relationships may serve as substitutes to absent market institutions and 
may help traders to reduce costs and perform efficiently. For these reasons, we need to take them 
into account when analysing the factors that affect contractual choices and traders’ performance. 
 
The exertion of market power by some firms in the coffee sector may also affect the behaviour of 
other intermediaries. There is some concern about the level of competition within the Mexican 
supply chain, given that agricultural markets can show evidence of low levels of concentration of 
buyers or sellers (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). Competition is thus an important element in the 
analysis. Being in a competitive environment is a factor that can increase the probability of 
contractual agreements between agents as they have to secure the provision of the product and 
the market in which that product will be sold (Fischer et al., 2009). It may also affect traders’ 
performance, since low competition may lead to higher marketing margins, which decreases the 
efficiency in the supply chain (Mose, 2007; Schroeter and Azzam, 1991). 
 
An environment in which transaction costs are high may lead to higher margins, and thus, to a less 
efficient trader and supply chain. The reason for this is that an agent facing high transaction costs 
will try to buy cheap and sell expensive in order to compensate for the related costs. This would 
only apply if the setting in which agents make their transactions enables them to do so. Poor 
physical infrastructure, high costs of processing, poor institutions and high costs of information 
gathering and monitoring contracts, are some of the costs associated with an inefficient set-up and 
higher margins (Jabbar et al., 2008; Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002). On the other hand, it is 
assumed that in a competitive environment, market power and hence marketing margins are 
reduced, creating a more efficient industry (Schroeter and Azzam, 1991; Porter, 1998). In this 
sense, a liberalization process like the one experimented by the Mexican coffee sector should end 
up in a competitive structure in which marketing margins of traders are low. 
 
What can the presence (or absence) of contracts between coffee traders tell us, both about them 
and about the Mexican coffee sector? According to Brousseau and Glachant (2002), the analysis of 
contracts allows us to address a number of important concepts for understanding the economic 
behaviour of agents. By investigating contractual relationships, we can understand how agents 
make their decisions and how they have been adapting to the actual institutional environment. 
 
Moreover, studying contractual agreements between Mexican coffee traders can shed light on the 
close link of these agreements with markets, institutions and the organization of firms (Williamson, 
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1998). Above, we have mentioned how our analysis is framed by the notions of NIE, and thus by 
TCE theory. In terms of contracts, TCE portraits contracts as methods to constrain ex-post 
behaviour, given the fact that there may be opportunistic behaviour, information asymmetries, 
differences in bargaining power, and possible hold-up situations from asset-specific investments 
among agents (Williamson, 1979). TCE focuses as well on the determinants and the duration of 
contracts. It also distinguishes between a contractual and a non-contractual exchange, which has 
implications in terms of the formality of relationships (Masten and Saussier, 2000). 
 
The Mexican coffee sector went from being ruled by a state-led marketing board to a free market 
set-up. This meant that part of the role played by the government in the regulated era had to be 
taken up by private agents. This role included not only buying, processing and marketing the coffee 
from growers but also providing them with financial and technical assistance. Those changes meant 
that new arrangements between these agents also had to be established. They may do so in order 
to reduce the transaction costs and the risk in the coffee market. One of these arrangements is 
that traders, especially exporters, may be vertically integrated in order to reduce transaction costs 
(Mehta and Chavas, 2008; Williamson, 2000; Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002). 
 
Yet, we also observe that there are various actors in the post-liberalization era besides exporters or 
transnational firms. Small-scale traders still exist because large-scale traders face higher assembly 
costs compared to local/regional traders. The large-scale firms lack the information the local and 
regional collectors have about the geographical area where they make their purchases. Small-scale 
traders know where the growers live and where the best coffee is sold. This means that new 
contractual arrangements were also created between large- and small-scale traders, depicting an 
agency relationship. In the first section of our analysis, we will investigate factors that may affect 
this contractual choice, elements relating to asset-specific investments, trade-credit relationships, 
and the type of coffee that is marketed by contracting partners. 
 
A prime reason for wanting to secure a trade relationship is having made investments that are 
specific to these relationships. Traders who invest in machinery or in assets that can only be used 
in coffee-related activities may want to have contracts with their buyers in order to reduce the risk 
of being out of the market. In this sense, having a long-term contract may give them higher 
benefits, since they will not face ex-post opportunistic behaviour from their buyers, who are aware 
of the traders’ sunk costs due to asset-specific investments (Williamson, 1979). 
 
However, traders who face recurrent transactions with their buyers, for example those who sell 
coffee every day, and who have not made any specific investments besides this, may not need a 
contractual agreement with their buyers. Repeated interactions between agents can lead to trust-
like relationships that do not rely on formal agreements to secure transactions (Fafchamps and 
Minten, 1999). 
 
Traders may also face asymmetries in information. Some large traders are unaware of the location 
of coffee growers or local collectors. With this in mind, small- or medium-scale intermediaries who 
know where to buy coffee can signal large-scale buyers that they have this knowledge and may 
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want to enter into a contract with them. In order to protect this information, intermediaries may 
want to negotiate better prices. If the intermediaries who know where to buy coffee provide this 
information to a buyer without a contract, there is no guarantee that the buyer will buy the coffee 
from them. A contract may also reduce search costs involved in transactions and in this sense both 
parties could benefit utility from an agreement. 
 
Traders face an uncertainty that may be due to price volatility in the coffee market. Considering 
this possibility, intermediaries may want to have a contract with their buyer in which they can 
negotiate schemes to share the risks of a volatile market before the harvest season starts. This 
kind of agreements, in which uncertainty is reduced, may give them a higher utility. However, not 
all coffee traders face such uncertainty. There are traders who do not rely on coffee to make their 
living because they have another business parallel to marketing coffee. If traders can diversify their 
sources of income, they have a reason for not having a contract. Moreover, traders who have 
different lucrative activities usually do not have coffee asset-specific investments, hence another 
reason for not having a contract. 
 
It is important to clarify that the traders in our sample ranged from small collectors to exporters, 
which means that the stage in which each agent operated may vary. Some of them buy directly 
from coffee farmers (or are in fact coffee growers themselves) and perform their activities at a 
local level. Others buy coffee from these local intermediaries and sell it to traders who operate at a 
state or national level. We also interviewed roasters who sell their coffee directly to consumers. 
These characteristics will be taken into account when we analyse the contracting decisions these 
agents made. Of course, a contract is an agreement between two parties, so the characteristics of 
one side are just half of the story to explain contractual choices. However, having these different 
agents in our sample also allows us to depict how the other side of the contract might behave, 
since we cover different stages in the supply chain. Unfortunately, because of time and money 
constraints, we did not interview coffee producers who were the providers of the first stage of the 
coffee supply chain. 
 
Market institutions are a key factor when studying performance. The rules of the game can shape 
the way in which traders decide to run their business. In this analysis, we will use market 
institutions as a tool to understand traders’ performance. These institutions can determine the way 
in which traders purchase and sell their coffee, how they pay and receive payment, and also the 
way in which they interact with other traders (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). The assets and the socio-
economic characteristics of each trader, however, can also determine their trading practices. 
According to Jabbar et al. (2008), actors who face the same market institutions can have different 
trading practices, denoting that there are trader-specific variables affecting trading behaviour, and 
thus, their performance. 
 
We have argued that new agents entering the sector were also a consequence of liberalization. 
These changes, as we have explained, should furthermore impact traders’ performance. From the 
fieldwork done for this study we observed that, after the liberalization, former exporters decided to 
become more involved in upstream steps of the supply chain; some of them acquired infrastructure 
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that was left by the extinct INMECAFE. However, in the past twenty years, there has been little 
new investment in processing plants and infrastructure related to the coffee sector. This poses a 
constraint to the coffee chain, since processing plants are operating with old machinery. The lack of 
machinery to process coffee and roads in some regions also shapes the behaviour of traders, since 
they have to take this condition into account in their trading practices. These factors can also affect 
the performance of traders. With all of the previous in mind, to analyse the marketing margins of 
the Mexican coffee intermediaries, we will make an OLS model in order to assess which variables 
can determine the performance of traders, including having a contract. 
 
We use marketing margins as an indicator of traders’ performance as in Jabbar et al. (2008) and 
Mose (2007) since they can give an indication of how traders perform given the minimization of 
their variable costs. These margins are measured as the difference between the purchase and the 
selling price of a quintal of parchment coffee.20 It is important to note that in our fieldwork we got 
information from traders who trade other types of coffee besides parchment coffee. In this logic, 
we had to make an adjustment in order to make the quantities and prices of coffee traded by each 
trader comparable. For this reason we transformed prices from other types of coffee into price of 
parchment coffee. This was done by first applying a weight conversion and secondly adding or 
subtracting the associated average costs of processing from cherry to parchment and from 
parchment to green coffee, respectively. After this process, we obtained all prices in terms of 
quintals of parchment coffee purchased and sold by intermediaries. Then, we calculated the 
difference between buying and selling prices and we ended up with gross marketing margins. 
 
In the model specification section, we try to translate the theory into an empirical model that we 
can estimate. The fact that traders decide to have contracts with their buyers is important in 
understanding the setting in which they interact with each other. Knowing which factors can affect 
this decision can help us comprehend how the Mexican coffee chain is shaped and how the 
institutional environment (the rules of the game) relates to trader’s decisions to have contracts – 
the play of the game. 
3.3. Data and methods 
 
In Mexico, coffee is produced in twelve states. These states comprise 52 regions, which represent 
541 municipalities (Escamilla et al., 2005; SIAP, 2008). For the purpose of this work, two states 
(Oaxaca and Veracruz) were selected to investigate the relationships among coffee traders and the 
environment in which they interact. Oaxaca is located on the Pacific Ocean slope, whereas Veracruz 
is located on the Gulf of Mexico slope. The Oaxaca producing regions are characterized by long 
periods of dry and hot weather, which helps the picking and processing of coffee beans. As a 
consequence, most of the coffee that is marketed in this state is either parchment or green coffee. 
The Veracruz producing areas have humid weather and several periods of rain throughout the year. 
This means that farmers cannot dry their coffee as easily as in Oaxaca, which results in them 
selling cherry coffee to the intermediaries (FIRA, 2003). 
                                            
20 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
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It is important to mention that cherry coffee is highly perishable and preferably must be processed 
within 24 hours after picking. We argue that these differences may have an impact on the way in 
which coffee traders interact with each other, on their performance, and on the type of 
mechanisms they choose to enforce their relationships. 
 
After choosing the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, the next step was to pick the regions (composed 
of some neighbouring municipalities) in which the investigation was to be carried out. In this study, 
four regions were selected, two in each state. For this purpose we established five criteria: the 
average altitude of the coffee plantations, having electricity in the households (a proxy for 
remoteness or isolation), having paved road (a proxy for accessibility to urban areas), coffee 
cooperative participation, and the number of intermediaries registered in the municipality. 
 
Table 3.1. Characteristics of coffee per producing state in Mexico. 
 
   State  Land with 
coffee (ha) 
Land harvested 
(ha) 
  Production 
(tons of cherry 
coffee) 
Yield (tons of 
cherry coffee 
per ha) 
   Farmers Average land 
per farmer (ha) 
 
Chiapas 253,462 251,951 529,250 2.10 174,571 1.45 
Oaxaca 185,187 160,888 165,829 1.03 102,513 1.81 
Veracruz 153,435 152,450 332,598 2.18 86,961 1.76 
Puebla 88,577 70,066 259,246 3.70 47,124 1.88 
Guerrero 54,328 53,917 51,152 0.95 21,326 2.55 
Hidalgo 26,335 26,335 40,197 1.53 34,616 0.76 
San Luís Potosí 22,539 22,539 18,688 0.83 17,552 1.28 
Nayarit 19,473 19,473 29,394 1.51 5,401 3.61 
Jalisco 4,497 3,984 4,357 1.09 1,106 4.07 
Colima 3,018 2,633 2,566 0.97 820 3.68 
Tabasco 1,040 1,040 619 0.60 1,211 0.86 
Querétaro 300 300 150 0.50 296 1.01 
Total 812,191 765,576 1,434,046 1.87 493,497 1.65 
Source: My own elaboration with information from SIAP (2008, 2010). 
Note: Land with coffee, farmers, and average land per farmer referred to 2008, while the other data are from the 2008-08 
harvesting season. 
 
Considering the altitude where coffee orchards are, municipalities that are located in the range of 
600-900 metres above sea level (masl) in general have few market restrictions. Municipalities 
above 900 masl, on the other hand, are more likely to encounter restrictions in marketing their 
coffee because of their geography; so, the ones located on a higher altitude are labelled as being 
faced with high market restrictions. 
 
The criterion of electricity gives an idea of the conditions in which intermediaries can operate. 
Municipalities in which more than 75% of the coffee growers do not have electricity in their house 
were considered as encountering high market restrictions. On the other hand, those municipalities 
with 25% or more of its coffee growers having electricity were labelled as encountering low market 
restrictions. 
 
The availability of paved road was measured as the percentage of coffee farmers at the municipal 
level who do not have this service provided to their communities. A low percentage indicates low 
restrictions for a municipality to market their coffee. With this in mind, if the percentage of not 
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Figure 3.1. Location of coffee-producing states and 
selected regions in Oaxaca and Veracruz, 
Mexico. 
having paved roads was equal or less than 20, the municipality was considered as having few 
market restrictions. In the same sense, if the percentage was more than 20, it was considered a 
municipality facing high coffee market restrictions. 
 
The percentage of coffee growers participating in a cooperative was also taken into account. The 
idea is that the more organization there is in a municipality, the more easily good marketing 
conditions for coffee arise. Thus, municipalities with 15% or less coffee growers involved in a 
cooperative – indicating a low level of organization – are considered as facing high market 
restrictions. This means that municipalities with more than 15% of their coffee growers 
participating in a cooperative are considered as encountering few market restrictions. 
 
Regarding the intermediaries in the municipality, their number was calculated using the list of 
coffee traders who were registered with the Mexican Association of the Coffee Production Chain 
(AMECAFE, for its initials in Spanish) (AMECAFE, 2009). Municipalities with less than four registered 
intermediaries were considered as suffering from market restrictions. Therefore, municipalities with 
less than or equal to three intermediaries registered were considered as being faced with high 
market restrictions. Those municipalities where there were more than three intermediaries were 
considered as having few market restrictions to commercialise coffee. 
 
With the above criteria, we then classified municipalities in Oaxaca and Veracruz into two 
categories, based on the number of restrictions they face. Those with four or more high market 
restrictions, including a low level of 
intermediary concentration, were 
grouped in the first category. Those 
with less than four restrictions but 
with a high level of intermediaries 
registered were included in the second 
category. In total, there were 19 
potential high market restrictions 
clusters – 11 in Oaxaca and 8 in 
Veracruz – and 14 potential low 
market restrictions clusters – 7 in 
Oaxaca and 7 in Veracruz. A 
randomized selection was then 
performed to determine one region 
per category and state. The four 
selected regions, two in each state, 
are shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
The selected region in Oaxaca with high market restrictions comprises the municipalities of San 
Felipe Usila and San Felipe Jalapa de Díaz. For the region with low market restrictions in this state, 
the municipalities included were Pluma Hidalgo, San Pedro Pochutla and Candelaria Loxicha. In the 
state of Veracruz, the municipalities included in the high market restrictions region were Chocaman 
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Table 3.2. General characteristics of the interviewed 
intermediaries. 
       Characteristics Mean  SD 
Age (years) 51.38 10.28 
Schooling (years) 9.40 4.35 
Gender (1 if male) 0.94 0.23 
Time in the business (years) 14.12 9.43 
Trader has another occupation (1 if yes) 0.43 0.50 
Months devoted to coffee trading 6.85 3.15 
Employees in the business 4.67 5.01 
Sample size         53  
Source: My own elaboration with data from the survey. 
and Tomatlan. For the low market restrictions region, the municipalities were Teocelo and 
Cosautlan de Carvajal. 
 
In order to conduct the interviews, we constructed a list with buyers selected in three different 
steps. The first was to match the list of registered intermediaries in the AMECAFE with the 
municipalities that were selected for this research. We then had a list of registered coffee traders 
per municipality. 
 
The second step involved was to ask municipal and local authorities about coffee intermediaries 
working there. This procedure was undertaken in the field as we visited each of the selected 
municipalities. We then compared the names given with the ones in the registered list and the ones 
we found to be non-registered. After having gathered the whole list of intermediaries per 
municipality, we proceeded to select a random sample from them. Both the registered and the 
non-registered intermediaries selected added up to a total of 34. 
 
The third step was to include relevant intermediaries that were referred to by the people we 
interviewed in the field. These relevant traders were described as being one step further in the 
coffee chain compared to those who referred them. Also, some of the relevant traders operate at a 
state or even a national level. In total, we surveyed 53 intermediaries. Apart from the surveys with 
intermediaries, we also held meetings with local authorities and people involved in the National 
Coffee System Committees (NCSC).21 For this purpose, we used previously designed semi-
structured questionnaires. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the general characteristics of interviewed intermediaries. Traders are on average 
middle-aged, with considerable experience in the business of trading coffee. Most of them started 
their businesses after the market 
liberalization reforms took place in the 
early nineteen nineties. In spite of this, 
68% of the respondents were familiar 
with coffee practices under the regulated 
market. This means that even though 
intermediaries started their businesses 
on average fourteen years ago, they had 
previous knowledge of what buying and 
selling coffee was about. 
 
Another aspect of traders’ characteristics was that 43% (23) of the respondents were working in 
other activities besides coffee marketing. Among these, eleven respondents worked in local grocery 
stores. The rest of them diversified their income by producing and/or selling other agricultural 
products and by trading livestock. Even though these intermediaries do not rely solely on coffee as 
                                            
21 The NCSC are non-governmental instances constituted to serve as mechanisms for permanent planning, communication and 
consultation between different actors in the coffee chain. 
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Table 3.3. Classification of interviewed intermediaries. 
      Category 
Number of 
respondents Percentage 
Local collectors 18 34.0 
Regional collectors 7 13.2 
Local cooperatives 4 7.5 
Regional cooperatives 3 5.7 
Traders/processors 8 15.1 
Roasters 3 5.7 
Exporters 8 15.1 
Others 2 3.8 
Total 53 100.0 
Source: My own elaboration with data from the survey. 
 
an economic activity, sixteen of them agreed that marketing coffee is the activity that promises 
them the highest economic benefits. It is important to keep in mind that coffee is a seasonal crop; 
in the case of Mexico, the harvest season runs from October to April. Respondents devote on 
average seven months to buy/sell coffee. Those who spend more months in the business and who 
engage in the processing or roasting of coffee are large exporting companies. 
 
Using data from the survey, we classified the intermediaries by the size of the area where they 
operate, and also by determining whether they add value to the coffee they buy and sell by 
processing. As can be seen in Table 3.3, almost half of the interviewed people operated as 
collectors on a local or regional basis. This means that this group of intermediaries did not add any 
value to the coffee they marketed, apart from transport and selection. Only 13% of the 
respondents were affiliated with a local or regional cooperative. There were only three cases in the 
sample in which cooperatives directly exported their coffee. The rest of the cooperatives only 
collected coffee from its members and 
then sold it to other intermediaries. In 
terms of value added, we found that 
20% of the respondents could be 
classified as processors/roasters. Also, 
if we look at regional differences, given 
the spatial set-up of our field work, we 
observed that processing activities 
often took place in areas where 
competition was high. 
 
Regarding intermediaries who are involved in processing activities, we found that 20% of all 
respondents were involved in wet processing; all wet processing plants were located in the state of 
Veracruz, as expected. The average wet processing capacity was 120 quintals per day.22 Survey 
data also show that intermediaries in Oaxaca only traded parchment coffee.23 This proves that our 
assumptions about differences in the type of coffee that is traded in each state are reflected in the 
characteristics of our sample. We observed that 30% of the respondents were involved in dry 
processing activities, with an average capacity of 140 quintals per day.24 More than half of the 
intermediaries involved in dry processing were exporting their coffee, and they accounted for all 
respondents who were classified as exporters. This is understandable, as most of the coffee is 
exported as green – and therefore processed – coffee. 
 
                                            
22 Coffee processed by the wet method is called wet processed or washed coffee. The wet method requires the use of specific 
equipment and substantial quantities of water. Following the wet process, the fruit covering the seeds/beans is removed before 
they are dried. 
23 Parchment coffee is obtained after cherry coffee beans go through wet processing. To obtain green coffee, parchment coffee 
goes through dry processing. 
24 The dry process is the oldest method of processing coffee. The entire cherry after harvest is first cleaned and then placed in 
the sun to dry on tables or on patios. The dry process is also known as unwashed or as the natural one. 
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Roasters accounted for 5.7% of all respondents and operated mainly at a local level. They supplied 
to local cafeterias or stores, and some even had their own coffee bar. All roasters were located in 
regions with few market restrictions, which again showed that all value-adding activities were 
concentrated in areas where it was easier to buy and sell this product. 
 
We also asked traders if they had five or more competitors in the area where they operated. A total 
of 50% of local collectors and 86% of regional collectors mentioned that they had five or more 
competitors. Also 50% of both local and regional cooperatives stated that they had five or more 
competitors in the area where they operated. For processors, roasters and exporters, the 
percentage of traders who answered that they had five or more competitors was 75%, 67%, and 
100%, respectively. We can see that in all stages of the supply chain, traders perceived their 
operational context as a quite competitive environment in terms of the number of traders they 
observed. However, it is clear that most of our sample consisted of traders present in the primary 
collection level of the coffee sector. As one of the interviewed coffee producers’ leaders affirmed, 
high competition is established in areas where coffee farmers sell cherry coffee. This condition 
allows coffee producers to receive higher prices than those who are located in places with low 
competition. 
 
In the survey, 94% of the respondents had coffee growers as their suppliers. In addition, some of 
the interviewees made direct purchases from coffee farmers, even when they worked at the 
regional or national level. Only 28% of the interviewed intermediaries had a contract with their 
suppliers. Survey statistics indicate that half of those who had agreements stated that it was a 
verbal one. 
 
An agreement between intermediaries and coffee growers can be beneficial for both participants. 
Intermediaries provide financial support to coffee producers to implement the picking, mainly to 
cover the transport of the coffee pickers and payments during the first days or week of the 
harvesting season. As was commented by some interviewers, they give money in advance to some 
coffee farmers in order to engage them for the coming harvesting season. Some respondents said 
that using this kind of financial agreement allowed them to pay a lower price and still receive a 
large quantity of coffee. The type of agreement set up with the buyers depends on the type of 
coffee that growers normally deliver. 
 
To have as much coffee as possible, large firms instruct their commissioners to set up some kind of 
agreement with coffee producers. Normally these commissioners have good knowledge about the 
type of coffee that can be bought in the region. They are financed with money from the firms in 
order to fund some coffee producers who will later become their providers. It was found that some 
companies also had skilled commissioners to provide technical assistance to coffee growers in 
producing and processing coffee. They did so to improve the coffee quality. 
 
For many small-scale producers, receiving economic support from the buyers establishes the 
relationship between the growers and the intermediaries. This kind of financing agreements 
became more common practice under the actual condition than they had been in the ICAs´ era; 
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Table 3.4. Assets owned by interviewed intermediaries. 
Asset 
Number of 
respondents Percentage 
Vehicle 30 56.6 
Store 43 81.1 
Coffee-cupping laboratory 6 11.3 
Processing plant 18 34.0 
Source: My own elaboration with data from the survey. 
 
nowadays, no formal bank credit is available for small- and medium-scale farmers in the Mexican 
coffee sector. For some coffee farmers, an option to tackle this difficulty is to become a member of 
a cooperative that sometimes has access to economic support from governmental or non-
governmental organizations. 
 
Another aspect we investigated in the survey was the ownership of assets by intermediaries, which 
is shown in Table 3.4. Looking at regional differences, we observed that there are more 
intermediaries with vehicles in the zone with high market restrictions in Oaxaca. We argue that this 
happens because this area is isolated, since it is located in a mountainous area and has a 
precarious road infrastructure. Thus, intermediaries should own vehicles to overcome these 
difficulties. This can also imply that traders located in a region with high market restrictions face 
higher transaction costs due to the mentioned isolation that may reflect in their performance and 
contract choices. Only few intermediaries 
own a coffee-cupping laboratory, and they 
are exporters. Cupping is important since 
it is a way of inspecting and ensuring the 
intrinsic quality of the coffee before it is 
exported. 
 
A third of the interviewed intermediaries own a processing plant, and most of them are located in 
the state of Veracruz. The fact that coffee growers mainly sell cherry coffee in the Veracruz regions 
creates a need for processing infrastructure, given that the coffee quality decreases if it is not 
processed within 24 hours after picking. Related to this, 80% of the respondents own a specific 
depot or place where they buy and sell coffee. The rest buys and stores coffee either in their house 
or in the processing plants. Despite this, traders stated that they do not store coffee seeking for 
better prices. They only use these depots to collect the required amount of coffee for transport 
later on. Local and regional intermediaries in Oaxaca usually take one week to gather the amount 
of parchment coffee necessary for a load. In Veracruz, those who buy and sell cherry coffee take 
one day to collect the coffee and they all sell it within the next 24 hours. Exporters are the ones 
who take more than a week to gather the amount of coffee needed, given the volume they trade. 
 
When asked about the problems they face as coffee traders, 60% of the respondents mentioned 
that price volatility was the main obstacle to commercialise coffee. Others mentioned a lack of 
security when transporting both coffee and money, and quality deficiency as problems. In terms of 
risk coping strategies adopted by intermediaries, we found that 30% of the sample tried to obtain 
good information about market conditions and prices. The most common way to gather information 
about prices was by phone, accounting for 95% of the respondents; internet was used by 37% of 
the sample. Most local and regional intermediaries made daily phone calls to their buyers to know 
the price for the coffee they were going to sell. 
 
The most common type of the agreement between intermediaries was an oral contract. Only 15 
respondents mentioned they used written contracts with their buyers to reduce any risk and 
uncertainty, and they were mainly exporters who needed a contract to export their coffee. In these 
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cases, the contract was compulsory to deal with customs authorities. This group of respondents 
were also the only ones to state that they used the futures market as a price risk management 
activity. Even though the government is trying to attract small intermediaries and growers into 
price hedging programmes, requirements are not easy to comply with. 
 
Most local and regional intermediaries said they interact with only one downstream trader each 
year. This shows that repeated transactions take place between traders along the coffee chain. 
These repeated interactions may also be important when analysing the (non-)existence of 
contracts. The fact that traders have known each other for years and that they trust each other 
may explain the absence of written contracts. Verbal agreements arise in these relationships, as we 
observed in the survey. However, if there are no written contracts, how can buyers be sure that 
sellers are going to give them their coffee year after year (or even day after day)? Forty per cent of 
the sample mentioned that they receive credit from their buyers at zero interest, and all of them 
stated they use this money to buy coffee. 
 
Another aspect that can be addressed by the data in the survey is to see if these repeated 
transactions between traders are a sign of an environment in which intermediaries are not free to 
choose whom to sell to, especially in the areas faced with high market restrictions. To assess this, 
we asked intermediaries whether they were now selling to a different person than they were five 
years ago. We observed that in the Oaxaca region with market restrictions, 60% of the 
intermediaries had changed buyer, because they were either looking for better prices or the last 
buyer did not respect their previous agreements. This result can be seen as an indication of 
intermediaries being free to choose the buyer that best fits their needs. 
 
Not all interviewed traders followed regulations established in the coffee sector. Twenty five per 
cent of the sample was registered in the National Coffee System (NCS). After registration, agents 
have to fulfil some requirements and pay an annual fee to be part of this system. The requirements 
are that one has to be legally established as a firm or, in the case of a natural person, one needs to 
have proper identification, a fiscal address, on has to be up to date with tax payments, and one 
needs to have a written recommendation from an active member of the coffee sector, among other 
things. Sixty per cent of the respondents were not registered in the NCS as intermediaries. 
 
Most of the intermediaries who were not registered in the system belonged to the categories of 
local and regional collectors. When asked about the reasons for not being registered they 
mentioned that there were many requirements and a lot of paper work in order to be in the 
system. Since registered traders issue a bill to coffee growers in which the quantity and price of the 
transaction is stated, and this bill is then used by growers to get government subsidies, most 
unregistered intermediaries get these bills from buyers working downstream in the coffee chain to 
satisfy the producers’ demand for the bills. 
 
The coffee chain starts with cherry coffee sold by growers; it is then transformed to parchment 
coffee, which is processed into green coffee, the type that is commonly exported. After that the 
green coffee can be transformed into roasted and ground coffee. In terms of the conversion from 
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cherry to parchment coffee, we know that 245 kilogrammes of the former make one quintal of the 
latter. Also, the average cost for doing wet processing is 146 Mexican pesos per quintal. In this 
case, with the weight conversion, we multiply the price of one kilogramme of cherry coffee to get a 
price per quintal of parchment coffee and add the processing cost to make it comparable. 
 
When going from green to parchment coffee, the weight conversion applied is that a quintal of 
green coffee is equivalent to 0.80 multiplied by the weight of a quintal of parchment, and the costs 
to be subtracted are 110 Mexican pesos per quintal, indicating dry processing. We subtract the 
costs, since green coffee is one step further in the processing stage and to get prices in terms of 
parchment coffee can be seen as going backwards in this stage. To go from the prices of roasted 
coffee to those of parchment coffee, and knowing that the former is sold per kilogramme, we 
multiply by 37.5 to get the weight equivalent of a quintal (in kilogrammes). We also have to 
subtract the associated processing costs, which in this case are 267 Mexican pesos; this is because 
we subtract both the costs of going from parchment to green coffee (110 Mexican pesos per 
quintal) plus the costs of going from green to roasted coffee (157 Mexican pesos per quintal).25 
 
After this process, we obtained all prices in terms of quintals of parchment coffee purchased and 
sold by intermediaries. Then, we calculated the difference between buying and selling prices and 
we ended up with gross marketing margins. From the 53 traders in our sample, 44 observations 
were affected by this conversion. We could not perform the conversion on the whole sample, since 
some traders refused to tell us their selling price. Furthermore, a limitation to this conversion is 
that the average costs we took into account in this process could change for each trader given their 
infrastructure and technology. However, we also could not get more precise costs because most 
interviewees did not share this information with us. 
 
With the previous characterization of coffee traders in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico, 
we constructed a set of variables to answer the research questions. A logit regression was 
performed to find variables affecting the intermediaries’ decision to have a contract (or not) with 
their buyer. In this procedure, we used several explanatory variables related to individual, regional 
and market characteristics to predict the probability of a trader having a contract. To assess the 
performance of traders in the Mexican coffee sector, we calculated their gross margins. Then we 
investigated which variables affected the intermediaries’ performance thus measured. To do so, we 
performed an ordinary least squares regression. 
3.4. Model specification 
3.4.1. Contract choices 
 
The decision to contract with another agent can be expressed by the general and simplified form of 
a discrete choice model. In this case, an intermediary will choose to enter into a contract with his 
buyer if the expected benefits of having one are greater than those of arranging the transaction in 
an alternative way (Masten and Saussier, 2000). In other words, a trader will choose to enter into 
                                            
25 The processing costs per each of the steps in the supply chain were obtained from the interviewed processors. 
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a contract if the expected utility of having one is greater than the expected utility of not having a 
contract, otherwise the choice will be not to have a contract. 
 
We constructed a set of variables that represent the socio-economic characteristics of 
intermediaries, as well as some indicators of their business practices and their relationship both 
with other traders and the environment in which they perform their activities (Milagrosa, 2007). 
Table 3.5 lists the variables that were included in the regressions. For a more detailed relationship 
between variables and contract, see earlier pages of this chapter. 
 
The dependent variable was a dummy that took the value of one if a trader had a contract and zero 
if not. It also stood for those agents who were part of a vertically integrated organization. The first 
explanatory variable that we included was the experience in marketing coffee. We expected this 
variable to negatively affect the probability of having a contract, since experienced traders would 
know how to deal with uncertainty and market imperfections without having to formalize a contract 
with their buyer. 
 
The next factor we introduced as an explanatory variable was the fact of having another business 
besides coffee trading. If traders had other sources of income, they were likely to not have a 
contract, since this diversification was assumed to reduce their risks. Also, the statement that they 
had other economic activities shows that they did not depend on a specific investment that could 
lead them to hold-up situations with their coffee buyer. For these reasons, we argue that engaging 
in other business has a negative effect on the contracting decision. 
 
    Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis (N = 53). 
   Variable                Units Mean SD 
Having contract 1 if the intermediary has a contract 0.60 0.49 
Margins1 Mexican pesos per quintal 410 687 
Experience2 Years of experience in the coffee business 14.09 9.21 
Other business 1 if the intermediary has another business 0.43 0.50 
Owns vehicle 1 if the intermediary owns a vehicle 0.57 0.50 
Interaction term3 1 if the intermediary has another business and owns a vehicle 0.30 0.46 
Roaster 1 if the intermediary is a roaster 0.23 0.42 
Wet processing plant 1 if the intermediary owns a processing plant 0.25 0.43 
Dry mill 1 if the intermediary owns a dry mill 0.30 0.46 
Long-term relationship 1 if the intermediary established a long-term relationship 0.34 0.48 
Contract 1 if the intermediary has contracts 0.57 0.29 
Sells cherry coffee 1 if the intermediary sells cherry coffee 0.19 0.39 
Competition 
1 if there is competition in the region where the intermediary 
works 
0.68 0.47 
Registered in the NCS 1 if the intermediary is registered in the NCS 0.42 0.50 
Buyer is registered 1 if the buyer is registered in the NCS 0.60 0.49 
Volume of sales4 Quintals per season 4,250 7,708 
Veracruz 1 if the intermediary resides in the state of Veracruz 0.49 0.54 
     Source: My own elaboration with data from the survey. 
     Notes: 1 The minimum is 25 and the maximum is 3,000. 
 2 The minimum is 2 and the maximum is 46. 
 3 The other business x owns a vehicle. 
 4 The minimum is 50 and the maximum is 36,000. 
 
In terms of traders’ assets, we included a dummy variable that represents whether traders owned 
a vehicle or not. Investing in a vehicle can be seen as an asset-specific investment if traders only 
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Table 3.6. Having or not having a contract per 
type of coffee intermediaries. 
Type of coffee 
Having a contract 
yes     no 
Cherry 5 7 
Parchment 14 5 
Green 4 1 
Roasted/ground 1 3 
Source: My own elaboration with data from the survey. 
 
used it to market their coffee. In this case, we expected that owning a vehicle positively affects the 
contractual decision. However, traders could have other businesses besides marketing coffee. In 
this sense, the effect of vehicle ownership could be more or less twofold. For this reason, we 
included an interaction term that depicts the fact that traders could own a vehicle and have other 
lucrative activities at the same time. Subsequently, we expected this interaction to negatively 
influence the choice of having a contract. 
 
The next variable in the model was a dummy that represents traders who had long-term 
relationships with their buyer. In this case, the variable had the value of 1 if the relationship dated 
back more than five years. Since trust and reputation among the traders and their buyer are 
factors that grow over time, we argue that having a long-term relationship can deter the decision 
to have a contract, since relational agreements can be chosen instead. 
 
Another variable included in our model was the fact that a trader sold cherry coffee. This 
characteristic implies that traders had to buy and sell the same product preferably within the 
following 24 hours after the coffee cherry had been picked from the trees, and thus repetition in 
transactions was evident. Being in a competitive environment could also affect the interaction 
among traders and, in this case, the probability of having a contract (see Table 3.6). For this 
reason, we included a dummy variable that indicates whether intermediaries had five or more 
competitors in the zone in which they 
operated. Since higher levels of competition 
may diminish opportunistic behaviour from 
intermediaries, given that their buyer could 
replace them (Bello et al., 1997; Fischer et 
al., 2009), we expected that competition 
would make it more likely for traders to 
have contracts. 
 
The statement of being registered as a trader in the NCS could also influence the contracting 
decision. Registered traders were more aware of the legal and normative framework of the coffee 
sector. This could make them rely more on formal agreements than on a spot market relationship. 
We also included a variable that depicts the information that traders might sell their coffee to 
registered buyers. The purpose of this was to find out whether dealing with such buyers leads to 
having a contract with them. 
 
As part of contracting decisions of traders in the Mexican coffee sector, factors like, among other 
things, asset specificity, bounded rationality, power relationships and opportunistic behaviour have 
an effect on the traders’ contracting decision. At the same time, these factors can also have an 
effect on the performance of the firm. In this study, by performance we mean the gross margins 
traders can get for the coffee they market, that is, the difference between purchase and selling 
prices. 
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Figure 3.2. Size of intermediaries vs. marketing margin 
(my own elaboration with data from the 
survey). 
3.4.2. Traders’ performance 
 
To find out which variables explain the variation of the margin, the gross margins were included in 
a linear regression model as dependent variable. In this sense, we regressed the margins on a set 
of variables depicting trader’s socio-economic, marketing and institutional characteristics. This 
linearization allows us to use the concepts drawn from the theory and apply them in an empirical 
way. The model was written as: 
 
                                                                                                         (1) 
 
where denotes gross margins for trader i;  is a vector which includes the aforementioned 
variables representing trader characteristics;  represents the parameters to be estimated, which  
are associated with the explanatory variables; and  represents a stochastic error term. 
 
The variables included in the regression model that estimates equation (1) and their descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table 3.5. These factors are also taken from the survey data obtained in 
our fieldwork. 
 
Experience in marketing coffee was the first independent factor included in the model. As we have 
mentioned, specific experience in marketing coffee is not the same as experience in the coffee 
sector, which can be given by a trader’s age. Most of the traders in our survey have had experience 
in the coffee sector even though they were not engaged in trading coffee. We expected a positive 
relation of this factor with the traders´ performance. 
 
In terms of the characteristics of the firms, we utilized the variable of whether a trader had another 
activity to obtain income from. We expected that if traders diversified their livelihood they would 
have lower margins because they did not rely solely on the profits from trading coffee (Jabbar et 
al., 2008). 
 
In theory, assets owned by a trader 
play a role in their performance. This 
is why we included vehicle ownership 
as an independent variable. The 
expectations for this variable were 
twofold. On the one hand, traders who 
own a vehicle may have more working 
capital than those who do not. In this 
sense, margins for these traders may 
be low, because they have the ability 
of having a large volume of business 
(see Figure 3.2). This means that even 
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though they have a small margin per quintal sold, they have the capital to buy more coffee and 
compensate (Jabbar et al., 2008). On the other hand, since a vehicle forms a costly asset, this 
would require a higher return from their business, thus margins might be high. 
 
The next set of variables show first the degree of integration that a given firm can have and 
secondly, the stage in the coffee chain in which a trader can be found. In our sample, some coffee 
agents had large margins but small businesses in terms of the quantity of the coffee they market. 
 
When intermediaries have dry processing facilities, this is often a sign of a vertically integrated 
firm. This means that traders have decided to integrate as a response to a marketing system in 
which transaction costs were high; market concentration or asset specificity applies. It also means 
that these traders adjusted to the new institutional environment and became more efficient by 
integrating, having increased productivity (Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002). We argue that this 
translates into lower margins per quintal although, as mentioned before, they might have a larger 
business, thus being able to buy and process a greater quantity of coffee. 
 
We also included a variable that indicates whether intermediaries traded cherry coffee. Traders 
who buy and sell cherry coffee should do the buying and selling transactions within 24 hours. This 
can be detrimental to their performance, since the urge to sell their coffee can deprive them of the 
opportunity to find better options in the market. This may also show that, given the environment in 
which they participate, they decide to sell cherry coffee because this means incurring lower costs. 
Hence, we expected a negative sign for this variable in the OLS regression. 
 
Operating in a (non-)competitive environment affects the way traders perform. This is why we 
included a variable that indicates whether a trader operated in a region with more than five 
traders. We expected that the more competitive the environment was, the smaller the margins 
would get (Mose, 2007). This means that firms will look to compensate low margins with larger 
volumes of coffee being marketed. 
 
Being registered in the NCS is another explanatory variable in the OLS model. Traders who had 
more knowledge about how to develop their business performed better or had lower margins than 
those who had less knowledge (who were not registered in the NCS). We also included a variable 
depicting whether traders faced buyers registered in the system. We did so to see whether these 
buyers took advantage of being registered, since this enabled them to give bills that growers could 
use to obtain government subsidies. Intermediaries might give lower prices to their providers in 
exchange for the bills; thus, traders would seek higher margins. 
 
The next variable included in the model concerned the decision made by traders to have a contract 
with their buyer. This comes from the reasoning that agents facing higher margins should turn to 
contractual arrangements. This variable tries to link the concepts of contract with the traders’ 
performance. Changes in the institutional framework should lead to contractual arrangements 
between parties in order to minimize costs (North, 1990). This means that having a contract should 
lead to lower margins as a consequence of such cost minimization. We should keep in mind that 
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Table 3.7. Determinants of contract engagement (logit). 
           Variables Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Experience  -0.037 (0.530)  
Other business  -0.115 (0.935)  
Owns a vehicle   0.831 (0.485)  
Interaction term  -0.913 (0.592)  
Roaster  -3.738 (0.019)** -0.73 
Wet processing plant  -2.571 (0.083)* -0.56 
Dry mill   2.886 (0.058)*  0.44 
Long-term relationship   1.080 (0.332)  
Sells cherry coffee  -3.215 (0.054)* -0.66 
Competition  -0.006 (0.995)  
Registered in the NCS   0.117 (0.926)  
Buyer is registered   1.050 (0.321)  
Veracruz  -0.156 (0.902)  
Intercept   1.486 (0.313)  
Observation numbers 53 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) index -24.28 
McFadden's R² 0.318  
Note: P-values in parenthesis. * and ** refer to significance at 10% and 
5%, respectively. 
the margins we consider for our model consist of the difference between buying and selling, and 
that the contract we analyse is between traders and their buyers. In this sense, if there is in fact a 
contractual agreement, it could only secure the selling price. We used the estimated probability of 
having a contract obtained from the logit model to avoid a potential endogeneity problem. 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Determinants of contract choices 
 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the logit estimation of the model for the decision made by traders 
to have a contract with their buyer. Results from the logit model are better interpreted when 
marginal changes in the probability 
are addressed. In this case, it is 
interesting to see how a unit 
change in one of the explanatory 
variables affects the likelihood of 
having a contract, keeping all other 
variables in the model at their 
mean value. This effect is 
measured by marginal probabilities 
(Greene, 2003; Milagrosa, 2007). 
The marginal effects for our logit 
regression are also reported in the 
same table; these are presented 
only for those variables that were 
significant at least at 10%. 
 
When dealing with continuous variables, we assume a one-unit change in the estimator (i.e. a one-
year change in trader experience in the coffee business) for interpreting the effect on the decision 
to have a contract or not. For discrete variables, the assumed change is from 0 to 1 (from not 
owning to owning a vehicle). 
 
The first variable found to be significant (at a 5% level) in our model was the one that indicates 
whether a trader is a roaster. The magnitude of the marginal effect is also significant, since being a 
roaster decreases the probability of having a contract by 73%. However, the sign of the coefficient 
is not consistent with our expectations and with what theory tells us. We expected a positive sign 
(meaning an increase in the probability of having a contract) given the fact that roasters are 
traders who are vertically integrated and have made specific investments. An explanation we found 
for this was the reality that in our sample, most roasters do not trade large amounts of coffee and 
usually sell their coffee to incidental customers. This means that they may choose other types of 
arrangements with these clients, especially spot market transactions, rather than formal contracts. 
 
The wet processing plant variable negatively affects the decision to have a contract. It confirms the 
proposition that intermediaries with asset-specific investments are more likely to have a contract. 
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The opposite result was found for having a dry mill. This magnitude of the associated marginal 
effect of the variable of owning a dry mill increases the likelihood of having a contract by 44%. 
 
The last variable that was found to affect the contracting decision is the one depicting a trader who 
sells cherry coffee. The associated marginal effect shows that selling cherry coffee decreases the 
probability of having a contract by 66%. This finding is in line with our expectations. Traders who 
sell cherry coffee face repeated transactions with their buyer, and then trust-like relationships can 
be chosen over formal contractual agreements (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999). 
 
The result related to selling cherry coffee suggests that trading this type of coffee is an option for 
intermediaries who do not want to (or cannot) make costly and specific investments, which, as 
observed, would induce them to use a contract. Traders who sell cherry coffee are located 
specifically in the state of Veracruz, and these geographical characteristics have shaped their 
behaviour, as can be seen in the above results. They have also somewhat adapted to the 
constraints their environment poses in terms of selling unprocessed coffee, which does not add 
much value to their product and can affect their performance in the business. 
3.5.2. Traders’ performance 
 
In this section the outcome from the regression analysis explaining performance is presented. 
Initially, we did a linear regression and estimated the parameters via OLS. However, post-
estimation tests showed that heteroskedasticity was present. There were also problems with the 
normality of the residuals and the predicting ability of the model. Nevertheless, no excessive 
multicollinearity was found in this first regression. 
 
In order to tackle the previous difficulties, we made a log transformation of the gross margins. This 
was done since the original dependent variable (margin) had influential outliers and its standard 
deviation was larger than its mean, which could be a reason for the problems obtained in the first 
regression’s post-estimation tests. Then, we ran a robust regression with the log-transformed 
margins as a dependent variable. This second regression showed the assumption of 
homoskedasticity and normality of the residuals to be acceptable, as well as a better predicting 
ability compared to the previous model. 
 
Taking into account the possibility that having a higher gross margin would make it more likely to 
there would be more money to start another business or to buy a vehicle; and also that having a 
higher gross margin, traders would be more likely to be registered in the NCS, we suspected that 
there was an endogeneity problem. We did a Hausman test for those variables to check this and 
found that the problem was not present. 
 
The results for the second estimation procedure are included in Table 3.8. The first variable listed 
as significant for our analysis of margins is the intermediaries´ experience, which indicates that an 
increase of one year of experience would reduce the coffee margin by 2.4%. This result suggests 
that when intermediaries have more experience, they have a bigger coffee business in terms of the 
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Table 3.8. Factors explaining gross log-
transformed margins (OLS). 
      Variable Coefficient 
Experience -0.024 (0.096)* 
Other business -0.336 (0.226) 
Owns a vehicle  0.129 (0.678) 
Roaster  0.998 (0.050)** 
Dry mill  0.342 (0.446) 
Sells cherry coffee -2.025 (0.000)*** 
Competition -0.590 (0.054)* 
Registered in the NCS  1.055 (0.008)*** 
Buyer is registered in the NCS -0.000 (0.999) 
Having a contract -1.609 (0.041)** 
Intercept  6.705 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  43 
R squared  79.99  
Note: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
quantity of coffee they trade. According to this line of reasoning, their profit may rely on the 
quantity of coffee rather than on the amount they earn per unit. It also indicates that they do not 
exploit their expertise as a monopolist, and that they pass the lower costs on to their customers. 
 
Being a roaster increases the margins by 
99.8%. In a way this contradicts the theory, 
since we mentioned that vertically integrated 
firms or firms that do processing should 
have low per quintal margins, given that 
they are more efficient and productive. 
However, this result is in line with our 
expectations, since roasters in our sample 
are somewhat special. They often do not 
participate much in competition with other 
traders, as they sell their coffee in places 
where there are no other roasters or they at 
least they differentiate their coffee from the 
others. 
 
The model also shows that a trader who sells cherry coffee will have lower margins than one who 
sells other types of coffee. As we mentioned before, traders dealing with cherry coffee have to buy 
and sell their product within the next 24 hours to avoid loss of quality. Traders who sell cherry 
coffee also face lower transaction costs and this is reflected in lower margins. The latter may 
indicate that there are not enough incentives and market institutions encouraging them to invest in 
adding processing value to their product. 
 
The results show that an intermediary who operates in a more competitive environment 
experiences a 59% decrease in the margins. This finding is consistent with the theory. Mose (2007) 
has stated that higher competition may lead to a lower marketing margin. 
 
The output of our regression indicates that traders who are registered and arguably operate under 
the rules set by the current structure of the coffee sector get larger margins than those who are 
not. This finding may be related to the fact that registered buyers are obliged to declare taxes and 
pay the government a certain amount for the value of the coffee they buy. The latter is in 
compliment to a government programme named The Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund. 
 
The fact that traders decide to engage in contractual agreements with their buyers reduces the 
gross margins. This shows that, as theory suggested, agents who make the decision to have 
contracts may face lower costs, since the reason to enter into such contracts was to tackle risks 
and uncertainty present in the market. In this sense, when dealing with lower costs, traders can 
settle for smaller per quintal margins. The rest of the variables included in the model made no 
significant contribution toward explaining coffee traders’ performance. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
The liberalization of the market should bring about a change in the institutional environment of a 
commodity market. This has to result in a more competitive framework, in which agents have to 
find new ways to relate to each other to increase their earnings. In this chapter, we investigated 
whether that proposition can be proved for the Mexican coffee supply chain. Twenty years have 
passed since the Mexicans experienced a transition from a state-controlled system into a free 
market. We provide some evidence on the successes and failures of the new institutional 
framework for this sector. 
 
The methodology we used to select the intermediaries also allowed us to depict the main actors of 
the supply chain in each of its stages. In the results section, we have presented information about 
trading practices, traders’ characteristics and the environment in which intermediaries perform 
their business. By analysing the data we collected in the survey, we were able to understand how 
traders behave and which decisions they make, for instance with regard to contracting sales. 
 
The objectives of this chapter were to identify and explain the contractual choices of traders in 
Oaxaca and Veracruz, Mexico, and to examine the performance of these agents. We found several 
variables that affect traders’ contracting decisions (being a roaster, having wet and dry processing 
facilities, selling cherry coffee) and also factors that influence traders marketing margins 
(intermediaries´ experience, being a roaster, participating in a competitive environment, having a 
contract, being registered in the NCS, selling cherry coffee). These outcomes allow us to answer 
our questions. These results are aligned to those found in other studies, like Winter-Nelson and 
Temu (2002), Mose (2007), Jabbar et al. (2008) and Fischer et al. (2009). However, there are 
differences in terms of the commodity that was studied and the context in which the research was 
done. 
 
One of our results indicates that coffee agents have involved themselves in different activities as a 
response to the transition from a state-led commodity chain to a liberalized environment. We 
described how some of them decided to vertically integrate in order to reduce transaction costs and 
achieve higher efficiency in the market, relying on a larger volume of business to have enhanced 
profits. Others, on the other hand, invested in assets that allowed them to add value to their 
product and to attain a better performance in terms of margins per unit of product sold. 
 
We also found that there are risks and uncertainty issues in the coffee sector that lead traders to 
engage in practices like selling cherry coffee. Even though these practices allow them to mitigate 
risks, they hinder their possibilities of improving their performance as coffee traders. A lack of 
supporting market institutions like credit bureaus, proper infrastructure, and clear regulations 
about the business have resulted in inefficient markets. The latter indicates that there is room for 
government intervention. In order to have a more efficient supply chain, these costs have to be 
reduced by giving technical support and increasing the skills of traders (with regard to marketing, 
branding, managing their own business), by improving access to information and credit, and by 
providing the proper infrastructure to diminish transaction costs. 
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Most of the traders are unknown to the government, and thus are unable to participate in any 
governmental initiative. Data indicate that 60% of the traders are not registered in the National 
Coffee System. That situation creates unsettling circumstances for small-scale traders. The coffee 
sector has to have clear rules for traders and informality has to be eliminated. 
 
Taking into account that the information we gathered focuses more on the primary and 
intermediate collectors, we indicate as an important finding that the portion of the Mexican coffee 
sector we analysed appears to be somewhat competitive. A challenge for further research related 
to the issues we tackle win this research is to gather precise data to perform a similar analysis at 
all stages of the coffee supply chain. 
 
In spite of this, we managed to describe that marketing margins diminish as competition between 
traders increase. This means that liberalization has indeed brought trader entry into the market. 
Credit constraints and uncertainty have forced most traders to neglect investments in new 
technologies and machinery. As we found, they mostly use the same infrastructure present twenty 
years ago, which has implications in terms of the success of the supply chain. As a result, we can 
say that there has been liberalization but no modernization in the Mexican coffee sector. Finally, we 
think that if the Mexican supply chain wants to be competitive, huge investments need to be done 
and improvements need to be made in both technology and institutions at all stages of the chain. 
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Chapter 4. The driving forces and economic impact of cooperative membership: Empirical 
evidence from the Mexican coffee sector*1 
4.1. Introduction 
 
There are two types of farmer organizations in the Mexican coffee sector: grassroots organizations 
and cooperatives. These are differentiated according to their abilities to mobilize support for 
farmers’ needs related to coffee production and trade. The former are unions or affiliations of 
farmers that represent them in the Coffee Product System (CPS) or towards any other regional or 
national governmental institution. The affiliation includes organizations integrated by small groups 
of farmers usually labelled as cooperatives. These cooperative are mainly focus on mobilizing 
economic support by applying for productive projects announced by the national or state 
government, while some other cooperatives make requests to (inter)national foundations or non-
governmental organizations to receive some kind of support. 
 
Under the former controlled coffee market, producers were organized mainly through the 
governmental organizations named Economic Production and Marketing Units (UEPCs, by its 
Spanish initials). At the end of the controlled coffee market era, almost 70% of the total Mexican 
coffee producers were included in these kinds of organizations. They were operating as small 
solidarity groups in which all members were responsible to compliment the deliveries of any of the 
group members. However, after the demise of the state-controlled coffee market in 1993, growers 
had to look for their own initiative to decide whether or not to participate in any kind of farmers' 
organization. 
 
Considering the importance of the coffee sector for many households and the role that cooperatives 
play in the current economic situation, this chapter addresses the following key questions: (1) 
What are the characteristics of farmers who are members of the coffee cooperatives? (2) What are 
the main factors that determine growers’ participation in coffee organizations? (3) Do coffee 
cooperatives that are active in the Mexican coffee sector assist farmers to find a better market 
outlet and receive better coffee prices? (4) What are the factors that influence the level of per 
capita coffee income, and to what extent do those factors differ between member and non-
members of cooperatives? 
 
The main objectives are to identify the variables that contribute in defining the membership of an 
organization, and to examine the significance, relative importance and direction of some of the 
most important variables influencing the per capita coffee income. We distinguish between four 
categories of variables: (a) individual factors (like age, gender, education, ethnicity); (b) family 
characteristics (family size, housing conditions); (c) farm factors (farm size, distance to road, 
altitude); and (d) regional factors (location and agro-ecological conditions, population density and 
traders incidence). We will discuss how these variables influence farmers’ marketing choices in 
terms of the type of coffee that is delivered, the price received for the coffee and the derived per 
capita coffee income effects. We will compare farmers participating in cooperatives with otherwise 
identical individual  farmers to  guarantee  unbiased results. We rely on  information  collected  in a  
                                            
* A revised version of this chapter will appear in the Journal of Co-operative Studies. 
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representative field survey, conducted in 2004 throughout the eight major coffee-producing states, 
and additional village-level data from the coffee census database, retrieved from 2002 to 2008. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the most important 
theories related to farmers' preferences and constraints regarding rural cooperation and present 
the main characteristics of the Mexican coffee market that may give rise to cooperative 
membership. Section 4.3 outlines the field survey data used in the study and the statistical 
methodologies used for data analysis. In Section 4.4, we will proceed with the presentation of 
results regarding the main variables influencing membership and participation in coffee 
cooperatives. This is followed in Section 4.5 by a discussion of the effects of cooperative 
membership on obtained prices and income effects, for which we relied on different specifications 
of probit, multinomial logistic and ordinary least square estimates. We finally conclude with a 
discussion on the implications for policy and outreach to strengthen the economic role of 
cooperatives in the Mexican coffee sector. 
4.2. Rationale for cooperative membership in the coffee production and trade 
 
Coffee is a major export product for many developing countries, and at world level it represents the 
second most important commodity after petroleum. The production of coffee in the world was 168 
million quintals in 2008/09.26 This represents an increase of 44% during the last 20 years (ICO, 
2009). The rise in production is, however, twice as much as the growth in demand for coffee, and 
therefore downward pressure on prices is increasingly becoming manifest (IDEA, 2006). Coffee 
produces an income for 125 million smallholder farmers and their families, who are mainly located 
in tropical zones of developing nations. The national economies in many of these countries is also 
highly dependent on coffee as a source of export earnings (Fuzhi, 2007). 
 
Particularly in the case of Mexico, the economic dependency on coffee has been reduced during the 
last decades. Coffee was originally introduced to this country in the late eighteenth century and 
was initially grown on large plantations, but during the following decades and at the start of the 
nineteenth century; it gradually became a smallholder crop. Coffee has been the most important 
source of agricultural revenues from abroad for many decades, generating 413 million dollars of 
foreign exchange annually in the nineteen nineties and up to 230 million dollars of foreign 
exchange annually during the last decade (Banco de México, 2010). It is reported that coffee was 
the fifth agricultural production commodity in terms of value added, just after tomatoes, fresh 
vegetables, avocados and peppers in 2008. Although coffee’s relative economic importance has 
declined, it still remains the country’s largest single export crop and a key source of foreign income 
(Calo and Wise, 2005; Pérez et al., 2001). 
 
The statistics of the Mexican coffee census data base updated in July, 2008 report a total of 
493,497 coffee farmers and a similar number of families depending to a certain degree on coffee 
production for their sustenance. Growers and their relatives together represent employment in 
                                            
26 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
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coffee-related activities for a total number of 1,547,210 people who are directly involved in coffee 
production. 
 
Coffee-producing farms are located in some of Mexico’s poorest provinces. The major coffee-
producing areas are mountainous, with poor communication and limited public services. Around 
84% of the rural communities where coffee growing represents the primary agricultural activity 
report high or very high poverty rates. Furthermore, 60% of the coffee producers live in extreme 
poverty, and more than half belong to one of Mexico’s 52 ethnic groups (Pérez et al., 2001; 
Avalos-Sartorio, 2006a). 
 
Regional and local characteristics determine the prospects for coffee processing. Many farmers 
process their own coffee in small processing plants owned by individual coffee growers; otherwise, 
larger processing facilities are owned by farmers or operated by farmer cooperatives. They can 
limit operations to only humid processing or become engaged in dry processing as well. The 
feasibility of the latter option depends mainly on the environmental and road conditions and on the 
volume of production available on the location where they are established. Due to the remote 
location and heavy rainfall in coffee areas, 86.86% of the Mexican coffee producers relies on wet 
processing, while 13.14% relies on dry processing (SIAP, 2008). 
 
The wet process is structured into four steps: 1) hulling is done by sending the coffee through a 
hulling machine operated by hand or by using a motor; 2) during fermenting, coffee seeds are left 
to ferment in wooden or cement tanks for 20 to 36 hours, depending on local weather conditions; 
3) washing is done in a tank, either manually or mechanically; and finally 4) drying the coffee 
seeds, either by putting them on concrete, fibre or synthetic materials on the ground or by using 
drying machines (Pérez et al., 2001). The dry process puts the coffee in the sunshine without 
removing any skin. Hereafter, the coffee is transformed from dry beans to green beans using 
milling machines. 
 
The governmental participation in the Mexican coffee sector has been gradually replaced by private 
companies during the past two decades. Under the former controlled coffee market regime, firms 
could buy raw coffee only directly from governmental warehouses. The current regime permits 
these firms to buy raw material also from wholesalers and small-scale companies rather than 
directly from small-scale farmers. In this setting, farmer cooperatives played an important role in 
collecting coffee from their members (and some non-members), processing it to get a high 
quantity of produce and selling coffee with more value added, thus negotiating better marketing 
condition vis-à-vis their trading counterpart for the benefit of their members. Thus, during the past 
years, there has been increased interest from the government and non-governmental organizations 
in strengthening cooperative participation as a strategy to address organizational, processing and 
marketing problems and to improve the economic conditions of many small coffee farmers. 
 
With the increasing interest from development agencies and governments in mechanisms for 
promoting collective action during the past decades, attention paid to the role of cooperative 
participation for overcoming smallholder’s marketing constraints is receiving new relevance 
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(Tanguy et al., 2008). Voluntary and cooperative organizations may assist their members to 
receive better prices and higher net incomes, but these incentives are not always available to 
ensure that farmers are better off in the commercialization process. Others authors claim that 
cooperatives in general are receiving renewed attention in terms of structuring development to 
promote equity (Basu and Chakraborty, 2008). 
 
Defining rural cooperatives as “an association of persons who work together to achieve certain 
objectives” (Levay, 1983), we can distinguish cooperatives from other economic organizations in 
the sense that cooperatives are voluntary associations of people, where decisions are taken based 
on member participation and representation and not based on capital voting power. Since 
smallholders tend to face large comparative disadvantages and diseconomies of scale in processing 
and marketing – due to the high transaction costs related to their usually small production size and 
volume (Tanguy and Alemayehu, 2009) – the main role of marketing cooperatives is to reduce 
transaction costs and to improve the bargaining power of smallholders against middlemen 
(Francesconi, 2009). 
 
In the present decade, additional objectives for joining farmer organizations are to improve access 
to funding from the banking system, to accede support from (non)governmental institutions, to 
receive resources for acquiring machinery to process coffee, to enable adding value to coffee, and 
to comply with the rules and regulations for standards in the coffee markets. On the other hand, 
coffee cooperatives are increasingly promoted by the state agencies as a way to sell products more 
directly at the domestic market, to enhance the coffee prices based on improved product quality, 
and to upgrade coffee production systems and technologies. In sum, being part of a cooperative 
organization might enable coffee farmers to overcome problems of low income and reduce the risks 
in marketing coffee. 
 
According to the literature, factors like the farmers' age, level of education, the size of the coffee 
farm, and location and altitude of the coffee plantation are of major importance for farmer's 
decision to adhere to cooperative organizations (see LeVay (1983) for a concise overview). In 
addition, it is expected that farmers who are integrated in some kind of cooperative are more likely 
to bargain higher prices and to generate a higher per capita coffee income compared to their non-
organized counterparts. In the following, we will test these hypotheses using comprehensive data 
on the Mexican coffee sector. 
4.3. Material and methods 
 
The study relies on information from the coffee census database and from a large-scale coffee field 
survey conducted in 2004. To guarantee a representative survey, we used the information from the 
coffee census to identify a sample of coffee farmers with a broad distribution of similar individual, 
family and farm characteristics that were retrieved from the original database.27 A sample of 1,396 
                                            
27 The national coffee census has been conducted by several government and non-government agencies. The database built 
until 2008 contains technical, economic, and social data from more than 493,000 coffee growers and includes detailed 
information about 776,000 coffee plots. Information refers to farm size, farmer age, size of household, market outlets, 
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farmers was taken from a list of 353,696 coffee plots that benefited from the productive 
development and coffee quality improvement programme; coffee farmers from the eight coffee-
producing states of Mexico were included. The sample selection took place in two steps: first 
municipalities were selected according to their proportion of coffee production; secondly farmers 
were selected from each municipality according to farm strata (Ramírez et al., 2004). This resulted 
is a stratified sample that is considered representative for the Mexican smallholder coffee sector. 
 
After the sample was selected, face-to-face interviews were conducted with each coffee farmer, 
using a structured questionnaire. This questionnaire included a farmer’s characteristics (such as 
age, sex, literacy, training and education); household characteristics (such as household size, 
family labour, emigration, income and total land owned); and a coffee orchard’s characteristics 
(such as tree density, yield, production, type of farming system, input use and organic 
certification). In addition, major issues related to the coffee farmer’s relationship with the market, 
the type of coffee sold and the price received, as well as institutional factors related to their 
participation in cooperatives and the kind of state support received for producing coffee were 
included. 
 
Descriptive statistics regarding the key variables that are considered as possible factors influencing 
farmers’ participation in cooperatives are included in Table 4.1. The comparison of these 
characteristics between members and non-members is reported in the same table. For all relevant 
variables, we performed a t-test analysis of means differences to identify significant differences 
between farmers who participate in a coffee cooperative and those who decided not to join. We 
subsequently used participation in a coffee cooperative for each coffee farmer as a dependent 
variable in the statistical analysis; this variable is defined as 1 if the coffee grower was member of 
a cooperative and 0 if coffee grower did not participate in any type of coffee cooperative. 
 
To address the research questions, we relied on three different procedures. First, a probit model 
analysis was performed that identified the individual, family, farm and regional factors influencing 
the likelihood of cooperative participation. Secondly, we performed a statistical analysis of means 
differences regarding the price levels obtained for coffee marketing between different types of 
coffee delivered by farmers. This was followed by a multinomial logistic regression to identify the 
variables that play a role in defining the type of coffee delivered by producers. Thirdly, we 
performed three ordinary least square regressions. In these we used pooled and non-pooled 
samples of organized and non-organized producers to identify the factors influencing per capita 
coffee income and the possible differences between cooperative and individual coffee farmers. 
 
The latter analysis required fundamental attention, since we needed to control for selection bias 
and confirm whether the subsamples reflected structural differences with respect to their 
performance. First, we reviewed the possibility of selection bias using a Heckman regression model. 
Since the inverse mills ratio turned out to be not significant, further estimates could rely on OLS 
                                                                                                                                        
household´s assets, members of household and their individual characteristics, type of coffee system and regional 
characteristics. 
Chapter 4 
86 
 
regression. Secondly, we relied on different specifications of the regression equations and 
performed a Chow test analysis to evaluate the structural differences in the coefficients between 
organized and non-organized coffee farmers. Results indicated that there are indeed important 
differences between both groups that justify a separate analysis. Consequently, the sample was 
split into two subsamples. The final models were tested for possible endogeneity problems using 
the general Hausman test; results indicated that this problem was not present. 
 
Table 4.1. Variables for membership of a cooperative (descriptive statistics and t-test). 
Variable Unit 
Cooperative 
(N=427) 
 Non-cooperative 
(N=969) T-test 
Signifi-
cance 
level Mean SD  Mean SD 
      Individual factors 
Farmer’s age Farmer’s age 47.57 14.82  50.18 14.96 3.015 *** 
Farmer’s sex 1 if the farmer is male 0.80 0.40  0.72 0.45 -3.135 *** 
Ethnicity 
1 if the farmer speaks any indigenous 
tongue 0.54 0.49  0.44 0.50 -3.391 *** 
Literacy 1 if the farmer can read and write 0.82 0.38  0.73 0.44 -3.733 *** 
Education Schooling level 4.25 3.48  3.46 3.38 -3.980 *** 
Training 
1 if the farmer has received training courses 
related to coffee 
  0.52 0.50  0.20 0.40 -12.52 *** 
Participating in 
the NCS 
1 if the farmer participates in activities 
organized by the National Coffee System 
0.16 0.37  0.00 0.04 -13.47 *** 
Institution 
1 if the farmer has a relation with 
government institutions 
0.34 0.47  0.51 0.50 5.928 *** 
      Family factors 
Farm size Coffee area per household member 2.06 11.69  0.69 1.13 -3.581 *** 
Household size Number of members in the farmer’s family 3.00 2.54  3.85 2.45 5.905 *** 
Family labour Number of family members working in coffee 1.88 1.52  2.31 1.61 4.698 *** 
Emigration 1 if a family member emigrated to work 0.42 0.49  0.62 0.48 6.981 *** 
Land property 1 if the farmer owns ejidal or communal land  0.84 0.36  0.55 0.50 -10.79 *** 
Cement house 1 if the house has a cement roof, wall or 
floor 
0.28 0.45  0.50 0.50 7.674 *** 
Electricity 1 if the farmer’s house has electricity 0.44 0.50  0.67 0.47 8.345 *** 
Type of access 
road 
1 if the farmer’s community has access to 
paved road 0.17 0.37  0.24 0.43 3.135 *** 
Transport 1 if the manner of transportation is by car 0.63 0.48  0.72 0.45 3.338 *** 
       Farm factors 
Altitude Metres above sea level 1,163 785  878  626 -7.229 *** 
Type of farming 
system 
1 if coffee is produced in a mountainous or 
traditional polycultural system  
0.32 0.47  0.43  0.49 3.757 *** 
Machinery to 
process coffee 
1 if the household has machinery to process 
coffee 
  0.47 0.50  0.28  0.45 -6.956 *** 
       Regional factors 
Farmers in the 
village 
Number of coffee farmers in the farmer’s 
municipality  3,682 3,082  2,890  2,491 -5.076 *** 
Intermediaries in 
the village 
Number of intermediaries in the farmer’s 
municipality 
 5.3 10.7  4.0  6.3 -2.9 *** 
Organization in 
the village 
Proportion of organized coffee farmers in the 
farmer’s municipality 
 21.7 18.3  7.6 11.0 -17.8 *** 
Intermediary 
sales in the 
village 
Proportion of coffee farmers in the farmer’s 
municipality who sell to an intermediary 
 62.5 30.6  80.5 21.6 12.6 *** 
Note: *** refer to significance at 1%. 
 
4.3.1. Intrinsic factors influencing farmers' participation in a cooperative 
 
Variables that are likely to influence cooperative affiliation are grouped into four categories: (a) 
individual factors that include variables on farmer’s characteristics (e.g. the farmer’s age, 
education and training); (b) family factors that consider variables at the household level (e.g. farm 
size, household size and land property); (c) farm factors that include variables related to the coffee 
production system (e.g. altitude, type of farm and machinery to process coffee); and (d) regional 
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factors that are related to the municipality context (e.g. farmers, number of intermediaries and the 
proportion of selling to an intermediary in the farmer’s municipality). We will discuss these 
variables (see Table 4.1) and identify their potential role in the decision-making process towards 
cooperative collective action. 
 
4.3.1.1. Individual factors 
 
The age of the coffee farmer is considered to be related to experience and work capacity. Most 
household heads in the sample were between 30 and 60 years old, with an average of 47.6 years 
for cooperative members and 50.2 years for individual farmers. Even while many cooperatives 
originate from earlier times, they seem to keep their attraction for slightly younger and middle-
aged farmers. It is therefore likely that cooperative members still have energy to transform the 
practices of their cooperative from the traditional practices current during the INMECAFE era of 
getting economic benefits from the government towards more commercial entrepreneurial activities 
now. 
 
Gender is another individual variable that might play a role in defining the farmer’s position vis-à-
vis the cooperative. A quarter of all household heads included in the sample were female. Even 
though women’s participation in coffee production has been increasing in the last decades, their 
participation in the Mexican agricultural sector still remains low. Women are consistently 
underrepresented in cooperatives, and therefore their contribution to the household income and 
(non-)farm activities tends to be lower compared to that of individual coffee farmers. 
 
Literacy and education are key variables that influence labour productivity and business 
orientation. According to the survey information, 24% of coffee farmers are illiterate, but the 
degree of illiteracy is substantially lower amongst cooperative members. The education variable 
takes years of formal schooling as an indicator, starting at primary school. About a quarter of the 
coffee farmers recorded no education level, 62% had between one and six years of schooling and 
only 12% enjoyed more than six years of schooling. Schooling levels of cooperative members were 
substantially higher than those of independent farmers. 
 
Considering that people who can read and have a certain level of education may be more open to 
either accept institutional change and/or the innovation of production systems to escape from 
chronic poverty, it is expected that farmers who are able to read and have more years of schooling 
will be more inclined towards participation in cooperatives. This is further reinforced by their better 
access to targeted training courses, in which cooperative members score twice as high as 
independent farmers. Thus, we expected to find a positive correlation between educational level, 
access to and participation in training courses, and the degree of cooperative participation. 
 
Regarding the farmer's relationship with the institutional environment, data was collected on their 
participation in the current industry-representing organizations, specifically their inclusion in 
support activities provided by the National Coffee System network at the municipal, state and 
federal levels. While the latter is virtually restricted to cooperative farmers, independent coffee 
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growers are more often related to public agencies in general. In Mexico, access to state agencies 
remains an important factor for subsidized input support, approval of credit requests and 
bargaining on transport and marketing facilities. 
 
4.3.1.2. Family factors 
 
There are several family or household factors included in the survey as possible determinants of 
cooperative participation and wealth. Per capita farm size reflects the available land resources for 
coffee production, which turned out to be almost three times higher at cooperative farms on 
average. Small-scale subfamily coffee farms tend to be less interested in coffee as a commercial 
activity. Otherwise, very large multifamily farms are quite capable to run economic operations on 
their own. The members of coffee cooperatives thus own and operate viable family units with a 
median farm size. 
 
The household size, considering the number of farmer’s relatives that live off and economically 
depend on the farmer provides an indication of labour availability. Almost 35% of all coffee farmers 
are nuclear families without family members being available, whereas 50% reported between 2 
and 6 members in the household. The availability of family labour is a very important element in 
attending regular coffee maintenance and production activities. Cooperatives show consistently 
lower family labour involvement in coffee production (even when their average coffee areas are 
larger), thus indicating a tendency towards labour intensification. This is partly mitigated by the 
lower incidence of labour emigration on cooperative farms, which might reflect somewhat improved 
livelihood conditions. The availability of sufficient rural employment options is considered as an 
incentive for cooperative membership. 
 
Land property ownership is usually considered as a key factor for stable rural livelihoods. The 
survey statistics shows that 43% of the farmers has ejidal property, 21% operates on communal 
land and 36% owns private land. It was considered as one if the farmer had ejidal or communal 
land property. Cooperative members more frequently belonged to common land property regimes. 
We took into account that these properties are usually located in more isolated and poorer areas 
than private properties are, and ejidal and communal properties are more frequently related with 
medium- and small-scale coffee farmers, who need to rely on cooperative organizations to 
strengthen their market access relationships. 
 
To consider some of the wealth characteristics of coffee-producing households, the type of housing 
was considered as a key factor. Sample statistics shows that, on average, 43% of houses had a 
cement roof, floor or walls, which indicates relatively greater wealth. While 50% of the individual 
farmers belonged to this category, only 28% of the cooperative farmers could count on cement 
houses. Similarly, access to electricity, paved roads and transport facilities were consistently higher 
for individual farmers. General access to roads was extremely low, reflecting the marginal 
conditions of many poor coffee farmers living in remote rural areas. Cooperative organization might 
– to a certain extent – mitigate these adverse conditions and is usually meant to enable farmers to 
overcome the above-mentioned wealth constraints. 
The driving forces and economic impact of cooperative membership 
89 
 
 
4.3.1.3. Farm factors 
 
Farming factors refer to the agro-ecological environment and farming system characteristics of 
coffee production. The altitude above sea level is of key importance for improving coffee quality. 
From the sample, 20% of the farmers had their plantation below 600 metres, 32% between 600 
and 900 metres, 25% between 900 and 1,200 metres, and 23% above 1,200 metres.28 Whereas 
possibilities to engage in other agricultural activities are increasing at a lower altitude, coffee 
quality and options for specialization in coffee production increase with a higher altitude. Given the 
fact that specialization is favourable for joint marketing, we expected a positive correlation 
between the altitude where a coffee farm was located and the degree of cooperative integration. 
This was indeed confirmed in the sample. 
 
The manner in which coffee orchards are managed by the farmers is considered equally important 
to capture the importance of coffee production for rural livelihoods. We distinguished four types of 
farming systems: sunlight (3.5%); specialized (36%); traditional (0.5%); and mountain (60%). 
Cooperative farmers were usually more specialized in coffee, whereas under private farmers, 
reliance on mountain or traditional polyculture still prevailed. Farmers located in better areas for 
producing coffee tended to farm their orchards in more environment-friendly ways, relying on self-
produced inputs and more labour-intensive methods. 
 
Another variable considered as part of the household assets refers to the ownership of machinery 
to process coffee. Cooperative farmers relied more on farm processing of coffee and thus owned 
more processing machinery, whereas private farmers might rely on centralized processing (thus 
increasing also their potential for quality improvement). Otherwise, participation in cooperatives 
could also be instrumental to increase access to processing equipment. 
 
4.3.1.4. Regional factors 
 
Regional factors refer to the spatial location of the farm and the externalities at municipal and state 
level. From the coffee census database, we retrieved the number of farmers per municipality, the 
amount of intermediaries who were active in the farmer’s municipality, and the proportion of coffee 
producers participating in local coffee organizations. We expected that these three variables 
produce a positive effect on the institutional environment for coffee production and trade, and thus 
might enhance the likelihood of cooperative participation. 
 
Cooperatives appeared more pronouncedly in larger villages where relatively less private 
intermediaries were active. Moreover, affiliation to cooperatives proved more frequent in 
communities that had a larger overall organization grade, thus indicating the likelihood of spill-over 
and/or demonstration effects. Although cooperative farmers sold significantly less coffee to private 
intermediaries (compared to private farmers), these sales were still high (62-80%) even in villages 
                                            
28 This variable was measured in metres above sea level, but was squared and then divided by 1,000 to permit a non-linear 
shape of its effect. 
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with a strong degree of cooperative organization. Cooperatives were likely to reduce the proportion 
of side sales, but the presence of intermediaries might also enhance local competition and push-up 
farm gate coffee prices. 
4.3.2. Extrinsic factors influenced by cooperative participation 
 
For our evaluation of the economic effects of cooperative membership, we focused attention on 
income, production and price effects, comparing between farmers who are members of a 
cooperative with independent coffee producers and who do not belong to any type of cooperative 
organization. The results of this comparison are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
4.3.2.1. Household income 
 
The household income on a per capita basis generally was 50% higher for cooperative members 
(12,000 compared to 8,000 Mexican pesos for individual farmers), whereas similar differences were 
registered for per capita coffee income. For both cooperative and individual farmers, coffee 
represented about 20% of the full household income. For 30-40% of the farmers, coffee was 
considered as a secondary income source. The economic effects of coffee production on the 
household income tended to be stronger for farms that were more specialized in coffee. 
Cooperative membership might enable further specialization, since additional risk diversification 
mechanisms are available at group level. In addition, the efficiency of coffee production could 
benefit from improved access to yield-increasing inputs and quality-improving processing options. 
Both effects are likely to generate positive household income effects. 
 
This can be further supported by access to several public subsidy and support programmes that are 
implemented in the Mexican countryside to assist poor people to overcome poverty traps. 
Cooperative farmers appear to receive substantially more frequent support from these 
programmes, commonly known under labels like “procampo”, “prodesca” and “oportunidades”. On 
average, 67% of all farmers in the sample received some kind of benefits delivered by these 
programmes, while their coverage of cooperative members rose to even 77%. Cooperative 
membership may thus provide a mechanism for increased access to public support services. 
 
4.3.2.2. Coffee production 
 
Coffee yields proved to depend strongly on the age of the coffee plantation, plant density and input 
applications. Cooperatives possessed slightly younger coffee trees but also less frequently made 
use of chemical fertilizer inputs. On average, only 7.5% of the farmers reported using chemical 
fertilizers, indicating that most production systems are still rather traditional. On the other hand, 
more cooperatives were engaged in organic coffee production. However, the latter system is still 
rarely used, since from the total sample of 1,396 farmers only 35 confirmed to have their coffee 
orchard certified as organic production. 
 
In terms of yield and production, cooperatives reached a 12% higher coffee production per hectare, 
which is likely to be the result of their higher degree of specialization and somewhat more intensive 
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production systems. The improved access of cooperative members to public support systems to 
enhance coffee production and household welfare will also stimulate cooperative coffee yields. 
 
4.3.2.3. Coffee marketing 
 
Coffee farmers relied on different market outlets, depending on the type of coffee processing. 
Cooperatives sold considerably more processed coffee in parchment, green or roasted form. 
Moreover, cooperative members were inclined to sell a larger proportion of their harvest through 
the cooperative channel, even while still some 50% was sold to other intermediaries (compared to 
83% for individual farmers). 
 
Table 4.2. Variables influenced by cooperative membership (descriptive statistics and t-test). 
Variable Unit 
Cooperative 
(N=427) 
 
Non-cooperative 
(N=969) T-test 
Signifi-
cance 
level  Mean SD  Mean SD 
                     Household income 
Per capita 
annual income 
Per capita annual income that farmer 
received in Mexican pesos in 2004 
11,969 20,641  8,121    9,322 -4.775 *** 
Per capita 
coffee income 
Per capita coffee income (coffee income 
divided by household members) in Mexican 
pesos in 2004 
2,547 4,112  1,634 1,885 -5.564 *** 
Importance of 
coffee income 
1 if the coffee income is the second source of 
income for the household 
  0.31 0.47  0.42  0.49    3.563 *** 
Support from 
programmes 
1 if the farmer received support of 
“procampo”, “prodesca” or “oportunidades” 
programmes 
  0.77 0.42  0.62 0.48    -5.617 *** 
           Coffee production 
Age of coffee 
orchard Age of coffee orchard in years in 2004 13.89 8.21  15.27 10.77 2.359 ** 
Coffee yield Quintals per hectare in 2004 6.57 4.61  5.88 5.59 -2.557 ** 
Organic 
production 
1 if the coffee orchard is registered as 
organic 
0.07 0.25  0.01 0.09 -6.038 *** 
Chemical 
fertilizer use 
1 if the farmer applies chemical fertilizer in 
the coffee plantation 0.03 0.16  0.09 0.29 4.360 *** 
                     Marketing 
Type of coffee 
1 if the farmer sells processed coffee 
(parchment, green, roasted or ground) 
0.78 0.41  0.56 0.41 -7.992 *** 
Selling through 
the cooperative 
1 if the farmer sold the coffee through  the 
cooperative 
0.47 0.50  0.16 0.36 -13.430 *** 
Selling to an 
intermediary 
1 if the farmer sold the coffee to 
intermediaries 0.49 0.50  0.83 0.38 14.049 *** 
Selling to the 
consumer or 
export 
1 if the farmer sold the coffee to the 
consumer or export 
0.03 0.16  0.01 0.10 -2.462 ** 
Timing of 
payments 
1 if the farmer received the coffee payment 
at the delivery of the product 
  0.83 0.37  0.90 0.34 3.440 *** 
Coffee price 
Coffee price in Mexican pesos per quintal in 
2004 
518  183.92  478   135.15   -4.421 *** 
Notes: ** and *** refer to significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
 
The timing of payment is of considerable importance for reinforcing the security of rural 
households. Individual farmers were more likely to receive direct payment upon delivery (90%), 
whereas some cooperative members had to wait for their final payment until the cooperative had 
processed and sold the coffee. These delayed payments – usually due to internal credit and finance 
constraints – resulted, however, in a higher average coffee price received by cooperative members. 
Trade-offs between both types of contract convinced farmers to affiliate themselves to the 
cooperative organization. 
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4.4. Results 
 
We will first analyse the factors that influence farmers’ participation in cooperative organizations, 
using a probit regression model. Hereafter, we will proceed with an analysis of coffee price 
differences between organized and non-organized farmers per type of coffee that is delivered. Due 
attention will be given to the variables that play a role in selecting the type of coffee delivered by 
(non-)cooperative producers, relying on multinomial logistic regression estimates. We will conclude 
with an analysis of the determinants of the per capita coffee income, applying an ordinary least 
square regression on the pooled sample and for each of the two subsamples of cooperative and 
non-cooperative farmers. 
4.4.1. Likelihood of cooperative membership 
 
To understand the factors that influence the choice for membership of coffee cooperatives, we have 
taken cooperative participation as a dummy that takes the value 1 if a farmer participated and 0 if 
he or she had not. Typical individual factors, family characteristics, farming system properties and 
regional factors were used as explanatory variables. The results for five different model 
specifications are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
A farmer's age had a positive effect on the probability of membership of a cooperative. The 
likelihood of cooperative membership increases with 1% for every 5 years that farmers were older. 
In addition, male farmers were considerably more likely to become a cooperative member. Literacy 
strongly enhances cooperative affiliation; marginal effects evaluated at the mean value indicate 
that an increase of 1% with regard to literacy increased the probability of joining a cooperative by 
8.5%. Similarly, the variable training showed a highly significant result, with a marginal effect at 
the mean equivalent of an almost 20% higher participation chance for each additional 1% increase 
in farmers' training. 
 
Farmers with a larger per capita farm size proved to have a higher chance of joining coffee 
cooperatives, but the marginal effect was declining with size, indicating that medium-size farmers 
are the 'preferred' cooperative members. This is confirmed by the effect of improved housing 
conditions, which had a strong negative effect on the probability of cooperative participation. The 
type of land property was significant in all models, showing that farmers who owned ejidal and 
communal land were more likely to participate in a cooperative compared to farmers who owned 
privately. Farmers located at a higher altitude were more likely to participate in coffee cooperatives 
compared to those located at a lower altitude. 
 
Institutional factors turned out to be equally relevant to explain cooperative membership. Farmers 
with more access to the state-led National Coffee System were far more likely to join cooperatives. 
The reverse effect might hold as well. Similarly, having access to electricity produced a positive 
effect on the probability of participation in cooperatives, enabling farmers to engage in more 
advanced coffee processing activities. 
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It should be noted that some commonly used individual and family factors (like education and 
family size) turned out not to be significant in the present model specification. On the other hand, 
several village factors proved to have a robust influence on the likelihood of participation in a 
cooperative, in particular the number of coffee growers and the proportion of organized farmers in 
the municipality. This point to positive scale effects of local organization. Interestingly enough, 
coffee sales to local intermediaries negatively affected the likelihood of cooperative membership. 
 
Regional dummies for the states of Veracruz, Puebla and Hidalgo showed a significant result in 
some model specifications, generally with a negative effect on the probability of participation in 
cooperatives due to acceptable access conditions (and thus strong competition with traditional 
intermediaries). We observed the opposite result for Chiapas, which indicates the attractiveness of 
cooperatives in sub-marginal conditions. 
 
Table 4.3. Factors determining membership of a cooperative (Probit model). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farmer’s age  0.005 (0.193)  0.006 (0.144)  0.006 (0.065)*  0.005 (0.142)  0.005 (0.158) 
Farmer’s sex  0.165 (0.163)  0.159 (0.179)  0.206 (0.072)* 0.163 (0.169)  0.112 (0.319) 
Farmer’s participation in 
the NCS 
 2.520 (0.000)***  2.457 (0.000)***  2.265 (0.000)***  2.469 (0.000)***  2.503 (0.000)*** 
Literacy  0.290 (0.048)**  0.287 (0.049)**  0.288 (0.017)** 0.301 (0.017)**  0.319 (0.009)*** 
Training  0.592 (0.000)***  0.611 (0.000)***  0.610 (0.000)***  0.611 (0.000)***  0.672 (0.000)*** 
Education  0.003 (0.874)  0.007 (0.735)    
Per capita farm size  0.046 (0.131)  0.050 (0.109)  0.069 (0.032)**  0.052 (0.094)*  0.045 (0.118) 
Size of household -0.0001 (0.996)  0.007 (0.789)  0.0304 (0.249)  0.008 (0.775)  0.015 (0.544) 
Land property  0.358 (0.006)***  0.380 (0.003)***  0.469 (0.000)***  0.385 (0.003)***  0.407 (0.001)*** 
Cement house -0.162 (0.256) -0.134 (0.347) -0.110 (0.432) -0.147 (0.301) -0.225 (0.098)* 
Electricity  0.431 (0.011)**  0.455 (0.007)***  0.463 (0.005)***  0.461 (0.006)***  0.408 (0.011)** 
Altitude squared and 
divided by one million  0.156 (0.037)**  0.139 (0.059)*  0.113 (0.111)  0.149 (0.045)**  0.121 (0.093)* 
Type of farming system -0.085 (0.457) -0.132 (0.232) -0.089 (0.415) -0.118 (0.288)  
Farmers in the municipality 
divided by one thousand 
 0.0135 (0.496)  0.014 (0.453)  0.047 (0.011)**  0.021 (0.282)  0.017 (0.377) 
Organized farmers in the 
municipality 
 0.043 (0.000)***  0.037 (0.000)***   0.038 (0.000)***  0.038 (0.000)*** 
Coffee sales to 
intermediaries -0.011 (0.003)*** -0.016 (0.000)*** -0.019 (0.000)*** -0.014 (0.000)*** -0.013 (0.000)*** 
Chiapas -0.564 (0.109)   1.044 (0.000)***   
Oaxaca -0.010 (0.825)   0.296 (0.267)  0.208 (0.325)  0.226 (0.275) 
Veracruz -0.933 (0.007)*** -0.575 (0.008)*** -0.436 (0.191) -0.516 (0.022)** -0.424 (0.041)** 
Puebla -1.044 (0.024)** -0.676 (0.066)* -0.528 (0.243) -0.609 (0.103) -0.663 (0.068)* 
Hidalgo -1.082 (0.003)*** -0.780 (0.004)*** -0.710 (0.049)** -0.711 (0.012)** -0.751 (0.007)*** 
Nayarit -0.843 (0.004)*** -0.733 (0.000)*** -0.406 (0.157) -0.573 (0.017)** -0.478 (0.038)** 
San Luís Potosí -0.516 (0.136) -0.177 (0.471) -0.0446 (0.896) -0.129 (0.607) -0.107 (0.661) 
Constant -1.313 (0.003)*** -1.264 (0.000)*** -1.256 (0.003)*** -1.477 (0.000)*** -1.500 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  1,250  1,250  1,250  1,250  1,342 
Pseudo R squared  0.425  0.423  0.376  0.423  0.418 
Log Likelihood -445 -447 -483 -446 -480 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.4.2. Price differences between cooperative and non-cooperative coffee farmers 
 
We registered important differences in mean coffee prices between farmers integrated in 
cooperatives and individually operating farmers that point to economic effects in terms of 
bargaining power. For a further analysis of these differences, we conducted a t-test analysis of 
Chapter 4 
94 
 
price differentials between pairs of farmers that deliver the same type of coffee. Hereafter, the 
same procedure was performed between pairs of average prices for different comparable types of 
coffee in the supply chain. The latter comparison was done separately for cooperative farmers and 
farmers who are not participating in the cooperative trade. 
 
Taking four types of coffee sold by farmers, cherry, natural dry, parchment, and green and ground, 
the t-test results showed several differences between groups. Considering the totality of farmers 
included in the sample, results showed that farmers who were members of a cooperative sold their 
coffee at a higher price than those who did not belong to a cooperative (see Table 4.4). 
 
The mean coffee prices reported show that the prices received by farmers who belonged to 
cooperatives and sold cherry coffee were higher than those who sold parchment and green and 
ground coffee. Although this is an unexpected result, the explanation is found in the fact that 
organized farmers deliver cherry coffee to the cooperative firm that processes and sells the coffee 
directly at the national or external markets. The cooperative pays the final price to their members, 
considering the price that the organization received minus the processing and administrative costs. 
This implies that cooperative farmers can compete with larger plantations in selling parchment, 
green, roasted or ground coffee. 
 
Most price levels received by cooperative members were statistically different from and superior to 
the prices paid to non-organized farmers who sold cherry and parchment coffee. Only for natural 
dry coffee non-organized farmers received a price advantage, but the number of cooperatives 
engaged in this process was very limited. Otherwise, prices received for green and ground coffee 
did not differ statistically between organized and non-organized coffee farmers, indicating that no 
major quality differentiation takes place. 
 
Table 4.4. Price differences between cooperative and non-cooperative members (t-test by type of 
coffee). 
Type of coffee 
sold by farmers 
     Organization Price1 SD T-test Group 
T-test with 
next stage 
Cherry 
Cooperative (N=60) 586.42 324.70 -5.298 1 (1 vs 5)  2.742 
Non-cooperative (N=305) 448.82 141.15  2 (2 vs 6) -5.259 
Natural dry 
Cooperative (N=24) 346.79 131.37 2.026 3 (3 vs 7) -4.014 
Non-cooperative (N=81) 427.88 182.30  4 (4 vs 8) -4.194 
Parchment 
Cooperative (N=306) 516.89 136.79 -2.181 5 (5 vs 7) -0.745 
Non-cooperative (N=442) 497.30 115.99  6 (6 vs 8) -2.533 
Green and 
ground 
Cooperative (N=22) 539.75 191.52 -0.246 7  
Non-cooperative (N=93) 530.89 141.19  8  
1 The price is in Mexican pesos per quintal. 
 
The results regarding the natural dry coffee prices are an unexpected outcome. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that in the usually remote places where farmers sell this type of 
coffee, the local cooperatives work with a low quantity produce and with scarce resources, which 
make them less competitive vis-à-vis private buyers. This obliges farmers' organizations to accept 
a lower price than their competitors do, since neighbouring private firms enjoy better soil and 
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management conditions to deliver larger quantities and to produce a better quality of coffee for an 
exchange with the next stage in the supply chain. 
 
The analysis of price differences between different types of coffee also reveals that further 
processing tends to be an attractive business. We therefore need to compare different coffee 
processing pathways, following either wet or dry processing techniques.29 Results indicate that 
farmers who sold cherry coffee consistently received a higher price compared to those who sold 
parchment coffee (groups 1/2 vs. 5/6). In a similar vein, the price differences of those who sold 
natural dry and green and ground coffee was highly favourable for the latter category of farmers 
(groups 3/4 vs. 7/8). This is particularly the case for cooperative farmers. Regarding non-organized 
producer’s prices, comparisons of the prices of those who sold cherry and parchment (groups 2 and 
6), parchment and green and ground (groups 6 and 8) and natural dry and green and ground 
coffee (groups 4 and 8) all resulted in statistically different prices. 
4.4.3. Factors affecting the mode of coffee selling by farmers 
 
To obtain more insight into the factors that play role in the type of coffee that coffee farmers 
normally deliver, we conducted a multinomial logistic regression analysis for the four types of 
coffee processing: cherry, natural dry, parchment, and green and ground. The coffee-processing 
stage variable was regressed against relevant individual, family, farm and regional factors. In 
addition, being a cooperative member was included as a dummy variable to test whether this factor 
is influencing the choice of the type of coffee sold. 
 
The marginal effects after multinomial logistic regression were obtained and outcomes are 
presented in Table 4.5. As we can notice, cooperative membership, farmer education and cement 
house ownership do not show a significant influence on any of the coffee processing choices 
included in the model. Otherwise, support received from public agencies negatively affects cherry 
processing and favours parchment processing. This might indicate that farmers subject to the 
national coffee programme enjoy certain advantages regarding further advanced processing 
modes. More traditional farmers belonging to ethnic groups, who have ample household labour 
resources and received less training, still opt for cherry marketing. Similarly, natural drying is 
preferred by larger families that are in transition from a coffee poly- to a mono-culture. 
 
Individual factors that influence the coffee processing choice refer to farmers' age (positive for 
cherry and negative for parchment coffee), gender (female-headed farmers prefer cherry 
processing), ethnicity (indigenous communities prefer natural dried coffee) and training (favourable 
for parchment coffee, but with a negative sign for cherry processing). 
 
                                            
29 Note that coffee sold as natural dry can neither be compared with the cherry, nor with parchment because this type of coffee 
is processed using the dry way, whereas processing from cherry to parchment coffee follows the wet way. Similarly, for green 
and ground coffee no further processing at farm level is considered, since this is done at factory level. 
Chapter 4 
96 
 
Family factors also play an important role in the selection of preferred coffee processing modes. For 
cherry coffee, household size and the availability of electricity provide a positive effect, while coffee 
support programmes have a negative effect. Natural dry coffee is preferred by larger households 
that lost people through migration have private land ownership and receive some general 
institutional support. For parchment coffee, household size, altitude and access to electricity and 
public coffee support programmes are important enabling factors. Green and ground coffee is 
mainly selected by larger farmers located at average or below average altitudes. 
 
Table 4.5. Likelihood estimates regarding the type of coffee sold by farmers (marginal effect after 
multinomial logistic regression). 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Observation numbers 1,249. Pseudo R square = 0.355. Log likelihood = -897. 
 
Finally, farm factors that influence the choice for coffee processing modes are related to location 
(altitude), the availability of machinery and the degree of specialization of the coffee production 
system. Natural dry is usually preferred on more diversified farms that suffer from a scarce 
availability of machinery and equipment. Parchment is used at higher altitudes and requires more 
machinery use. Green and ground coffee is only feasible at lower altitudes. This implies that when 
the altitude increases the probability to sell parchment coffee increases as well, whereas the 
opposite result holds for green and ground coffee. 
 
The states of Chiapas and Veracruz were included as dummy variables. In Veracruz, cherry coffee 
is preferred, whereas natural dry is hardly feasible due to high rainfall. In Chiapas, parchment 
coffee is the main delivery mode, whereas green and ground coffee – given the prevailing 
mountainous conditions – results with a negative sign. 
 
 
Variable/Type of              
coffee sold 
Cherry  Natural dry  Parchment  Green and ground 
dy/dx Signi-
ficance 
 dy/dx Signi-
ficance 
 dy/dx Signi-
ficance 
 dy/dx Signi-
ficance 
Cooperative (1/0) -0.023    0.000    0.033   -0.010  
Farmer’s age  0.002 *   0.000   -0.003 **   0.000  
Farmer’s sex -0.066 *  -0.010    0.073 **   0.000  
Ethnicity -0.111 ***   0.015 *   0.092 **   0.061  
Training -0.110 ***  -0.009    0.101 ***   0.012  
Education  0.006   -0.002   -0.005    0.000  
Per capita farm size  0.000   -0.002   -0.000    0.002 ** 
Size of household  0.016 **   0.004 **  -0.023 ***   0.002  
Land property -0.018    0.011 *  -0.012    0.019  
Electricity  0.140 ***   0.009   -0.150 ***   0.002  
Cement house -0.047    0.013    0.043   -0.008  
Emigration  0.006    0.013 *  -0.032    0.013  
Institutional support -0.025    0.021 **   0.016   -0.011  
Support from public 
coffee programme 
-0.140 ***   0.002    0.140 ***  -0.002  
Altitude squared and 
divided by one million 
-0.050   -0.008    0.083 ***  -0.026 * 
Type of farm system  0.088 ***  -0.031 ***  -0.049   -0.007  
Machinery -0.120 ***  -0.060 ***   0.200 ***  -0.018  
Chiapas -0.169 ***  -0.013    0.239 ***  -0.056 * 
Veracruz  0.171 ***  -0.049 ***  -0.115 **  -0.007  
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4.4.4. Determinants of the per capita coffee income 
 
The analysis regarding the variables influencing the per capita coffee income was based on OLS 
regression models. First a pooled regression was performed, using all observations included in the 
sample. Secondly, using the probit regression (see Table 4.3), we defined a Heckman selection 
model to test for potential selection bias. The results of this latter analysis indicate that this 
problem was not present. Thirdly, two additional regressions were performed, one considering only 
farmers that were cooperative members and another one only with individual (non-cooperative) 
farmers. 
 
We used the Chow test to evaluate the significant and structural differences in parameter and 
function estimates and to test whether (non-)pooling is warranted. This resulted in significant 
statistic differences between both regressions that justify non-pooling. Therefore, we finally present 
the results from three types of regressions: the pooled sample, the cooperative subsample and the 
non-cooperative subsample (see Table 4.6). The Chow test confirmed that the coefficients for the 
variables determining the per capita coffee income are different between cooperative and non-
cooperative groups. 
 
Concordantly, we performed OLS regressions for the four categories of variables (individual, family, 
farm and regional). All individual factors – with the sole exception of ethnicity – showed a 
significant result in the pooled sample, whereas literacy and education showed a significant result 
in the income equation of the cooperative group. Otherwise, education proved to be the only 
significant individual factor for the non-cooperative members group. 
 
As part of the family factors, farm size, the availability of machinery and electricity influenced 
income levels in the pooled sample. Membership of cooperatives had – as expected – a positive 
impact on the per capita income; its coefficient indicates that affiliation to a cooperative increases 
the per capita coffee income with 313.90 Mexican pesos, equivalent to 2.6% of the average 
income. Within the cooperative subsample, farm size, private land property and access to 
electricity tended to increase income. Within the non-member sample, farm size had a positive 
income effect, whereas machinery and electricity showed a negative result, implying that 
increasing the public and private infrastructure may reduce the per capita coffee income. This is 
mainly explained by the fact that far less advanced coffee processing takes place amongst 
individual farmers. 
 
For the group of farm factors, the age of the coffee plantation and type of coffee system favoured 
coffee income in the pooled and non-member subsample. For the cooperative subsample, income 
was reduced by altitude, whereas for the non-cooperative subsample income increased with 
altitude. This is probably related to the reduced options for coffee processing in high altitude areas, 
and the increased orientation of private farmers towards high-quality segments of coffee that 
benefit from altitude. 
 
Chapter 4 
98 
 
Regarding the regional factors, the number of coffee farmers and the proportion of organized 
farmers in the municipality negatively affected the per capita income in the pooled sample. This 
point to trade-offs between the number of suppliers (competition effect) and the degree of farmers' 
organization (bargaining effect). An increase in the number of intermediaries could raise the per 
capita coffee income as the result of a more intensive competition. This became more apparent in 
the cooperative subsample. 
 
Table 4.6. Factors determining the per capita coffee income (OLS estimates). 
   Variable   Pooled sample  Cooperative  Non-cooperative 
Farmer’s age  9.068 (0.096)*  20.20 (0.166)  3.294 (0.429) 
Ethnicity -131.8 (0.433) -319.9 (0.512) -104.3 (0.413) 
Literacy -573.7 (0.004)*** -1,749 (0.003)*** -151.5 (0.304) 
Education  116.0 (0.000)***  255.3 (0.000)***  54.40 (0.010)** 
Per capita farm size  395.6 (0.000)***  376.4 (0.000)***  378.2 (0.000)*** 
Type of road  148.1 (0.390)  493.2 (0.379)  7.110 (0.954) 
Land property  190.5 (0.219)  1,292.5 (0.019)** -44.81 (0.686) 
Machinery -425.2 (0.007)*** -611.7 (0.132) -282.5 (0.025)** 
Electricity -1,580 (0.000)*** -1,860 (0.000)*** -1,282 (0.000)*** 
Cooperative  313.9 (0.071)*   
Support from programmes  4.569 (0.977) -43.24 (0.927) -96.38 (0.420) 
Altitude -0.135 (0.225) -0.448 (0.093)*  0.169 (0.072)* 
Age of coffee trees  15.35 (0.026)**  39.47 (0.111)  9.593 (0.046)** 
Type of coffee  446.6 (0.007)***  1,326 (0.021)**  400.9 (0.001)*** 
Farmers in the municipality -0.082 (0.009)*** -0.061 (0.453) -0.073 (0.005)*** 
Intermediaries in the municipality  75.69 (0.000)***  140.9 (0.000)***  2.121 (0.813) 
Selling to an intermediary in the municipality  0.897 (0.810) -2.996 (0.771) -2.757 (0.392) 
Farmers organized in the municipality -19.18 (0.010)** -41.47 (0.009)*** -1.667  
Chiapas  1,479 (0.000)***  2,059 (0.011)**  1,048 (0.000)*** 
Guerrero  1,538 (0.001)***  1,511 (0.118)  1,930 (0.000)*** 
Veracruz  413.0 (0.067)*  676.2 (0.465)  348.4 (0.029)** 
Constant  1,211 (0.021)**  139.0 (0.919)  1,772 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  1,297  397  900 
R square  0.319  0.346  0.395 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The three state dummies were significant for the pooled and non-cooperative subsamples, but in 
the cooperative sample only Chiapas was significant with a positive sign, indicating that especially 
in this state participation in a coffee cooperative produced an increase in the per capita income. 
This reflects the long tradition of farmers’ struggle and the high degree of organization that is 
characteristic for this state. 
4.5. Conclusions and outlook 
 
This study has identified several key factors influencing the participation of coffee farmers in 
cooperative organizations. We obtained the data from a survey of 1,396 coffee growers stratified 
by municipality and randomly selected within the municipalities, and complemented with 
information from the national coffee census. We used probit models to detect the main factors that 
influence cooperative membership in the Mexican coffee sector. It appears that a farmer's age, 
gender (male), a farmer's access to the National Coffee System, literacy rate, participation in 
training events, farm size, communal land property, availability of electricity, higher altitude, the 
number of farmers in the municipality and the proportion of organized farmers in the municipality 
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all favour cooperative affiliation. Only the housing conditions (as a proxy for wealth) and the 
proportion of farmers in the municipality selling to intermediaries negatively affect prospects for 
cooperative membership. Regional differences regarding coffee production conditions also showed 
a significant result in influencing the likelihood for joining a cooperative. 
 
In several respects, our results are broadly in line with findings from earlier studies (Basu and 
Chakraborty, 2008; Francesconi, 2009; Karli et al., 2006; Ruben and Lerman, 2005; Tanguy and 
Alemayehu, 2009; Tanguy et al., 2008) that rely on different methods to address similar questions 
regarding cooperative affiliation. On the effect of the farmer’s age and gender, we can confirm the 
findings by Karli et al. (2006) and Tanguy et al. (2008, 2009) that register a positive effect of a 
farmer’s age and male membership on cooperative membership. This might imply that Mexican 
coffee cooperatives represent a relatively older population and maintain a largely male-biased 
membership composition. In a similar vein, the positive influence of literacy on cooperative 
participation is confirmed, in line with results reported by Tanguy et al. (2009). The positive effect 
of a farmer's access to the National Coffee System reflects the fundamental importance of public 
support, concordant with similar findings by Karli et al. (2006) for Turkish cooperatives. 
 
Our results do not show significant effects of education and household size and composition on the 
likelihood of cooperative membership. A minimum of literacy and participation in coffee training 
events appear to be more important than formal schooling. Most other individual and household 
characteristics reflected the expected effect. Local and regional factors, such as the availability of 
electricity, altitude and population density showed a strong and significant positive impact on the 
probability of cooperative participation. Better-off farmers with more resources were less likely to 
engage with cooperative organizations. 
 
Regarding the effects of cooperative affiliation on coffee marketing options and farm household 
income, we have found consistent evidence that cooperative farmers are able to negotiate for 
better coffee prices, especially when delivering cherry and parchment coffee. On the other hand, 
our results show a negative effect of cooperative participation on the average price when delivering 
natural dry coffee. This implies that cooperatives enjoy a comparative advantage in coffee 
marketing only if some additional processing services can be included. 
 
As part of the analysis regarding farmer’s choices for different types of coffee processing, we 
elaborated a typology based on specific intrinsic and extrinsic factors that influence the degree of 
processing. Older farmers with a larger household size and less institutional support are more likely 
to sell cherry coffee. Otherwise, indigenous farmers with more common property farm land and 
some emigrated family members tend to prefer delivering natural dry coffee. Parchment coffee is 
typically delivered by younger and smaller households located at higher altitudes, who received 
training and possess some machinery that enables deliveries of parchment coffee. Finally, larger 
farms located at a lower altitude select deliveries of green and ground coffee. Contrary to our 
expectation, we did not find clear evidence that the cooperative participation exercises a direct 
influence on decisions regarding the type of coffee that farmers sell. Our results are consistent with 
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the geographic location of coffee farmers, with Veracruz mainly selling cherry coffee and Chiapas 
selling parchment coffee. 
 
With regard the factors that are important in defining per the capita coffee income, we have found 
an overall positive effect of cooperative participation on household welfare. However, neither the 
richest nor the poorest coffee farmers are most affiliated to cooperatives, but more importantly, it 
is the middle-class farmers who benefit from the greatest welfare effects. This tends to be 
mediated by their improved access to external infrastructure (roads, but mainly electricity) that 
enables further progress in coffee processing. Only when the coffee cooperatives support upgrading 
and value added activities, significant price advantages can be generated. 
 
Some limitations to the analysis need to be acknowledged. First, given the available field data, we 
can only draw conclusions about relevant coffee activities and unable to infer full household income 
effects. Higher prices may lead, however, to more attention dedicated to the coffee fields and may 
eventually increase the coffee income share of rural households. Secondly, differences in coffee 
production systems and technologies are only globally acknowledged. Cooperative affiliation may 
lead to an improved input efficiency and lower average input costs that positively affect net farm 
income, but these effects were not fully included in the data set. 
 
Finally, our results provide consistent evidence and a sound motivation for further promoting 
cooperative coffee production in rural Mexico, particularly in areas where options for economies of 
scale and further processing are available. In addition to individual factors that enhance 
cooperative membership (literacy, training), there is considerable scope to support cooperative 
development through institutional programmes that strengthen the external infrastructure. 
Moreover, local and regional economies of scope readily emerge in communities where more 
farmers adhere to cooperative organizations, thus potentially generating a kind of snowball effect. 
 
Further research regarding the long-term effects of rural organization on farm household welfare 
and bargaining power, comparing matched samples of members and non-members living in the 
same area, would make it possible to shed more light on the enduring effects of cooperative 
membership. Our material suggests that under the current wave of market liberalization in Mexico, 
coffee cooperatives received a new impetus that enables progress in processing, marketing and 
supply chain upgrading. 
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Chapter 5. Farmers' cooperatives as a response to uncertainty: Empirical findings from 
the Mexican coffee sector 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Coffee is a major export crop for many developing countries and represents the second most 
traded world commodity after petroleum. The worldwide production in the 2008-09 harvesting 
season was 168 million quintals (7.6 million tons of green coffee).30 Coffee generates income for 
125 million smallholder farmers and their families in developing countries, who live in more than 50 
developing countries including Mexico. 
 
In Mexico, coffee is a very significant crop, both economically and socially. It is fifth in value of 
Mexico's total agricultural exports, and almost 500,000 farmers and their families depend on coffee 
for a living (SIAP, 2008). Coffee orchards are concentrated in Mexico’s poorest zones, while major 
coffee-producing areas are mountainous, with poor communication and limited public services. At 
present, coffee is the primary economic activity for more than 4,500 communities located in 12 
Mexican states; many of these communities have a large indigenous population. Consequently, 
60% of coffee producers live in extreme poverty, with more than half of them belonging to one of 
Mexico’s 52 ethnic groups (Fuzhi, 2007; ICO, 2009; IDEA, 2006). 
 
Coffee has been the most important source of agricultural revenues from abroad for many decades 
in Mexico, generating 413 million dollars of foreign exchange annually in the nineteen nineties and 
up to 230 million dollars of foreign exchange annually during the last decade (Banco de México, 
2010). Although coffee’s relative economic importance has declined, it still remains the country’s 
largest single export crop and a key source of foreign income (Calo and Wise, 2005; Pérez et al., 
2001). 
 
Under the controlled coffee market regime, producers were organized mostly through government 
associations. However, after the demise of the economic clauses of the international coffee 
agreements in 1989, growers faced considerable uncertainty about their trading environment. 
Under the quota system, the basic farmers’ organizations were the Unidades Económicas de 
Producción y Comercialización (UEPCs, by its initial in Spanish); but after the ending of the 
economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreement, most of them disappeared and some of 
them changed into another kind of producer organization, named producer cooperatives. Since 
then, producers have increasingly formed and joined cooperatives that engage in activities such as 
securing access to funding, adding value to the product, entering into sustainable coffee markets, 
providing information, and negotiating better prices and quality vis-à-vis their counterparts.31 This 
has partially filled the gap left by the government in processing, marketing, and exporting coffee. 
 
                                            
30 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
31 The words organization, association, cooperation and cooperative are used synonymously in this work to avoid boring 
repetition, although it is recognized that each of them contains its own distinctions and connotation. 
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This chapter focuses on the cooperatives’ response to uncertainty. We will present evidence to 
show that more farmers engaged in cooperatives, where the predictability about the trading 
environment, measured as the variance of the coffee prices at the municipal level from 2001 to 
2004, was lower. In doing so, we will also answer the reverse question: to what extent has price 
unpredictability diminished due to cooperative participation? We will also test the relationships of 
variability of coffee price variability and cooperative membership with the individual coffee price 
and yearly coffee income. 
 
In Chapter 4, we have used similar information and work on the factors determining the coffee 
growers´ willingness to participate in a cooperative. The effect of cooperation on the per capita 
yearly coffee income was tested as well. During that work, we found that local and regional factors 
show a strong and significant impact on the probability of cooperative participation. Regarding the 
factor affecting the level of household welfare, we found that cooperation matters. 
 
The results indicate that there is no clear link between cooperative participation and the 
predictability of local coffee prices. However, we have found clear evidence that – controlling for 
individual and municipal characteristics, education of the head of household, communication, land 
property, altitude, farm size, number of coffee farmers in the municipality and variance of farm size 
– the variability of the coffee price positively affects farmer’s membership of an organization. The 
results also indicate that membership of a farmers’ organization helps producers increase their 
coffee price and income. 
 
We rely on information collected in a representative field survey conducted in 2004 throughout the 
eight major coffee-producing states, additional village-level data from the National Coffee Census 
database retrieved from 2002 to 2008, and other databases reported by SIAP (2010), ICO (2009) 
and CMC (2005). 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents theoretical 
considerations of risky markets and farmers' preferences and constraints regarding rural 
cooperation. It also presents major characteristics of the Mexican coffee market related to these 
topics. Section 5.3 outlines data used in the study and the methods we applied. Section 5.4 
highlights the empirical approach. Section 5.5 proceeds with the presentation of empirical results 
grouped into four parts: (1) the variability of the local coffee price and its effect on the degree of 
organization; (2) market price variability as affected by the degree of cooperation; (3) the effects 
of price variability and cooperation on the individual price; and (4) the influence of market 
uncertainty and cooperation (membership) on the annual coffee income. Finally, in Section 5.6 we 
draw some conclusions and policy recommendations to strengthen the economic role of 
cooperatives in the Mexican coffee sector. 
5.2. Theoretical considerations 
 
In times of uncertainty, farmers have an additional incentive to participate in cooperatives. In 
normal times, the incentive for forming a cooperative comes from the potential benefits of 
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economies of scale and of a better negotiating position vis-à-vis the traders. If uncertainty is 
added, farmers may seek information from colleagues to better know what the market may bring 
in terms of prices and access to traders. Without such collaboration, traders are likely to strike 
different deals with different farmers. This would result in a high (cross-sectional) variance of the 
prices paid to different producers. In the event that farmers know more about the market because 
they have obtained more knowledge of the prices other farmers received, the variance of the prices 
paid is likely to be less. Similarly, if many traders can arbitrage between supplying farmers, this 
may also lead to a low level of variance. This also requires intensive knowledge of what farmers 
have to offer and on the low costs of arbitraging. Besides receiving better coffee prices, organized 
growers may join a cooperative to vertically integrate with a processing stage and thereby achieve 
higher prices for their product. On the other hand, it would be easier for coffee intermediaries to 
deal with organized farmers. Thus, we expect that by forming cooperatives both farmers and 
intermediaries win by reducing transaction costs. 
 
As described by ICO (2005), market prices are influenced by several factors. Those factors are the 
result of the transactions of agents intervening in the commodity. Other, less important or less 
related factors are also determining the coffee price path and volatility. 
 
Price volatility is an important concern for the different actors in any supply chain. The market 
uncertainty generates difficulties in planning and the development/implementation of effective 
market policies. Particularly, in the case of the coffee market, volatility is directly linked to the 
primary supply and demand; this change is particularly important when prices fall. Also, this 
volatility is influencing the producers and other primary agents´ behaviour. Higher price volatility 
implies a higher standard deviation; by contrast, a market registering a lower price variability will 
produce a lower standard deviation. 
 
ICO (2005) found that the price volatility became higher under the free trading system than under 
the economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreement. This phenomenon has been observed 
particularly after 1993. The same study found that the coffee price volatility is increasingly related 
to the investment fund activities in the last decade, and less to the market factors and more to the 
environment factors. 
 
From one year to the next, local prices will vary in response to the world market price and in 
response to changes in local conditions, such as changes in weather and trading networks. If 
trading channels are relatively rigid, farm gate prices are likely to follow external prices quite 
closely, while margins between farm gate and export prices are rather fixed. If, however regimens 
change (due to traders exiting or entering) every year, these margins may vary from one year to 
the next. Another reason for local prices to not follow export prices completely are local quality 
changes and environmental characteristics, such as infrastructure and/or weather conditions. As 
Figure 5.1 shows, the margins between state and international prices change from year to year. 
 
Chapter 5 
104 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Price margins between producing state price and 
Other Milds price (my own elaboration with data from 
SIAP (2010) and ICO (2009)). 
If arbitrage between villages is rather costly because of a lack of infrastructure, it will not secure 
equal pricing over space. Over time, however, prices may still be stable relative to export prices, if 
the same traders purchase the coffee year after year. Fluctuations in the relationship between local 
prices and export prices over time are an indication that this is not the case (or that quality 
fluctuations play an important role, which is not observable). Membership of cooperatives and the 
better communication that comes with it may substitute for stronger competition among traders. It 
might result in a reduced 
spatial variation of prices and 
thereby in more stable price 
relationship with the export 
markets. This can be tested 
by checking whether the 
degree of organization of the 
farmers at the municipal level 
has a positive effect on the 
local residual variance of the 
coffee prices, after accounting 
for international coffee price 
fluctuations. 
 
Coffee farmers face a number of difficulties. Generally, they are located in areas with poor 
infrastructure and service provision. Their income is highly volatile because of the fluctuation of 
coffee prices. As a result of isolation in some areas, intermediaries normally work under imperfect 
competition. An increase in the number of purchasers was expected after the end of the economic 
clauses of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and the demise of INMECAFE in 1989, but this 
has not happened at the processor level; the number of local processors and exporting companies 
has remained the same or has even decreased in some years. As some interviewed intermediaries 
told us, shortly after the ending of the quota system, several primary traders related to local 
investors disappeared from the coffee market, and then traders from multinational companies 
spread in some of the producing regions. Nowadays, in some places there are smaller and medium-
sized primary traders in producing areas than there were under the controlled system, but many of 
them are not registered in the coffee product system; thus, when checking the statistics, it appears 
that there are fewer primary traders than there were before 1989. 
 
Coffee growers in Mexico face two main risks. One comes from production fluctuations due to 
adverse weather and pests or diseases, and the other comes from the market due to the volatility 
of local prices, which in itself is a result of volatile international coffee prices and exchange rate 
fluctuations. The second risk is arguably the more important one. Price fluctuations cause problems 
for the individual growers in planning their investments and in maintaining their coffee plantations. 
Farmer cooperatives are also hindered by coffee price variability in collecting, processing, and 
marketing the product. Specifically, cooperative managers do not know the amount and quality 
they will be able to buy in the coming months. 
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Figure 5.2. Ways of selling coffee by any grower 
member of a cooperative (my own 
elaboration with data from the 2004 
survey). 
Cooperative 
48%
Intermediary 
49%
Consumer    
or export
3%
As there currently is no market regulation, the world coffee price fluctuations are transmitted 
directly to the coffee producers, who bear most of the impact of price volatility. We argue that for 
many coffee farmers, price volatility can be handled more efficiently through processing and selling 
the coffee collectively rather than doing so individually (Gjolberg and Steen, 1999). The possibly 
better price for farmers can come in two ways: one by selling more downstream of the supply 
chain and one by acquiring more negotiation power vis-à-vis their buyers. Another way to tackle 
these market issues is by selling through the future market mechanism. 
 
Defining a rural cooperative as an association of persons who work together to achieve certain 
objectives, we can distinguish cooperatives from other economic organizations in the sense that 
cooperatives are voluntary associations of people, where decisions are based on member 
participation and representation and not on capital voting power (for a variety of types of 
cooperatives, their constitution and objectives, see Levay (1983)). As there are large economies of 
scale in processing and marketing, individual farmers are disadvantaged due to the high 
transaction costs related to their usually small production size (Tanguy and Alemayehu, 2009). The 
main advantage of marketing cooperatives is then that they reduce transaction costs and thus 
improve the bargaining power of smallholders against middlemen (Francesconi, 2009). 
 
Under the free coffee market, the federal and state governments have shortly promoted 
cooperatives. Some coffee grassroots organizations (UNORCA, CNOC) have recently been 
promoting farmer organizations as well, as 
the way to sort the collecting, processing, 
and selling of the product in a more 
profitable manner. According to information 
coming from the Mexican Coffee Census 
(SIAP, 2008), only 13.8% of the coffee 
producers participate in some kind of 
cooperative. But only a minority of farmers 
joins a cooperative and if they are 
members, they do not normally sell all their 
coffee via the cooperative. This is what 
Figure 5.2 shows for the farmers surveyed 
in 2004. 
 
Producer cooperatives work in the same market as private companies do. The cooperatives 
compete with transnational buyers to purchase similar coffee. Yet, normally, cooperatives are at a 
disadvantage because private buyers typically have the capacity to pay the total value of the 
product upon receipt, whereas cooperatives lack the cash money to do so; they often pay a first 
instalment, about 50% of the value upon receiving the coffee. Cooperatives complete payment 
upon finishing the harvest season (Pérez et al., 2001). Thus, because transnational companies do 
not have budget constraints, they are often active in buying coffee directly from both organized 
and non-organized farmers. Furthermore, having these two very different competitors in the same 
market has implications for their behaviour. They are forced to align prices, services and buying 
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station; normally, private buyers are adapting to the cooperatives’ way of working, and sometimes 
cooperatives try to adapt to the private buyers; this means that they try to pay similar prices and 
to establish their buying centre near to the others. Additionally, some other issues are similar 
among competitors in every producing region, such as the quality, time in the season, and deals. 
 
The firms’ adaptation to cooperatives' functioning could be beneficial or problematic for both 
organized and non-organized farmers placed in the same area. It depends on the efficiency of the 
cooperatives' operations. As a result, as has been mentioned by Milford (2004), purchasing prices 
are normally higher in areas where cooperatives are present than in areas where such 
organizations are not operating. We expect, however, that also in places where cooperatives are 
working inefficiently the coffee price will be lower. 
 
The development of grower organizations has been supported by the government. Federal and 
state agencies require coffee growers to be organized if they want to apply for some subsidy; in 
addition, some support to increase long-term investment in processing plants is given only to 
organized producers. In the last two decades, government agencies have been supporting farmer 
organizations to increase investments in producing, processing, and marketing coffee; they do so 
mainly through two programmes: “fondo de inversión y capitalización” and “proyectos 
productivos.” Other government support to organized producers has been oriented to facilitate the 
communication and information exchange regarding the market condition. To do so, the federal 
government has been financing programmes such as “promoción del consume del café” and 
“coberturas de precios”; the first one was supported with 4.48 million dollars and the second one 
with 8.14 million dollars in 2009. Additionally, through the government’s economic support in a 
similar vein, market information has been distributed through the platform of the CPS and the 
AMECAFE. 
 
Karli et al. (2006) has shown that variables such as education, communication, income, farm size, 
medium and high technology variables, influence the farmer’s decision to participate in 
organization. Thus, it has been found that small and medium-sized farmers are more likely to join 
an agricultural cooperative than wealthier farmers are. Particularly in Chapter 4, we found that age, 
gender, farm size, the level of organization at the village level, among other factors, favour 
cooperative formation; whereas the housing condition and the proportion of producers selling to 
private traders at village level negatively influence cooperative filiation. In the same chapter, we 
found a positive effect of cooperation on the per capita coffee income. 
 
At a higher level, several small cooperatives have joined in grassroots organizations that give them 
a voice in formulating regional and national policies. This process can be observed in more 
populated coffee-producing states such as Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, and Veracruz. Thus, 
cooperatives which have emerged in many ways have been involved in a variety of strategies; the 
most successful types of coffee grower cooperatives have been those that have been oriented on 
work in organic and fair trade coffee (Pérez et al., 2001). 
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5.3. Empirical approach 
 
We considered the variability of the coffee price over eight years (2001-2008) at the municipal 
level as a dependent variable to be tested against the level of organization coming either from the 
2004 survey or from the 2001 National Coffee Census database. We expected a higher degree of 
organization in 2004 in municipalities with a higher variability of coffee prices from 2001 to 2004. 
Considering the influence that the level of organization can have in the market, we also expected 
that municipalities that register a higher level of organization in 2004 would have a lower level of 
variability in coffee prices evaluated from 2005 to 2008. 
 
In this chapter, we use a unique approach. By using coffee prices over an eight-year period at the 
village level, we were able to have a variable related with the variability of coffee prices. This 
variability is also expressing the structural differences among coffee-producing municipalities. 
Then, to test the effect of the cooperation registered in 2004 on the variability of the coffee price, 
we took the period from 2005 to 2008 and got the variability of the coffee price only on this period 
of time. In the same vein, we evaluated the possible effect of the variability of the coffee price 
from the 2001–2004 period on the level of cooperation registered in 2004. By doing so, we were 
able to control for a possible recursive effect of cooperation and the variability of the coffee price. 
 
In our analysis of the decision to join a cooperative, we introduced the density of coffee producers 
and the variance of farm sizes at the municipal level as explanatory variables. A large number of 
coffee farmers in the municipality implies low transaction costs in organizing a cooperative. At a 
given number of farmers, a larger variance of farm sizes in the municipality indicates a greater 
diversity of interests. This may hinder the formation of cooperatives. We also expected that a 
higher number of similar producers in the same municipality would make it easier to organize 
cooperatives. Additionally, we expected large-scale coffee producers to be less willing to join a 
cooperative because they have better options for vertical integration and creating their own coffee 
brand. On the other hand, we expected small- and medium-scale farmers to be more likely to join 
agricultural cooperatives as they have more to gain (Karli et al., 2006). 
 
Factors like the level of education, the size of the coffee farm, and the location and altitude of the 
coffee plantation are of some importance in a farmer's decision to get affiliated with a cooperative 
(see Levay (1983) for a concise overview). We also expected that farmers who live in a 
municipality with better market characteristics to commercialise coffee, have less incentives to 
cooperate. In the following section, we will test these hypotheses by using comprehensive data on 
the Mexican coffee sector. The procedure applied here is the same as in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Yet, we dropped some variables (farmer participation in the NCS, literacy, training, per capita farm 
size, type of farming system, organized farmers in the municipality and coffee being sold to 
intermediaries), while farm size, altitude squared and variance of farm size, and the mean and 
variance of the coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 at the municipality level were added in this 
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chapter.32 By including these variables, we try to test how much easier it gets for farmers to be 
organized as an effect of their similarity at the municipal level. With this procedure, we also try to 
capture the effect that the uncertainty and variability of the coffee price have on cooperative 
formation. Thus, the model specification in the present chapter differs much from the similar one 
used in Chapter 4. 
 
The economic effect of cooperatives on farmer benefit was evaluated by testing whether being a 
member of a grower organization increased the coffee price and farmers’ income. This test is a 
fundamental one to shed light on the role and impact of cooperatives; it relates to the relevant 
policy discussion on the importance of grower organizations with regard to increasing coffee 
producers’ economic benefits. The principle applied to these two sections is that cooperation 
increases coffee prices by reducing transaction costs, as it generates some value added to the 
product, and increases farmers’ bargaining power over buyers. At the same time, grower 
organizations can reach more economically attractive markets (Tanguy et al., 2008) which results 
in higher economic benefits. We expected that organized producers would have a higher income 
than those who are not cooperative members. 
5.4. Data and methods of analysis 
 
Data was collected in a survey of the eight main producer states in Mexico in 2004 (Ramírez et al., 
2004). This information was complemented with information included in the Coffee Census 
database (SIAP, 2008). In addition, to measure price uncertainty and calculate the mean and the 
variance price in the 2001–2004 period, we used municipal data on prices for eight years, 
constructing a panel with data coming from the SIAP databases (SIAP, 2010). Using these panel 
data, we tested for the effect of farmer organization on the price variability, by applying an 
ordinary least square regression. For this procedure we used data for the 432 municipalities listed 
in the Census, which included the 66 municipalities considered in the 2004 survey, of which the 
prices were available for most of the eight-year period. 
 
The National Coffee Census was administered mainly in 2001. Both, the 2004 survey and the 
Census, include individual, family, farm, market, and regional characteristics. In the survey, a 
sample of 1,396 farmers was taken from a list of 353,696 coffee plots benefited with the 
“desarrollo productivo y mejoramiento de la calidad del café” (productive development and coffee 
quality improvement) programme. The sample selection took place in two steps: first, 
municipalities were selected according to their proportion of coffee production; secondly, farmers 
were chosen from each municipality according to farm strata (Ramírez et al., 2004). This resulted 
in a stratified sample that is considered representative for the Mexican coffee sector. 
 
The SIAP average annual rural coffee prices were weighted by the total monthly production. It is 
representative of the price paid to coffee growers during the corresponding period of time. These 
                                            
32 The NCS is a non-governmental instance constituted to serve as mechanism for permanent planning, communication and 
consultation between different actors in the Mexican coffee supplying chain. 
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Figure 5.3. Rural coffee price and price margins (my own 
elaboration with information from ICO (2009), 
Banco de México (2010) and SIAP (2010)). 
statistics are generated yearly for the main crops farmed in Mexico. To do so, the next expression 
has been applied: 
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ARCP = Average Rural Coffee Price. 
i = 1, 2, ... n represents the number of months when the coffee is marketed. 
Pi = Average coffee price in the i month. 
Qi = Coffee production in the i month. 
 
Thus, the ARCP is equally representative of the municipal, state and federal level. These prices, 
which are reported on a yearly basis, are an average for the whole range of qualities and growers 
in the municipality. The registration of the price in each producing region falls under the 
responsibility of the SAGARPA, which has offices spread all over the coffee-producing areas, named 
Support for the Sustainable Rural Development Centres (CADERS, by its initials in Spanish). Each 
month, personnel from this ministry interviews producers and intermediaries randomly selected 
from each producing region to get the average coffee price. Then, these prices are sent to the 
Agriculture and Livestock Information System (SIAP, by its initials in Spanish), which processes 
and publishes the statistics (personal communication with SIAP personnel). These coffee prices 
have been reported on the SIAP website annually since 2001 (SIAP, 2010). 
 
The SIAP statistics report the price in cherry coffee equivalents. To make this comparable across 
producing regions, the parchment and dry beans coffee price is used as a standard measure. For 
example, the price of a kilogramme of parchment coffee is divided by 4.35 to get the price of 
cherries. This factor is the same as considering a quintal of parchment coffee to be equivalent to 
57.5 kg, whereas a quintal of cherry coffee is equal to 245 kilogrammes. Using the SIAP statistics, 
we can compare the Other Milds and fob prices with the average rural price. Figure 5.3 shows the 
local prices as well as the margins between fob and Other Milds and the rural prices.1 The high 
variation of the rural price over the 
last 28 years is clear enough. The 
margin between the export prices 
(fob and Other Milds) and the rural 
prices also fluctuates; during the 
nineteen eighties, the price margins 
were larger than they were during 
the last two decades. At the end of 
the nineteen nineties and the 
beginning of the 21st century, a low 
margin was recorded. 
 
                                            
1 Fob price was computed by dividing the total coffee export value by the volume exported; the information are reported by the 
Banco de México (2010), and the Other Milds prices are reported by the ICO (2009). 
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The work to build the National Coffee Census database was done by sending technicians and 
qualified personnel to take the measurement of each plot with a coffee orchard with the aid of GPS, 
and to interview the owner of each coffee plantation. This information was then noted down and 
organized to construct a unique database (SAGARPA, 2001). While the major part of the 
information was collected in 2001, since then other information has been added to the National 
Coffee Census. The database built until 2008 contains technical, economic, and social data of 
493,497 coffee growers. Information about farm size, a farmer’s age, household size, market 
outlets, assets in the household, members of household and their individual characteristics, type of 
coffee system and regional characteristics can be retrieved from this information (SIAP, 2008). 
 
Table 5.1. Names and descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis (N = 1,396). 
Variables Definition and unit Mean SD 
                          Individual  
Farmer’s sex 1 if the farmer is male   0.74    0.44 
Ethnicity 1 if the farmer speaks any indigenous language   0.48    0.50 
Education Schooling level in years starting in primary school   3.70    3.43 
Cooperative member 1 if the farmer is a cooperative member   0.31    0.46 
Predicted cooperation Prediction of being a cooperative member from the probit 
regression 
  0.29    0.25 
                         Family 
Cement house 1 if the house has a cement roof, wall or floor   0.43   0.50 
Electricity 1 if the farmer’s house has electricity   0.60   0.49 
Type of road 1 if the farmer’s community is accessed by a paved road   0.22   0.41 
                         Farm 
Coffee price Mexican pesos per quintal (2004)     491   153 
Coffee income Annual coffee income in Mexican pesos (2004)     3,652      3,336 
Land property 1 if the farmer owns ejidal or communal land     0.64  0.48 
Altitude Metres above sea level        915      358 
Farm size Hectares of coffee    1.89   6.89 
Age of coffee trees Age of the coffee plantation in 2004  14.85 10.08 
                        Market 
Type of coffee 
1 if the farmer sells processed coffee (parchment, green, roasted, 
or ground coffee)     0.63  0.48 
Ratio intermedia-
ries/farmers 
Number of intermediaries in 2005 divided by the number of coffee 
farmers in the farmer’s municipality multiplied by 1,000       1.31    1.93 
Mean of coffee prices Mean of the coffee price in the farmer’s municipality from 2001 to 
2004 (Mexican pesos per quintal) 
    376  111 
Variance of coffee prices Variance of the coffee prices in the farmer’s municipality from 2001 
to 2004 (in thousands of Mexican pesos per quintal) 
  8,482 11,094 
                       Regional and state 
Farmers in the 
municipality 
Thousands of coffee farmers in the municipality from the National 
Coffee Census (only municipalities included in the 2004 survey)       3.13     2.71 
Level of organization Percentage of farmers organized in the municipality according to the 
National Coffee Census (2001). 
   11.86   15.18 
Variance of farmer’s size Variance of farm size in the farmer’s municipality according to the 
2004 survey sample (in thousands) 
    26.13   95.95 
Chiapas 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Chiapas    0.27  0.44 
Guerrero 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Guerrero   0.03  0.17 
Hidalgo 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Hidalgo   0.11  0.32 
Nayarit 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Nayarit   0.11  0.32 
Oaxaca 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Oaxaca   0.14  0.35 
Puebla 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Puebla   0.07  0.26 
San Luís Potosí 1 if the coffee household is in the state of San Luís Potosí   0.04  0.20 
Veracruz 1 if the coffee household is in the state of Veracruz   0.21  0.41 
Note: A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry beans, or 46 kg of green coffee. 
 
The names and descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter are depicted in Table 5.1. 
We considered the standard deviation of the residuals calculated from a panel database (the 
procedure is explained below) as a dependent variable. Membership of an organization in 2004 
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Figure 5.4. Time line and direction of the relationship of 
organization and rural prices’ variables. 
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(survey data) was measured as one if a coffee producer was a member of a cooperative and zero 
otherwise. We used the same measure for organized membership reported in the National Coffee 
Census database (2001). The individual coffee income was calculated from the survey database by 
multiplying the coffee production with the individual price received by farmers in 2004. 
 
We relied on five steps to test the relationship between cooperation and price uncertainty, and 
between market uncertainty and predicted cooperation with the individual coffee price on the one 
hand and household coffee income on the other (see Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2. Summary of the various steps followed in this chapter. 
Step Method Source of information Relationship 
1 
OLS regression in 
panel data SIAP and ICO coffee prices. 
To find the relationship between the local and international 
coffee prices. The standard deviations (SD) of the residual 
(2001–2008, 2005–2008) were obtained. The first period 
for 66 and 432 municipalities. 
 
2 Probit regression 2004 survey, ICO, CMC, and 
National Census. 
Regression of cooperative membership with individual, 
family, market, and regional characteristics. The predicted 
membership of a cooperative was obtained. 
 
3 OLS regressions 
SD of the residual from the first 
step and level of organization 
from the 2004 survey and 
Census database. 
The effect of level of organization in the variability of coffee 
prices from 2005 to 2008 and the effect of the level of 
organization in 2001 on the variability of prices from 2001 
to 2008 (using 66 and 432 municipalities). 
 
4 OLS regression 
Predicted cooperation from the 
second step, 2004 survey, CMC, 
SIAP, and Census information. 
 
The effect of cooperation and market instability on the level 
of individual coffee prices gathered in 2004. 
5 OLS regression 
Predicted cooperation from the 
second step, 2004 survey, CMC, 
SIAP, and Census information. 
 
The effect of cooperation and market instability on the level 
of the annual coffee income estimated in 2004. 
 
During the first step, an ordinary least square regression was made using panel data on the local 
coffee prices of 432 municipalities included in the Mexican Coffee Census database. The local coffee 
prices over eight years were regressed on international prices (Other Milds) to get the residual. 
From this step we got the standard 
deviation (SD) from the period from 
2005 to 2008, which we hypothesized 
to be affected by the degree of 
cooperative membership at the 
municipal level. We investigated this 
issue for a sample of farmers included 
in the 2004 survey; we included only 66 
municipalities within these data. The 
standard deviation from 2001 to 2008 
came from the same regression as well; 
we then investigated de relationship of 
this with the level of organization 
(2001) at the municipal level (see 
Figure 5.4). 
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We calculated the local mean and variance of the coffee prices using the same panel database of 
432 municipalities. These results we then took as explanatory variables in a probit estimation that 
related the membership of a cooperative in 2004 to farmer, family, farm, market, and regional 
characteristics. Also, in addition to the local price characteristics, we included the variance in farm 
sizes per municipality in the membership regressions, to capture the ease with which farmers could 
organize themselves: the more heterogeneous the farms, the more difficult it might be. We took 
some market variables calculated by using the municipality database as explanatory variables in 
the OLS regressions applied in the fourth and fifth steps. These were done to identify the effect of 
cooperation and price variability on the individual coffee price and to identify the factors influencing 
individual coffee income, respectively. 
 
For the second step, we used a probit model to identify the individual, family, farm, market and 
regional factors affecting the farmer's likelihood of joining a cooperative. To test the effect of 
market uncertainty (the variability of coffee prices) on the willingness to join a cooperative, we 
used the observed membership of a cooperation as dependent variable as well as individual, 
household, market and regional characteristics, including the mean and variance of the coffee 
prices at the municipal level from 2001 to 2004. From this step we obtained the predicted 
probability to be member of a cooperative, which was then included as explanatory variable in the 
regressions of the individual coffee price and a household’s coffee income. 
 
During the third step, we carried out three OLS regressions relating the standard deviation over the 
2005–2008 period to cooperative membership in the 2004 survey and relating the standard 
deviation in 2001–2008 to cooperative membership in 2001 (obtained from the National Coffee 
Census). For this second period, we ran two regressions, one using only the data on the 
municipalities included in the 2004 survey (to make the results comparable to the first regression), 
and the other using all the municipalities included in the National Coffee Census database (see the 
illustration in Figure 5.4). We also controlled for other variables at the municipal level. 
 
During the fourth step, we executed an OLS regression to find out the effect of cooperation and 
price variability on the individual coffee price. The individual coffee price was hypothesized to be 
positively related to cooperative membership and negatively to price variability; the variables were 
regressed together with some individual, household and regional characteristics as explanatory 
variables. 
 
During the fifth step, one OLS regression was done to identify the factors influencing the coffee 
income received by the 1,396 farmers included in the 2004 survey. This procedure allowed us to 
find the effect that cooperation has on the welfare of organized growers. To figure out whether 
organized farmers get a higher price than not-organized farmers do and establish that this is 
unrelated to the variability of the coffee price, we included an interaction term of predicted 
cooperation with the variance of local coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 as an explanatory variable. 
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5.5. Empirical results 
5.5.1. Market characteristics versus cooperation 
 
The first step was to regress the local prices of the 432 municipalities on the world market prices 
(Other Milds) and to calculate the residual variance. We had prices over eight years, from 2001 
to2008. With a 1% significance level, the results showed a positive and strong correlation between 
these prices (see Appendix 2). This result means that the local prices closely follow the world 
market prices (Other Milds) reported by ICO (2009). 
 
The decision to join a cooperative can be expressed by the general and simplified form of a discrete 
choice model. In this case, a producer will choose to be a cooperative member if the expected 
benefits of joining a cooperative are greater than the cost involved (Masten and Saussier, 2000)  
 
We generated a set of variables that describe the farmers’ individual and households´ 
characteristics, as well as some specification of their location and states; we also considered some 
market characteristics they face. Table 5.3 lists the variables that were included in the regressions. 
 
We estimated the determinants of cooperative membership in a probit model for four different 
specifications, as presented in Table 5.3. The specifications differed in the inclusion of the mean 
and variance of the coffee prices before the year in which membership was measured i.e., 2004 
(see Figure 5.4). 
 
Table 5.3. Market factors influencing participation in coffee cooperatives (marginal effects after 
probit estimations; state dummies included, but not reported). 
   Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Farmer’s sex  0.073 (0.011)**  0.074 (0.007)***  0.084 (0.004)***  0.085 (0.004)*** 
Education  0.007 (0.044)**  0.007 (0.007)***  0.008 (0.033)**  0.008 (0.032)** 
Cement house -0.040 (0.295) -0.039 (0.296) -0.048 (0.201) -0.056 (0.134) 
Electricity  0.050 (0.210)  0.053 (0.194)  0.061 (0.129)  0.026 (0.528) 
Land property  0.111 (0.000)***  0.110 (0.000)**  0.022 (0.004)***  0.093 (0.004)*** 
Altitude -0.0004 (0.016)** -0.0004 (0.016)** -0.0004 (0.020)** -0.0003 (0.062)** 
Altitude squared and divided 
by 1,000 
 0.0002 (0.011)**  0.0002 (0.010)***  0.0002 (0.005)***  0.0002 (0.016)** 
Farm size  0.003 (0.234)  0.003 (0.241)  0.003 (0.227)  0.005 (0.102) 
Farmers in the municipality  0.008 (0.106)  0.009 (0.103)  0.012 (0.019)**  0.004 (0.498) 
Variance of farm size  0.256 (0.041)**  0.253 (0.044)**  0.216 (0.206)  0.444 (0.315) 
Mean of the coffee prices from 
2001 to 2004 
  0.0001 (0.728)  -0.003 (0.000)*** 
Variance of the coffee prices 
from 2001 to 2004 
   0.006 (0.000)***  0.035 (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.165 (0.000)*** -0.250 (0.601) -0.525 (0.213)  0.605 (0.228) 
Observation numbers  1,298  1,298  1,279  1,298 
Pseudo R square  0.251  0.251  0.269  0.280 
Log likelihood -586 -586 -573 -564 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
The type of land ownership is very significant in all models, showing that farmers who owned ejidal 
and communal land were more likely (11%) to participate in cooperatives as compared to farmers 
who owned private land. Male heads were 7% more likely to participate than female heads were. 
Although an increase in the percentage of female heads of rural households was registered, coffee 
organizations apparently continue to be male-biased. Above 850 metres, altitude had a positive 
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Figure 5.5. Variance of the coffee prices from 2001 to 
2004 and level of organization in 2004. 
effect on participation in coffee cooperatives. This indicates that producers who have better natural 
conditions to produce a better quality coffee are more willing to participate in organizations. 
 
Our approach is novel in that it includes characteristics of the municipalities. Among these, we see 
that the more farmers there are in a municipality, the higher the degree of membership is. This 
result is confirming our theory. Furthermore, the more variation in farm size there is, the higher 
the membership is, too. This is surprising, as less homogeneous groups are more difficult to 
organize. Yet, they may very well organize themselves in different cooperatives, as these each by 
themselves are rather homogeneous. 
 
The mean and the variance of the coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 correlated with membership in 
2004; the first with a negative and the second with a positive sign. Hence, the poorer the 
conditions were for marketing coffee, the stronger the motives for membership were. This finding 
can be related to the information presented in Figure 5.5, which shows an increase in the level of 
organization when the variance of the coffee prices increased. The overall results included in Table 
5.3 indicated that the degree of education, and whether the producers owned ejidal or communal 
land, increased the probability of participation in a cooperative, whereas owning private land 
reduced the producers' likelihood of participation. From this we can derive that middle-class coffee 
producers were the ones more likely to participate in cooperatives. Similar results have been 
reported by Francesconi (2009) and Tungay & Spielman (2009) for studies done in Ethiopia. 
 
In summary, results indicated that there is a positive correlation between the farmer’s sex (male), 
education, traditional land, an altitude over 850 meter above sea level, the number of farmers in 
the municipality, the variance of farm size and membership of a cooperative. We also found that 
the higher the variances of the local price and the lower its mean, the more farmers join a 
cooperative. 
5.5.2. Organization and the variability of local coffee prices 
 
As Figure 5.5 shows, the variances of local coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 were hardly correlated 
with the level of organization in 2004, although higher levels of organization were often found with 
higher levels of variance. Using cross-sectional data as we did for the level of organization, we 
could not test for the direction of 
such a relationship. For that reason, 
we used the variance of the coffee 
prices measured from 2001 to 2004 
to test their effect on the level of 
cooperation in 2004; in the same 
vein, we tested the effect of 
membership in 2004 on the residual 
variance of the coffee prices 
measured from 2005 to 2008. 
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From the panel data built with the municipal and international coffee prices across eight years, the 
standard deviation (SD) of residuals per municipality was calculated. This SD then indicated the 
variation in local prices that cannot be accounted for by external prices. We then took this 
municipally constructed variable as a dependent variable and regressed on municipal, market, and 
regional factors. To avoid circular causation, we related the SD over a certain period to the level of 
organisation at the start of the period. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 5.4. 
 
We carried out three OLS regressions. One considered the standard deviation of the residual 
coming from the municipality price from 2005 to 2008 as a dependent variable, while two 
considered the standard deviation of the residual coming from the municipality price from 2001 to 
2008 as a dependent variable. Of these two, one was done using only the municipalities included in 
the 2004 survey, and the other was done using all the municipalities included in the National 
Coffee Census. The first of the three regressions considered the degree of organization calculated 
from the farmers surveyed at the municipal level as an explanatory variable, whereas the last two 
considered the level of organization at the municipal level calculated from the Coffee Census 
database (see Figure 5.4). 
 
The level of organization did not come out as a significant factor of the residual variability of the 
rural price. The outcomes show that – up to 1,300 metres – the higher the altitude, the lower the 
price variability, and that a higher number of farmers in the municipality resulted in a higher price 
variability. The variance of farm size at the municipal level and the ratio of intermediaries to 
farmers did not show a significant relationship to the price variability, but the signs are plausible: 
more diversity and less competition might lead to more price variability. The major coffee-
producing states (Chiapas, Veracruz and Oaxaca) have much lower levels of residual variation of 
the coffee prices compared with other states (Puebla, Hidalgo, Nayarit and San Luís Potosí). 
 
Table 5.4. Factors affecting the variance of local coffee prices (OLS estimates). 
 
Variable 
Standard deviation of the residual of local price 
From 2005 to 2008 and 
survey municipalities 
From 2001 to 2008 and 
survey municipalities 
From 2001 to 2008 and 
Census municipalities 
Level of organization in 2001  0.056 (0.292)  0.011 (0.641) 
Level of organization in 2004 -0.004 (0.893)   
Altitude  0.028 (0.091)*  0.037 (0.007)***  0.005 (0.136) 
Altitude squared divided by 1,000 -0.011 (0.184) -0.018 (0.008)*** -0.001 (0.510) 
Ratio intermediaries/farmers -0.283 (0.425) -0.011 (0.969) -0.018 (0.427) 
Farmers in the municipality  0.456 (0.088)*  0.290 (0.174)  0.129 (0.451) 
Variance of farm size  3.341 (0.642)  2.449 (0.673)  3.848 (0.348) 
Chiapas -9.241 (0.000)*** -5.025 (0.031)** -3.964 (0.000)*** 
Veracruz -4.701 (0.025)** -3.272 (0.048)** -3.532 (0.000)*** 
Oaxaca -7.964 (0.006)*** -5.360 (0.008)*** -4.264 (0.000)*** 
Puebla  0.518 (0.853) -0.391 (0.861)  1.600 (0.097)* 
Constant  0.411 (0.952) -1.980 (0.725)  12.69 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  66  66  424 
R square  0.311  0.266  0.162 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
The level of organization became significant when we dropped state dummies from the first 
regression, but this is not significant in the other two regressions. In short, we did not see the 
expected relationship between residual variances of the coffee price and the level of organization, 
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or at least the expected effect of the level of organization on the market stability was not evident in 
this model specification. 
 
The lack of effect of the degree of organization on the predictability of the local coffee price might 
be attributed to the small share of sales of cooperative members that go through the cooperative. 
Members are not marketing more than 50% of their coffee through the cooperatives. In addition, 
as said above, the average degree of organized producers is around 12% at the municipal level 
(according to the Coffee Census database). These two elements might prevent cooperatives from 
exerting a strong influence on the local market conditions. 
5.5.3. The influence of cooperation on the individual coffee price 
 
To investigate which variables explain the level of the individual coffee price, the coffee prices that 
each producer obtained in 2004 was included in a linear regression model as dependent variable. 
Thus, the coffee price was regressed on a set of variables depicting producer’s individual, family, 
farm, market, regional and state characteristics. A simple model representing this relationship can 
be written as: 
 
                                                                                                           (1) 
 
where denotes the individual coffee price for producer i,      is a vector which includes the 
above-mentioned variables representing producer characteristics,  represents the parameters to 
be estimated and that are associated with the explanatory variables, and  represents a stochastic 
error term. 
 
The variables included in the regression model that estimates equation (1) and their descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table 5.1. These variables are also constructed based on information 
from the 2004 survey and other sources indicated in the data and method section. 
 
In accordance with our theory, the predicted cooperation showed a positive effect on the individual 
coffee price. This relationship confirms part of the result obtained in the t-test done on a cross-
sectional base, using the 2004 survey data; the t-test gave a result opposite to the one obtained in 
this OLS regression. That is because the first one used prices at the municipality level, whereas the 
latter used the individual coffee price. The OLS output also shows that selling a more processed 
product helps in getting a higher price (see Table 5.5). 
 
Even when the farm size showed a significant result and with a positive effect on the individual 
price, its coefficient is very small, to show the power on the negotiation of larger producers against 
their buyers. Having more competition can be translated in a higher coffee price; we confirmed this 
expectation with the positive correlation between the ratio of intermediaries/farmers at the 
municipality level and the individual coffee price. As was expected, the mean coffee price from 
2001  to  2004  showed  a  positive  relationship  with  the  individual  coffee  price. The number of 
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farmers at the municipality level gave an unexpected result, as it indicated that having a higher 
number of growers at the village level reduces the level of the price received by farmers. An 
explanation for this to happen is that bigger municipalities in terms of the number of coffee farmers 
are located in more isolated places; they communicate less and may be faced with less competition 
among traders. 
 
Table 5.5. Market characteristics and cooperation on the individual coffee 
price (OLS estimates). 
Variable Coefficient 
Cooperative member  81.57 (0.009)*** 
Electricity -0.42 (0.971) 
Altitude  0.01 (0.827) 
Altitude squared divided by 1,000 -0.01 (0.685) 
Type of coffee  43.24 (0.000)*** 
Farm size  1.34 (0.021)** 
Ratio intermediaries/farmers  12.72 (0.000)*** 
Farmers in the municipality -6.31 (0.001)*** 
Mean of the coffee prices from 2001 to 2004  0.13 (0.009)*** 
Constant  418.53 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  1,246 
R square  11.84 
       Notes: P-values in parenthesis. ** and *** refer to significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
We investigated whether in a municipality with a higher level of organization the coffee price was 
higher as well. To do so, we used the same model to run a regression including a dummy as 
explanatory variable; it was  calculated with data from the Census database (SIAP, 2008) 
accounting for the level of organization (more than 5% mean 1) at the municipal level (see the 
output in Appendix 2). The output shows a significant negative correlation of the level of 
organization with the coffee price. Having more than 5% of organized farmers in the municipality 
reduced the coffee price to 43 Mexican pesos per quintal. It seems that the coffee prices were 
lower in municipalities where a higher level of organization was registered in 2001. 
5.5.4. The effect of market variability and cooperation on the coffee income 
 
We used an OLS regression to relate the coffee income to membership and other factors. We 
included five categories of variables (individual, family, farm, market, and regional) in the analysis. 
In order to avoid possible endogeneity, we used the predicted probability obtained in step two (see 
Table 5.2). The results are presented in Table 5.6. They show that the predicted membership of 
cooperatives has a positive effect on coffee income; its coefficient indicates that affiliation to a 
cooperative increased the coffee income in 2004 by some 3,251 Mexican pesos per year. 
 
As expected, ethnicity negatively affects the household coffee income. Ageing trees had positive 
effects on the income. The farm size and the type of road access positively affected the coffee 
income as well. These results indicate that larger-scale farmers had more income than small-scale 
farmers had. We can say that coffee-producing areas with better communication are more 
attractive to coffee buyers. This may mean more competition, and hence, perhaps a higher coffee 
income under these conditions. 
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According to the results of these regressions, the type of coffee shows a positive correlation to 
income. This implies that coffee growers who normally sell processed coffee had a higher coffee 
income than those who did not process the product. The mean coffee price at the local market from 
2001 to 2004 positively influenced the coffee income. This shows the beneficial effects of past 
prices – probably through better maintenance of the trees – on the current yield and/or quality. 
 
This relatively higher coffee income received by organized coffee farmers is confirmed also by 
checking the difference of farmers’ price and the average price reported by SIAP at the municipal 
level in 2004. Organized farmers registered a margin of 16.7 dollars per quintal, whereas non-
organized farmers registered 13.8 dollars per quintal (SIAP prices are in cherry presentation, 
whereas the producers’ prices are in cherry, parchment, green, and ground presentations). Other 
variables such as land property, the number of coffee farmers at the municipal level, the local 
variance of coffee prices from 2001 to 2004, and the interaction terms of the predictability of 
cooperation and variance of the coffee prices did not show any relation to the coffee income under 
this model specification. Thus we can state that there is no evidence that the variability of the 
coffee price is generating an effect on the coffee income, either for organized or non-organized 
farmers. 
 
Table 5.6. Market characteristics and cooperation on coffee income (OLS 
estimates). 
Variable Coefficient 
Ethnicity -930.04 (0.000)*** 
Education  83.96 (0.003)*** 
Cooperative member  3,251 (0.005)*** 
Type of road  514.09 (0.026)** 
Land property -257.40 (0.0291) 
Altitude  2.68 (0.022)** 
Altitude squared divided by 1,000 -1.16 (0.061)* 
Farm size  132.26 (0.000)*** 
Age of the coffee plantation  25.05 (0.006)** 
Type of coffee  1,128 (0.000)*** 
Farmers in the municipality  50.10 (0.240) 
Mean of coffee prices from 2001 to 2004  6.98 (0.000)*** 
Variance of coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 -31.474 (0.253) 
Predicted cooperation x variance of the coffee price  54.341 (0.204) 
Constant -1,491 (0.064) 
Observation numbers  1,250 
R square  17.06 
      Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Generally, the overall results from this step indicate that cooperative membership had a positive 
effect on the coffee income. Perhaps cooperatives were likely to attract extension, public services, 
and to modify the market characteristics for input and services. As Milford (2004) has mentioned, 
cooperatives may bring in government funds, increase innovation as they bring new production 
technology and approaches, and help members to increase their knowledge. In many cases, both 
positive and negative commercial benefits from these changes can be spread to neighbouring 
farmers, including those who are not members of grower organizations. As the mean of the coffee 
prices and other variables included in the regressions indicate, the better the market condition for 
coffee, the higher the coffee income. 
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5.6. Conclusions and policy recommendation 
 
This study shows that while farmers appear to opt for cooperative membership, more often when 
faced with a higher price variability (and lower prices), this does not seem to affect the price 
variance itself. Cooperative membership does lead to higher incomes from coffee, however. The 
lack of effect on the price variability can be ascribed to the fact that farmers do not sell all their 
coffee to cooperatives and that the share of organized farmers is relatively low. Hence, 
membership does not affect municipal prices that much. 
 
With regard the elements inducing the participation of coffee farmers in cooperative organizations, 
similar to the findings of Karli et al. (2006), we found that education positively influences farmers’ 
willingness to join a cooperative. We found, however, a negative correlation of private land 
ownership with cooperative affiliation. This finding is a little contradictory in the sense that we 
expected that private land owners are the ones with more education; but considering the findings 
from Chapter 4, we sustain that the middle-educated and the middle-wealthiest coffee producers 
are the ones who most often join a cooperative. 
 
According to our results, we did not find any clear evidence that a village with better market 
characteristics shows a lower level of cooperation. More variance of the coffee prices from 2001 to 
2004 induced more cooperation, whereas the higher the mean of the coffee prices from 2001 to 
2004 was, the lower the willingness was to cooperate. It seems that selling coffee as an individual 
grower increases the chance to earn from the temporal high coffee price. 
 
With regard to the factors correlated to coffee income, we found cooperative participation to have 
an overall positive effect. Our model specification was able to capture this relationship even when 
we did not control for the spill over effect that organization has. Indeed, non-organized coffee 
farmers living in the same producing area might have to take some of the same benefits or losses 
received by the organized coffee farmers as the direct effect of the cooperative. 
 
Our findings suggest that government aims and intentions to increase cooperation will increase the 
farmers’ economic benefits. Even though the governmental, police and non-governmental agency 
support of coffee cooperatives does not directly benefit the very poor coffee producers, we 
maintain that those poor farmers can benefit from cooperative effects by the spill over. 
Accordingly, our results may contribute to improve programmes supporting the Mexican coffee 
sector. 
 
Organized coffee farmers are receiving higher coffee prices than those who are not organized. This 
is a result of the fact that the organization is helping producers to reduce transaction costs in 
collecting, processing and selling the product. 
 
Even when the participation in a coffee cooperative is not translated in a reduction of the market 
instability, the higher individual coffee price and coffee income received by organized coffee 
farmers make a big enough difference to motivate producers to join an organization. 
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According to our theory and our results, better market conditions for coffee reduce the probability 
of farmers joining a cooperative. Thus, coffee farmers facing more market instability are more 
likely to join a cooperative. Thus, coffee farmers facing more market instability are more willing to 
participate in a producer organization. We argued that those smallholders who are placed in a 
location with a lack of public services will be the first to be interested to have a cooperative. They 
will do so to improve their negotiation power vis-à-vis their buyer, but also to benefit from various 
government programmes supporting the coffee sector. 
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Chapter 6. Household diversification and its effect on the annual coffee income: Evidence 
from the Mexican coffee sector 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The process of liberalization of the Mexican economy of the nineteen eighties opened the door to 
imports and exports of raw materials because of a decrease in regulations at the border. On the 
other hand, a drastic reduction of support from the government to the coffee sector took place, 
ending the domestic regulation of the coffee market at the beginning of nineteen nineties. These 
changes pushed coffee farmers to adapt to the relatively free coffee market during the nineteen 
nineties and two thousand tens. As part of this process, coffee-producing households have been 
increasingly engaged in diversification activities within and outside the coffee sector. Some coffee 
smallholders shifted resources away from their coffee parcels and concentrated on subsistence 
crops or on other income-generating activities. However, as coffee production represents invested 
capital, many farmers did not abandon or remove their coffee trees (Calo and Wise, 2005) and 
instead aimed at vertical integration by taking up the on-farm processing of coffee. 
 
That the coffee prices reached historically low levels in the world market in the early two thousand 
tens exacerbated this process. Producer prices in Mexico, which stood at 213 Mexican pesos per 
quintal in 1990 and reached 534 pesos in 1995, subsequently fell to 388 Mexican pesos per quintal 
in 2002. By 2005, rural prices had recovered to 542 Mexican pesos per quintal (ICO, 2009). 
 
Diversification has been defined as a form of household risk management but also as a response to 
prices. Income diversification implies adopting agricultural activities different from the traditional 
one, or non-agricultural activities. Diversification also means changing the use of assets available 
and reallocating labour to other activities, such as wage labour or self-employment, or migration 
(Reardon et al., 1992; Ellis, 2000a). Thus, diversification includes any combination of activities not 
related to the conventional coffee production to generate positive effects on the total household 
income. In this study, we will include a particular form of diversification, namely vertical 
diversification within the coffee sector, i.e. selling coffee that has undergone some on-farm 
processing. 
 
Some earlier research has been done on the strategies of producing, processing, and marketing 
coffee by coffee-producing households in Mexico (Avalos-Sartorio, 2006b; Calo and Wise, 2005; 
Díaz, 1996; González and Nigh, 2005; Renard, 1991). Yet, no one has studied Mexican farmers´ 
behaviour with regard to diversification and the effect that reduced coffee prices had on a certain 
type of diversification. The main questions addressed in this chapter are: what are the driving 
factors, and in which direction do they drive the diversification of the livelihood of coffee-producing 
households? Did coffee growers respond to the low coffee price around 2003 by increasing 
diversification? Did structural characteristics at the municipal level influence diversification? And 
how did this diversification influence the level of farmers’ annual coffee income? 
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The study is restricted to the effects on the coffee income only instead the total household income. 
This is dictated by the available data. On the other hand, the wealth of data permits the inclusion 
of lagged variables as dynamic factors, such as past diversification, in the analysis of household 
decisions to begin with certain types of diversification. We used data collected in a representative 
field survey, conducted in 2005 throughout the five major coffee-producing states in Mexico and 
could relate these households to the Census of 2001. We took additional village-level data from the 
National Coffee Census database retrieved from 2001 to 2008 and other databases reported by 
SIAP (2010), CMC (2005), and INEGI (2011) as a source of information. We distinguished between 
six categories of variables: (1) natural capital (altitude, age of the coffee plants, and yield); (2) 
human capital (the farmer’s gender, ethnicity, literacy, and education); (3) physical capital 
(electricity, type of road, and land property); (4) social capital (cooperative membership, farmers 
and  population at the municipal level); (5) diversification (diversification in 2001 and in 2005); 
and (6) market issues (the ratio of intermediaries/farmers, coffee prices, the variance of coffee 
prices, and the price margin). In this, we introduced the lagged variables of diversification in 2001 
to better capture the effect of the fall in coffee prices on the diversification in 2005. To this we 
applied a multivariate probit to allow for correlation among diversification options. 
 
In this chapter, the farm household is the principal unit of analysis. The overall hypothesis to be 
tested is that diversification increased from 2001 to 2005 as a response to the low coffee prices; 
that change would be captured by internal and external factors explaining diversification. 
Particularly, we expect that external factors, such as market and natural capital, would dictate the 
way in which households will diversify their livelihood in response to the current economic 
conditions. 
 
Even when we think that the coffee price is the variable that coffee growers primarily take into 
account to make a decision in the long run regarding their investment, during the low coffee price 
period (2001–2004) many other things happened that may have influenced the coffee growers’ 
decision to diversify. One of the biggest and direct influences on the producers´ decision-making 
may have been the change in the general organization of the coffee sector. During this period, the 
change from the MCC to the NCS was carried out. Furthermore, a coffee support programme 
named the Stabilization of Coffee Pricing Fund started in 2002. This subsidy programme 
encourages producers to rely more on coffee in the long run, thus increasing the investment in 
coffee orchards and in processing facilities (see the information included in Chapter 2). 
 
The results indicate that the institutional environment, such as the number of coffee farmers and 
the coffee-price margin at the municipal level (like a lower local price), is positively correlated with 
the coffee farmers’ decision to engage in “coffee-extra” activities, i.e. turning to on-farm 
processing and selling coffee on further downstream in the supply chain. Those factors, together 
with particular natural, human and physical kinds of capital, capture the households’ response to 
low coffee prices. A poor institutional environment for coffee in the municipality, which we 
measured as the differences in the coffee price margin in 2003 and the coffee price margin in 2005 
(the higher the differences, the worse the institutional environment for coffee), reduces the 
willingness to engage in coffee-extra and non-agricultural activities. There is consistent evidence 
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Figure 6.1. National and international coffee prices (my 
own elaboration with data from SIAP (2010) 
and Banco de México (2010)). 
that general diversification and these coffee-extra activities in 2001 had significantly positive 
effects on the annual coffee income in 2005. Clearly, the fall in the coffee price during the 2001–
2004 period made farmers turn to more diversification. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 will present theoretical considerations 
to explain the coffee growers’ response to a low coffee price. Section 6.3 will describe the data and 
method used in the study; here, we will also present statistics from the survey and the National 
Coffee Census of 2001. Section 6.4 will present some major characteristics of the diversification in 
Mexican coffee sector. Section 6.5 will specify the models used in the analysis. Section 6.6 will 
proceed with the presentation of results, grouped into two parts: 1) how factors, including low 
coffee prices, relate to diversification; and 2) how factors, including diversification, influence the 
annual coffee income. In the last section, we will draw conclusions and discuss their implications 
for policy and outreach in Mexico’s coffee-producing areas. 
6.2. Theoretical considerations 
 
There are many reasons why coffee-producing households diversify their sources of income. The 
decline and variability of the coffee prices, partly as a result of the liberalization of the coffee 
market, have induced many farmers to diversify their sources of income. This process does not 
exclude the possibility of diversification within the traditional commodity, in this case within the 
coffee sector. More than two decades ago, coffee farmers started to diversify their livelihood; 
however, investments in such changes have been restricted and constrained by the endowment at 
the coffee growers’ disposal. Diversification implies adopting different crops (horizontal 
diversification), engaging in different value-adding activities (vertical diversification within coffee 
processing), or even diverting away from the agricultural sector (Barghouti, 2004; Eakin et al., 
2005). We distinguished each of these by c for coffee-extra, a for taking up other agricultural 
activities, and n for non-agricultural activities. Farms that continued only to sell unprocessed coffee 
beans were considered non-diversified (nd). 
 
From a theoretical point of view, 
the major change that coffee 
growers witnessed between 2001 
and 2005 was the drop in coffee 
prices. Producer prices fell from 
692 Mexican pesos per quintal in 
2000 to 445 pesos in 2001 and 
388 pesos in 2002. They then rose 
again to 439 Mexican pesos per 
quintal in 2003, 405 pesos in 
2004 and 543 pesos in 2005.34 
Taking into account that the levels 
                                            
34 The coffee prices are in real Mexican pesos. 
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Figure 6.2. Box diagram of land and labour allocation. 
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prevailing in the second part of the nineteen nineties were between 500 and 1,000 Mexican pesos 
per quintal (see Figure 6.1), the prices around 2002 were very low and many farmers found it 
difficult to continue their business. 
 
Such low coffee prices make growing other crops more attractive, but, as coffee is a tree crop, a 
decision to reallocate land to other crops is not easily taken, and some land may not be suitable for 
other crops at all. The low prices induced farmers not to hire as many workers as before and to 
offer lower wages. The common practice of sharecropping also implies that the wages of workers 
fell. The returns to household labour fell as well. Off-farm wage employment and migration then 
became better paying alternatives to this family labour, but growers had to compete with laid-off 
workers for these jobs. 
 
Finally, the low prices for raw coffee only partly translated into lower prices for the processed 
coffee products. Sales at the consumer level are attractive as they depend on the gross margin 
between the selling price and the price of raw coffee, and this margin increased when international 
prices fell. 
 
Thus, three broad fields of diversification became of interest to the farm household: a) going for 
further processing of the coffee and selling more downstream in the supply chain (c); b) adopting 
other crops, either on former coffee land or other land held by the household (a); and c) accepting 
non-farm employment or migration (n). In alternatives c and a, the family would divert labour from 
growing coffee to alternative employment on the farm, while in n, the reduction of on-farm labour 
coincided with more outside employment. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows a box diagram in 
which land and labour of the 
household are allocated to possibly 
two crops. A non-diversified farm 
household is represented by the solid 
arrow from O to A, exhausting the 
two available resources. If coffee 
prices fall and wages fall with it, the 
optimal labour intensity of coffee goes 
up, as indicated by the arrow AB. This 
opens the possibility of growing a 
second crop, typically less labour-
intensive, for which some land is 
made available by reducing coffee land. This new efficient use of the resources is given by point B, 
with a corresponding lower use of labour and land for coffee. If, however, coffee land cannot be 
used for other purposes, or the option value of keeping the trees alive is high enough, then an 
optimal point in C may arise, where all land is devoted to coffee, but not all labour is used for it. In 
the first case, the lower coffee prices are translated into a higher labour intensity through the 
mechanism that real wages fall sharper than real land rental prices, on account of the labour-
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Figure 6.3. Graphical representation of factors and 
decision-making on diversification (adapted 
from Pfiefer, et al.(2009)). 
intensive nature of coffee production. This higher intensity is reflected in the slope of the new line 
OB, compared with OA. In the second case, land is not mobile, and the effect of lower prices falls 
upon land more than it does on labour. Land rental prices fall sharper than real wages, and a lower 
labour intensity becomes optimal. This is shown by the arrow OC. The lower intensity leads to a 
surplus of labour on the coffee farm, indicated by the distance CA in the box diagram. The surplus 
can find employment either outside the farm or by going for value-added activities such as the on-
farm processing of coffee. 
 
In this chapter, we categorised the households assets into five groups: 1) natural capital, which 
refers to the households’ endowment of natural resources; these are stocks from which resources 
useful for livelihoods are derived (land, water, trees, mountains and lakes); 2) human capital, 
which refers to human skills, capability, and knowledge (skills, education and health); 3) physical 
capital, which comprises assets brought into existence by economic production processes (stores, 
processing plants and machinery); 4) social capital, which refers to the social networks and 
associations in which people participate and from which they can derive benefits that complement 
their living (networks, membership of formalised groups); and 5) financial capital, which consists of 
the stocks of money to which the household has access (a bank account, cash money and  credit 
sources) (Carney, 1998; Ellis, 2000b). 
 
The households’ decision to diversify 
can be a result of two types of 
motivation: 1) external factors (a fall 
in coffee price) push farmers to do 
so, or 2) internal factors (family 
labour growth, increased land) 
motivate farmers to reach certain 
goals or levels of productive 
investment (see Figure 6.3). Some 
farmers may feel secure only 
producing and selling coffee on the 
regional market without processing. 
Indeed, around 18% of the coffee 
producers included in the 2005 
survey had not registered any of the 
three types of diversification defined above. As a consequence, 82% of the coffee-producing 
households included in the sample were represented in one, two, or the three diversification 
groups. The change in the relative prices of coffee and other possible crops is a factor of change in 
the farmer’s behaviour or willingness to diversify. In this case, a relatively long period of low coffee 
prices and the relatively unstable coffee prices may lead to an increase in the household’s interests 
in diversifying their livelihood. 
 
Figure 6.3 is a representation of the factors influencing the household’s decision to diversify. There 
is a direct link between the external factors, natural characteristics and institutional environment 
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Figure 6.4. Households’ options to diversify in 
function of land and labour. 
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Table 6.1. Coffee growers’ response to low coffee 
prices during the 2001–2004 period. 
Strategy undertaken 
% of growers 
included in the 2005 
survey (N=2,294) 
Reduce fertilization   31.0 
Reduce weeding   66.7 
Reduce pruning   58.5 
Cut the coffee plantation    3.8 
Introduce other crops    8.3 
Rent out the land    1.7 
Increase family labour  50.8 
Go elsewhere for some wages 17.8 
Join a cooperative to process coffee  7.6 
Source: My own elaboration with data from the 2005 survey. 
and the farmers’ and households’ characteristics, both of which are internal characteristics. Those 
four groups shape the decision to diversify. As other scholars have stated (Pfeifer et al., 2009) 
among these internal factors feature farm size, farm type, education, and the farmer’s age. 
 
If coffee farmers do not have access to additional land, they have two options for diversification. 
Firstly, they can introduce a crop that can be farmed in the same coffee plantation, such as 
oranges, wood trees, bananas and ornamental plants. Secondly, they can remove coffee trees to 
establish any other crop or livestock that is feasible in the same natural conditions (see Figure 
6.4). 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the three groups of 
activities that farmers or households can 
diversify into, and relates them to the 
land owned by and labour available in 
coffee-producing households. We state 
that under the market uncertainty and 
changes in the institutional 
environment, mainly expressed in low 
rural coffee prices, households are 
forced to diversify their portfolio of 
income. Thus, if coffee households have 
enough family labour available, human 
capital does not work as a constraint in 
undertaking any diversification, but land does. In this case, there are clear differences between 
large-scale and small-scale land owners. 
 
It is also important to look at the reduction in the quantity and quality of maintenance activities 
necessary to farm coffee when the coffee price fell. Evidence from the 2005 survey indicates that 
79% of coffee farmers reduced the maintenance of their coffee orchards as a result of long periods 
of low coffee prices; the highest response pertained to a reduction in weeding and pruning of the 
coffee orchards (see Table 6.1). In other words, when coffee prices are lower, coffee producers 
react by reducing the practices carried out 
in the coffee plantations. This kind of 
modification on farming coffee has a 
negative effect on the household’s 
decision to use the family labour to work 
in the coffee plantations. Also, the 
reduction of the maintenance (investment 
in coffee) has a negative effect on the 
coffee-producing areas as many producers 
behave in a similar way; as a result of this 
reduction, a decline of the labour demand 
is felt in the coffee sector. 
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Figure 6.5. Graphical representation of sources of 
information used in this work. 
6.3. Data and methods 
 
The analysis is based on data from a representative survey made in 2005, which has information 
on 2,294 coffee-producing households of five main coffee-producing states of México. This 
database includes information related to household size, assets, agricultural production, family 
labour, migration, the market participation, education, organization, and programmes financed by 
the government. This survey was carried out by the Regional Centre of the Autonomous Chapingo 
University, located in Huatusco, Veracruz, Mexico. 
 
The survey information was 
complemented with data from the 
Mexican coffee census, which 
dates from 2001 and had been 
updated until 2008 (SIAP, 2008); 
it includes information related to 
the growers’ characteristics, 
coffee orchards, public services, 
family education, characteristics 
of the household’s house, assets 
ownership by coffee-producing households, and the way and types in which coffee was sold by the 
growers. 
 
Additionally, we obtained the number of coffee intermediaries that were registered at the municipal 
level in 2005 from the Mexican Coffee Council (2005). From the Informatics Agricultural and 
Livestock System (2010), we obtained the coffee price at the municipal level in the 2001–2004 
period, and we included information regarding the total population at the municipal level (see 
Figure 6.5) obtained from the National Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (2011). 
Using this information, we calculated variables that were later included in the regressions. The 
states where the survey was administered were Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Veracruz. 
They account for 95% of the total coffee farmers, 95% of the total area planted with coffee, and 
97% of the total production in Mexico. 
 
For the purpose of this chapter, we categorized the activities considered in the diversification 
options into three groups, each of which constitutes a dependent variable. 
 
1) Coffee diversification (coffee-extra). We started from the fact that the households included 
in the survey sample were all coffee farmers. Among the diversified coffee-producing 
households, we included those growers who were not simply coffee producers but also 
participated in additional activities related to coffee. If coffee farmers were selling coffee 
through cooperatives, selling coffee with some value added (parchment, dry beans, green, 
roasted and ground), selling the coffee at other markets beyond regional ones, or were 
producing certified coffee, they were considered as vertically diversified. If a coffee 
household was involved in at least one of the activities listed above, we classified it into 
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this group. From the 2005 survey we gathered that 66% of growers sold parchment coffee, 
5.6%sold green roasted or ground coffee, 21.2% sold through a cooperative and 15% sold 
organic coffee. In total, there were 1,518 coffee growers in this category of diversification. 
 
2) Agricultural diversification. Here, we considered all other agricultural or related activities 
that coffee farmers or coffee-producing household members undertook as part of their 
business activities, which were not part of the coffee sector. Some of the most common 
activities included here were farming staple foods (corn, beans), raising livestock (pigs), 
and participating in forestry-related activities. According to the 2005 survey, 283 
households farmed basic grains, 104 farmed corns, and 34 farmed sugar canes. In this 
group of activities 497 coffee growers were registered. 
 
3) Non-agricultural diversification. This group of options includes all the economic activities 
that coffee farmers or coffee-producing household members undertook, that were not 
directly linked to farming. It includes business activities (processing products other than 
coffee, providing services, marketing outputs), construction, professional activities, hand-
made crafts, house workers, employees, agricultural workers, and emigration. Statistics 
from the 2005 survey shows that 547 households reported to have members who had 
emigrated, 37 households had members who engaged in professional activities, 25 
households had members who were drivers and 12 households had members engaged in 
construction activities. We registered a total of 1,042 coffee growers as having diversified 
into non-agricultural activities. 
 
The dependent variables considered in the regressions were computed from the survey database 
(2005), taking into account the definition of each type of diversification listed above. All the 
dependent variables referring to diversification in our analysis are dichotomous ones that only take 
the values of one or zero depending on whether a household adopted this activity or not. Coffee 
income was computed by multiplying the individual average coffee price reported in 2003 and 2004 
with the individual coffee production. A household was diversified if the coffee-producing household 
adopted at least one of the three groups of diversification considered, and zero otherwise 
(corresponding to non-diversified in that particular group of activities). The source of the lagged 
explanatory variables was the National Coffee Census database (dated as 2001), and some 
variables were calculated using data from complementary sources (see Table 6.2 and Figure 6.5). 
 
To take into account the role that the institutional environment plays in the farmers’ decision to 
diversify, we considered the variables of market characteristics, specifically the ratio of the number 
of coffee intermediaries divided by the population of coffee farmers at the municipal level. We also 
considered the total number of coffee farmers at the municipal level as part of the institutional 
environment for coffee production. From the National Coffee Census database, we computed the 
total number of coffee farmers registered in each of the municipalities included in the sample. A 
higher concentration of farmers meant better environmental conditions for coffee production. In 
order to find some links to the potential for employment, we included the variable of the total 
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population in the farmers’ municipality. We obtained this information from the National Institute for 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics (2010). 
 
Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis (N = 2,294). 
Variables Unit and specification Year Mean SD 
Dependent variable 
Not-diversified 
1 if the farmer does not have any of the diversification 
options 2005   0.06 0.24 
Coffee-extra 1 if the household has engaged in coffee diversification 2005   0.79 0.41 
Agriculture 1 if the household has engaged in agricultural diversification 2005   0.26 0.44 
Non-agriculture 
1 if the household has engaged in non-agricultural 
diversification 
2005   0.54 0.50 
Coffee income 
Natural logarithm of the annual coffee income in Mexican 
pesos 
2005   9.97 1.36 
Natural capital 
Altitude Metres above sea level divided by 1,000 2001       0.98    0.37 
Age of coffee plants Strata of the age of coffee trees1 2005       2.77    1.58 
Yield Quintals per hectare 2005     11.36  11.31 
Human capital 
Gender 1 if the head of household is male 2001  0.76    0.43 
Farmer’s age Age of the head of household 2001    41.56  14.43 
Indigenous 1 if the farmer speaks an indigenous language 2001  0.36    0.48 
Literacy 1 if the farmer can read and write 2001  0.80    0.40 
Education Schooling level of the head of household2 2005  1.86    1.69 
Family labour 
Number of members in the farmer’s household who are 
between 15 and 60 years old 2005  2.18    1.62 
Physical capital 
Total land Total land (in hectares) owned by the household 2005 12.92  26.69 
Type of road 
1 if the household’s community has access to paved or 
terrain road 
2001  0.85    0.36 
Land property 1 if the farmer owns ejidal or communal land 2001  0.56    0.50 
Social capital 
Coffee farmers 
Number of coffee farmers in the municipality divided by 
1,000,000 2001  0.003    0.003 
Total population 
Number of people who live in the municipality divided by 
1,000,000 2010     0.05    0.07 
                       Diversification 
Lag non-diversified 
1 if the farmer does not have any of the diversification 
options 
2001     0.17    0.38 
Lag coffee-extra 1 if the household has engaged in coffee diversification 2001 0.70    0.46 
Lag agriculture 1 if the household has engaged in agricultural diversification 2001 0.10    0.30 
Lag non-agriculture 1 if the household has engaged in non-agricultural 
diversification 
2001 0.29    0.45 
                      Market issue 
Ratio intermedia-
ries/farmers 
Number of intermediaries divided by the number of coffee 
farmers in the farmer’s municipality, multiplied by 1,000 
2005 1.96    3.15 
Coffee price Average amount of Mexican pesos per quintal farmers 
received in 2003 and 2004 
2005  704.30 191.20 
Variance of the coffee 
price 
Variance of the coffee price in the household’s municipality 
in the 2001–2004 period (in millions of Mexican pesos per 
quintal) 
2004      0.01     0.02 
Price margin 
Difference of the average coffee price at the municipal level 
and the Mexican fob coffee price (in thousands of Mexican 
pesos per quintal) 
2003   0.19     0.18 
Note: A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry, or 46 kg of green coffee. 
             1 Strata of the age of coffee trees in years: 1 (<= 6), 2 (7–10), 3 (11–15), 4 (16–20), 5 (21–30), and 6 (>=30). 
 2 The education was measured as follows: 0=not educated, 1=incomplete primary school, 2=complete primary school, 
3=incomplete secondary school, 4=secondary school, 5=high school, 6=technical school and 7=bachelor's degree. 
 
As we suspected, some variables we were using as explanatory were behaving as though they were 
endogenous. To test this, we applied the procedure described by Pfeifer et al. (2009), who also 
used a multivariate probit. The procedure consists of two steps for testing instrumental variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002). As a result of this endogeneity test, we dropped electricity as an explanatory 
variable and included the type of road that households’ communities had access to. The hypothesis 
that other explanatory variables were not endogenous could not be rejected. In this procedure, we 
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included the lagged variables (diversification groups measured in 2001) as potentially endogenous 
variables. The results indicated that no exogeneity problem was present for the non-diversified, 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities; in the case of the coffee-extra, this problem was 
present but at significance level of 10% only. 
 
For all factors explaining the type of diversification, the individual test of significance was done 
after a multivariate probit estimation; the result of this indicates that all explanatory variables 
included in this model specification were important in explaining the type of diversification coffee 
growers undertake. 
 
For the Ordinarily Least Square regressions, two types of test were done. One was the Durbin-Wu 
Hausman test to figure out whether some explanatory variables where endogenous or not; the test 
also considered the lagged variables for each of the diversification groups. We found that this 
problem was not present in the second model specification. 
6.4. Diversification in the 2005 survey and its statistics 
 
While diversification may reduce risk by spreading production activities to various enterprises, 
additional risks are also involved in the adoption of new strategies. The greater part of this risk 
comes from having little skill, knowledge, or experience required by the new activities. Adopting 
new crops, livestock, or non-agricultural activities require the adaptation of technology to the 
natural resources and existing infrastructure in order to produce and process different goods. Also, 
to be competitive requires having knowledge of product quality and market settings. These 
uncertainties are translated into livelihood risks for producers who engage in different livelihood 
strategies (Barghouti, 2004; Varangis et al., 2003). 
 
Even when there is good reason not to depend solely on coffee production, there are many coffee-
producing households that still continue under this system. Data from the 2005 survey show that 
6% of the households depend only on coffee income for their living. For some coffee-producing 
households, their ancestors already produced coffee; accordingly, actual farmers want to remain 
coffee producers to maintain the family tradition. Yet, out of economic need, they are forced to 
spread their sources of livelihood more widely. Additional reasons to produce coffee under the 
current environment are: coffee assures an income, even if it is reduced; coffee is subsidized; 
coffee is more profitable than other crops; coffee is an easy job; coffee provides personal 
satisfaction; and coffee maintains environmental conditions (from a personal interview with the 
main stakeholders of the Mexican coffee sector). 
 
All activities described above have a payoff in economic terms. When coffee growers proceed to 
vertical integration, they gain a more stable coffee market; even when the price they receive is not 
so high, it helps in avoiding a more reduced coffee income, particularly when farmers live in places 
without a well-functioning coffee market. Other gains of processing the product is that the coffee 
growers can keep the coffee for a longer time than if they had to sell it in cherry form. This allows 
them to improve their negotiation position vis-à-vis the traders. Producing differentiated (organic 
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and Fair Trade) coffee helps growers to receive higher and more stable prices compared with the 
price received by growers in a similar institutional environment. Even though many coffee 
smallholders have found other sources of income within the coffee sector, many others do not have 
the training, technical assistance, financing, or market access for this to be an economically viable 
alternative (Stephanie and Seth, 2005). 
 
Coffee households engaged in agricultural activities receive economic benefits mostly in getting a 
product to complement their daily diet; that is important, as they reduce their direct expenditure 
on food in this way. Also, this complementarity is important in places where the food market is not 
working properly. To produce staple foods and fruits, growers do not need to use a huge portion of 
land or devote much labour. with regard to the agricultural activities, raising livestock or producing 
some trees for wood is another way of saving that helps coffee households to face shocks either in 
their cash crops or in the family (Reardon et al., 1992). By producing sugar cane, oranges, lemons, 
banana leaves and avocados, households may complement the income they have as coffee 
producers. 
 
If the households have extra land to be used for the production of other crops besides coffee, they 
have enough reason to diversify their agricultural activities. This strategy helps households to use 
the available land better. Having other crops can also be seen as a complementary activity during 
the year. This makes sense, considering the fact that the demand for labour to farm coffee is not 
constant during the year or even during the picking season. However the combination of several 
crops enables coffee-producing households to use their resources in a more efficient manner, and, 
at the same time, increase the total household income. As the 2005 survey shows, 17% of the 
households included in the sample were producing crops related to their daily dietary needs, 
notably corn, beans and bananas. 
 
Pérez-Grovas (2001) has shown that coffee farmers owning less than two hectares of coffee 
plantation do not need to hire labour to resolve the demands of farming coffee in terms of weeding, 
fertilizing, pruning, controlling the shade and plagues, and renewing trees. Normally, picking is the 
most labour-demanding activity and is done by the whole family, including the children. These 
small landholders normally integrate orange, avocado, lemon, and banana plants as part of their 
shade trees. These products are useful to complement the coffee households’ diet. In brief, with 
these additional trees and staple crops, an average-sized household can keep itself busy the whole 
year. 
 
Coffee farmers who do not have the asset endowment to combine with the external factors to 
diversify their income in the agricultural sector have no other option but to emigrate. Therefore, in 
the last two decades, many young people from coffee-producing regions migrated to work in large 
cities within Mexico or in the United States. This practice was not common among coffee-producing 
households before 1990. In recent years, migration has in part been a survival strategy for many 
coffee-producing households. The money received from migrated members is normally used to 
cover the household’s consumption and to make some home improvements. In a few cases the 
funds received from this source have been used to invest in businesses. Also, this kind of resource 
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helps in funding the expenditure of producing, processing marketing  coffee and other products 
(Davis, 1999). 
 
The non-agricultural activities, mainly earning some wage in urban areas or migrating to the United 
States, helps the coffee household economies to derive a constant income throughout the year. As 
the 2005 survey indicates, 25% of the households registered members who have migrated. The 
diversification options that households have depend on their asset endowments and external 
factors (Ellis, 2000b).35 Considering that the rich households have a better endowment to diversify, 
they benefit the most from diversifying their livelihood (Ellis, 1998). 
 
Income diversification is more than just income generation. In most cases, diversification increases 
employment in rural areas (Varangis et al., 2003). Also, diversification of income sources is 
considered to be one of the strategies farmers use to reduce household income instability and to 
reach the minimum income to survive. As Reardon et al. (1992) have argued, in the absence of 
agricultural insurance markets, rural households have to look for income diversification activities in 
order to ensure a minimum income for their households. Seeing the importance of diversification in 
stabilizing incomes and reducing rural poverty, governments in developing countries have an 
increased interest in promoting diversification (Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001). 
 
Another motive to diversify is the idea that having more than one commercial product increases 
the times throughout the year when growers can receive cash. This type of diversification of 
activities can help producers save money by investing in agriculture with the earnings from other 
crops. This way of spreading income facilitates households in resolving their food needs throughout 
the year. Additionally, having more than one commercial crop helps producers reduce the market 
risk. However, as some authors (Barrett et al., 2001) have argued, that this type of strategy is less 
effective because the prices of the crops produced within the same area are highly correlated, as 
they share the same market characteristics. 
 
The majority of coffee farmers in Mexico are small landholders. According to the 2005 survey, the 
average area of land owned by coffee-producing households is 12.9 hectares, and on average they 
devote 7.2 hectares to coffee. Thus, the land owned by the household and not farmed with coffee 
is, on average, 5.7 hectares; yet, 35% of farmers included in the 2005 survey did not have any 
extra land for agricultural activities. 
 
According to the 2005 survey, there was an increase of 19% of households that hired labour to 
farm and harvest coffee from 2001 to 2005. The increase in hired labour may be the result of 
outmigration during those years. Large-scale farmers in terms of land ownership were the ones 
who registered the highest percentage of hired labour to work in coffee; 80% of the households 
                                            
35 A household has been defined as a group of people who, while living in the same place (house), share meals and make joint 
or coordinated decisions with regard to resource allocation and use (Ellis, 1998). 
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with more than 5 hectares hired labour to work in the coffee orchards and 75% of them also hired 
labour to harvest this product. 
 
The 2005 survey indicated that 94% of the total households were classified as being diversified in 
2005. More than 78% of the surveyed households engaged in diversification within coffee 
production, 12% with agricultural activities and 30% with non-agricultural activities. Of the total 
number of interviewed coffee farmers, 2.4% engaged in all three groups of diversification activities 
(binary triplet indicating 1 1 1) at the same time. Therefore, many coffee-producing households 
can be considered as being diversified and some of them engaged in pluriactivity. 
 
Table 6.3. Characteristics of diversified coffee-producing households included in the database. 
Type of 
diversification 
Binary 
triplet 
Frequency % large-scale 
farmers1 
% older heads of 
household2 
% in large coffee 
municipalities3 
% with terrain or 
paved road4 
2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 
Non-diversified (nd) (0 0 0) 335 117 24.78 23.08 31.34 44.44 36.41 37.61 87.16 88.72 
Coffee-extra (c) (1 - -) 1,344 1,518 36.53 36.03 25.07 23.85 57.07 54.87 82.37 82.94 
Agriculture (a) (- 1 -) 192 497 33.85 41.05 28.65 25.96 40.63 56.33 86.45 85.31 
Non-agriculture (n) (- - 1) 559 1,042 31.48 30.04 25.58 30.04 51.70 48.18 88.37 88.96 
(c  a) (1 1 -) 117 413 41.03 40.68 27.35 24.46 26.50 59.08 81.20  84.26 
(c  n) (1 - 1) 355 803 33.52 33.25 23.66 23.66 55.21 48.94 83.66 87.05 
(a  n) (- 1 1) 70 185 34.28 37.30 21.43 23.24 40.00 50.27 87.14  87.57 
(c  a  n) (1 1 1) 42 157 47.62 36.31 23.81 22.29 21.43 51.59 80.95 85.99 
1 Greater than or equal to eight hectares of the total land owned by households. 
2 More than fifty years old. 
3 Farmers located in municipalities with more than 2,000 coffee growers. 
4 Household’s community has access to terrain or paved road (proxy for a non-isolated location). 
Notes: The frequency is in numbers whereas the other figures are percentages of all households with the indicated 
diversification pattern. In bold are the numbers that are significantly different from the rest of the households. The c, a 
and n include the combination of c a, c n and a n, while the latter two include the c a n. A hyphen (-) in the triplet 
indicates that that particular activity can assume any value (of 0, 1). 
 
There was an increase in diversification of around 13.7% in 2005 compared to 2001. A higher 
increase was registered within the coffee-extra diversification. This may have been a response to 
the low coffee prices between 2001 and 2004. Data included in Table 6.3 also indicates that 
younger heads of household were more inclined to engage in coffee diversification. The statistics 
show that households located in municipalities with a denser coffee grower population had the 
tendency to diversify into coffee-extra. 
 
In 2005, there had been some changes in the households in all four diversification options 
compared with 2001. No less than 20.2% of the surveyed households were non-diversified in 2001, 
whereas 5.1% were (still) non-diversified in 2005 (see Table 6.4). Considering the three groups of 
diversifications, the biggest change was registered in the agricultural one, which changed from 
7.5% in 2001 to 21.7% in 2005. 
 
The survey of 2005 only includes coffee income, not the total household income. To shed some 
light on the relative role of coffee incomes, we report in Table 6.5 the income data derived from a 
survey held in 2004 that did include measures for both types of income. This survey among 1,396 
growers showed clear differences in the per capita coffee income among the households that had 
engaged in different types of diversification. The highest per hectare income was registered by 
those that were non-diversified. The households that had a more diversified livelihood reported the 
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lowest per capita coffee income. This indicates that those economic units were less supported by 
coffee production than by other activities. 
 
Table 6.4. Changes within diversification options between 2001 and 2005. 
Source: My own elaboration with data from the National Coffee Census and 2005 survey databases. 
Note: Some farmers are repeated in some options; for that the sum of the total is higher than the number of households 
included in the 2005 survey. 
 
The group of non-diversified households registered the highest annual income per hectare. This 
suggests that these households were receiving money from sources other than coffee, as they did 
not have a high level of coffee income. The group of households more diversified within agriculture 
and non-agriculture (- 1 1) are the ones that registered the lowest per capita annual income. 
Overall, coffee income represented a small part (some 20%) of the total household income. 
 
We did not use the 2004 survey as a source of information in this chapter, because the information 
about the diversification crops, labour and the response to low coffee price scenario was only 
included in the 2005 survey. Furthermore, the 2005 survey covered a larger number of producers 
than the 2004 survey did and better reflected the responses to the low coffee prices and the 
structural differences among municipalities. 
 
Table 6.5. Household income from the 2004 survey (in Mexican pesos). 
Type of diversification Binary triplet Frequency  
Per capita annual 
coffee income 
Per capita annual 
income* 
Per hectare annual 
income 
Non-diversified (nd) (0 0 0) 225 1,159 5,326  10,240 
Coffee-extra (c) (1 - -) 896 2,241 10,847 7,514 
Agriculture (a) (- 1 -) 130 986 5,316 8,179 
Non-agriculture (n) (- - 1) 603 1,639 8,492 9,588 
(c  a) (1 1 -) 20 1,150 7,560 5,278 
(c  n) (1 - 1) 257 2,078 10,677 8,322 
(a  n) (- 1 1) 97 933 4,987 9,157 
Source: My own elaboration with data from the 2004 survey. 
Notes: In bold are the numbers that differed significantly from the rest of the households. The c, a and n include the 
combination of c a, c n and a n, while the latter two include the c a n. 
* The total income includes income from government programmes such as oportunidades or progresa and can be 
higher than the per capita annual coffee income even for non-diversified households. 
 
Survey statistics show that the average coffee yield was 10.6 quintals per hectare in 2001 and 11.6 
in 2005. Given that in 2005 the coffee price was higher, this increase in yield was not so large; this 
can be seen as an expression of the low maintenance that coffee orchards received during the 
period of low coffee prices (from 2001 to 2004). It is also evident that households that diversified 
with coffee-extra increased their coffee yield by 2.1 quintals per hectare, whereas the non-
diversified households reduced their yield by 2.2 quintals per hectare between 2001 and 2005. 
 
As Table 6.6 shows, the households diversified into coffee-extra register the highest area of coffee 
orchards, whereas those with three groups of diversification register the lowest. Table 6.6 also 
indicates that land without coffee is very important for the households´ decision to diversify into 
Year 
 2005 
Total 
Option Non-diversified (nd) Coffee-extra (c) Agriculture (a) Non-agriculture (n) 
2001 
Non-diversified (nd) 75 172 86 131 464 
Coffee-extra (c) 18 851 244 325 1,438 
Agriculture (a) 18 80 29 45 172 
Non-agriculture (n) 7 415 138 541 1,101 
Total 118 1,518 497 1,042 3,175 
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any of the three groups of diversifications. The extra land owned by the household diversified into 
agriculture is 9.6 hectares, whereas the households that are not diversified have on average 1.9 
hectares without coffee. Looking at the same factor in the other diversification options allows us to 
conclude, that to engage in agriculture, coffee-extra and agriculture, or in the three groups of 
diversifications at the same time, coffee households must have a greater portion of extra land 
available. 
 
Table 6.6. Average variables of farmers/households engaged in coffee-extra and other activities in 
2005. 
 
 
Factor 
 
Non-diver-
sified 
 
Coffee-
extra 
 
Agricul-
ture 
 
Non-agri-
culture 
 
Coffee-
extra and 
agriculture 
Coffee-
extra and 
non-
agriculture 
 
Agriculture 
and non-
agriculture 
Coffee-
extra, 
agriculture 
and non-
agriculture 
Hectares with coffee orchard  6.27 7.42 6.72 6.95 6.58 7.17 5.55 4.90 
Yield of coffee (quintals per ha) 11.62 11.34 12.46 10.79 12.21 10.70 12.37 11.62 
Total land owned by the household 8.18 13.99 15.76 11.66 16.23 12.61 13.26 12.99 
Land without coffee orchard (ha) 1.90 6.57 9.03 4.71 9.65 5.43 7.70 8.09 
Family members working in coffee 2.65  1.74 1.80 1.97 1.63 1.79 1.82 1.66 
Ratio of family members working in 
coffee/hectares with coffee orchard 0.78 0.65 0.63 0.84 0.60 0.70 0.67 0.63 
Hiring labour to work in coffee (1= 
yes) 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.77 
Annual coffee income (in Mexican 
pesos) 
53,728 70,107 78,457 63,573 75,235 63,477 69,364 49,730 
Per capita annual coffee income 
(considering only family members 
who work in coffee) (in Mexican 
pesos) 
34,867 58,971 62,419 52,691 60,252 53,816 54,451 37,487 
Percentage of family labour used to 
harvest coffee 
35.67 52.27 44.56 46.23 46.52 46.97 44.79 46.25 
Percentage of family labour used to 
farm coffee 
42.82 49.57 53.10 48.95 55.90 50.22 54.77 57.34 
Profit in Mexican pesos per quintal 103.63 121.16 129.36 82.36 144.21 103.09 115.81 112.82 
Source: My own elaboration with information from the 2005 survey database. 
Notes: In bold are the numbers that differed significantly from the rest of the households. The c, a and n include the 
combination of c a, c n and a n, while the latter two include the c a n. 
 
The number of coffee growers located in the households´ municipality was higher for those with 
coffee-extra than it was for the rest. This suggests that households placed in a better institutional 
environment for coffee are more focused on coffee-extra diversification than those located in 
municipalities with a lower number of coffee producers. Coffee-producing households situated in 
municipalities with a higher number of coffee farmers and in more isolated places engaged more in 
diversification with coffee-extra activities (see Table 6.3), whereas households headed by a male 
farmer were more oriented on diversification into agricultural activities. 
 
The data discussed above indicate that almost all (94%) coffee households in 2005 were 
diversified, and more so than they were in 2001 (81%). Those that changed typically moved into 
coffee-extra and non-agricultural activities. Those that did not diversify characteristically had 
rather small farms with older heads; these farmers lived in municipalities that had smaller numbers 
of coffee growers. Households that opted for coffee-extra activities were their opposites: rather 
large farms with younger heads, situated in large coffee-growing communities. Those that had 
non-agricultural sources of income tended to be female-headed more often. 
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The preferred choices of coffee-extra and non-agriculture showed, according to a 2004 survey, the 
highest scores for per capita household income. Coffee income generally formed 20% of the total 
income and only slightly more in the non-diversified and coffee-extra households. 
 
The next section will go into the possible determinants of the choices made, focussing on 
endowments as a factor of portfolio choice, or as a factor of the change in portfolio, and on the role 
of prices and their variability. The latter aspect could show whether there is reason to believe that 
the extremely low coffee prices between 2001 and 2005 induced some diversification. 
6.5. Models specification 
6.5.1. Factors influencing diversification 
 
The factors that we have been discussing in the previous sections were analysed using two distinct 
econometric models. Model 1 analyses the specific choice that households make regarding the 
three diversification groups. To the three options we added the default choice of non-diversification 
so as to avoid a potential selection bias. Since we considered four options at the same time as 
dependent variables, with three of these not being mutually exclusive, we ran a multivariate probit. 
Applying this model, we carried out three regressions. The first considered the variables that may 
play a role in the household’s decision on diversification in the four directions. The second added to 
those variables a set of four explanatory variables, each characterizing the choice that the 
household had made in 2001. Finally, the third included a variable depicting the differences in the 
coffee price margin in 2003 and the one in 2005. 
 
The inclusion of the lagged choice made the outcome more oriented toward the dynamics of the 
choices made by the household. Whereas the first regression model dealt with the general 
relationship between the endowments and environment of the household and the choices made, 
the second regression – by including the earlier choice – captured the effects of whatever had 
changed between 2001 and 2005, notably (but not only) the low coffee prices. The third regression 
model tried to capture the structural differences among coffee-producing municipalities and the 
effect of inter-municipal differences in price changes. 
 
The models allowed for non-exclusive choices for types of diversification. Thus, a household could 
go for c (coffee-extra), a (agriculture) or n (non-farm income), any combination of these three, or 
being non-diversified. If it chose a combination, the household was modelled as if it separately 
opted for two or three possibilities. This engendered a high degree of possible correlation between 
the diversification choices, and the use of a multivariate probit model enabled us to account for 
these correlations between the options chosen. The main correlation came from the competition in 
resource allocation. Land, for example, was divided among one or two diversification groups; 
labour could be divided over all four diversification groups considered. In addition, unobservable 
characteristics of the household caused choices to be correlated. 
 
Model 1 examined any of the three diversification options defined above: coffee-extra, agricultural, 
and non-agricultural activities as dependent variables, in addition to a non-diversified one. Each of 
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these dependent variables, complemented with a set of explanatory variables, is one equation. By 
using a multivariate probit model, the four corresponding equations were estimated 
simultaneously, allowing for a possible correlation between those groups. As Pfiefer et al. (2009) 
have affirmed, this kind of estimation maximizes the likelihood based on a quadri-variate normal 
distribution that can be estimated using a simultaneous technique known as the SUR. 
 
The models can be written as: 
 
y* non-diversified        =         βnX + εn 
y* within coffee           =         βrX + εr 
y* agriculture              =         βgX + εg 
y* non-agriculture       =         βoX + εo 
 
with εi ≈ N (0, Ω) 
yi = 1[y*i ≥ 0] 
and 
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The coefficient βi and the correlation of the residuals between the choices were estimated with the 
same estimation procedure. We also included some X variables that were recorded in 2001, to 
consider the effects of an earlier orientation on the later diversification. Four lagged variables were 
included as explanatory, one for each of the diversification types plus one for the non-diversified. 
By including those variables, we tested whether all the factors listed as explanatory variables for 
diversification in 2005 were able to capture the households’ response to the fall in coffee prices 
between 2001 and 2005 as well as other factors in this period. 
 
Model 1-A, using only endowments and environmental conditions as explanatory variables, was 
meant to reflect the traditional economic approach to explain activity choices. Producers with 
better land endowments were expected to opt for land-intensive activities, those with abundant 
labour for labour-intensive activities, et cetera. This estimation could show the importance of these 
endowment variables for the choices made, and under the prevailing conditions. These conditions 
included the prevailing prices of products from these activities. In conditions where input markets 
are not well integrated (land is not rented out frequently, labour is not so mobile), endowments 
were expected to play a stronger role than conditions. 
 
Model 1-B, which included dummies for the earlier choice as explanatory variables, should typically 
attribute many of the endowment effects to these dummies; the more so, the less these 
endowments change over time. Land is rather fixed, while household size is fixed to a lesser 
extent; having coffee trees can also be considered a rather fixed factor. For those choices in 2005 
Chapter 6 
138 
 
that were not the same as those in 2001 and could not be attributed to these dummies, we relied 
upon the other variables for an explanation. Endowments were then expected to play a secondary 
role and changes in the conditions surrounding the household could have more of an influence. 
Thus, we expected effects of the low coffee price to come out more clearly in this model than in 
model 1-A. 
 
As part of the natural capital, the location and specific characteristics of the land owned by the 
coffee households are important in the way coffee is farmed and the possibilities coffee growers 
have for adopting agricultural activities. In more isolated places and with more sloped land, the 
introduction of other crops is more difficult. Around 50% of the coffee producers have land at 
above 1,000 meters above sea level. 
 
According to the 2005 survey, two thirds of the coffee households were headed by men. Gender 
can be important in portfolio choices, as agricultural activities require physical strength and are 
more insecure for women. The adoption of additional activities, different from the ones traditionally 
undertaken by the coffee households, may also require new skills, for which education can be 
important. The 2005 survey indicated that the mean level of education of household heads was 
lower than primary school, while many farmers had not been to school and were illiterate. More 
educated heads were found in wealthier households. These households can diversify into more 
favourable labour market conditions (Ellis, 1998). Differences in human capital and asset specificity 
may lead to differences in the degree and types of diversification (Perz, 2005). 
 
The availability of family labour should be a determining factor in diversification. The 2005 survey 
indicated that 80% of the surveyed households had less than 4 members between the ages of 15 
and 60. In addition, information from the National Coffee Census indicates that coffee households 
had less than two people permanently working in coffee production. 
 
Owning limited resources as physical capital allocated to coffee production may push households to 
diversify into agricultural and non-agricultural activities. On average, coffee households own 5.7 
hectares without coffee; depending on the land characteristics, this resource can be used to farm 
other crops or to raise livestock. As stated by Ellis (2000), not only do households’ factor 
endowments, such as land and labour, help people shape their strategies, but public infrastructures 
such as roads and electricity do as well. For example, the availability of roads or accessibility to 
markets can restrain  farmers from some economic activities, not only because of the impossibility 
to transport inputs and outputs, but also because of the market failure for many goods (Reardon et 
al., 1992). The households´ access to terrain or paved road was taken as an indication of 
accessibility. Survey statistics indicate that 52% of the households had electricity in their house, 
while 15% of the coffee households were located in communities with a lack of access to paved or 
terrain road. 
 
Social capital also plays an important role in the opportunities open to households´ members. If 
coffee producers are located in places where many of their neighbours are coffee producers, the 
opportunities to form cooperatives and to adopt technology for producing and processing coffee are 
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better. In our sample, 52% of the coffee producers lived in municipalities with more than 2,000 
coffee producers. By itself, having more growers around favours growing coffee and the coffee-
extra activities; but if coffee prices fall, the influence will be felt sharper in those specialized 
villages than in more diversified villages. These changes also depend on the natural and social 
capital present in each coffee-producing area. In addition, on improved labour and food markets 
agglomeration effects can be expressed. 
 
Finally, we included the recent conditions in the coffee market. Coffee prices were captured in two 
variables, one showing the variance of coffee prices at the municipal level in the four years before 
2005, and one showing the gap between the municipal price and the fob price in 2003, the year 
with the lowest farm gate prices. A larger gap indicated a lower price at farm level. The average 
margin between the municipal and the fob price was 192 Mexican pesos per quintal. 
 
To better capture the changes that occurred in recent years, mainly the fall in coffee prices 
between 2001 and 2005, we introduced the lagged choice variables. We added one dummy 
variable for each of the diversification types observed in 2001, plus a dummy variable for being 
non-diversified in 2001. With these dummies, the equations came close to fixed effects 
specifications. 
6.5.2. The effect of diversification on the annual coffee income 
 
In this section, we will present the results in two steps. First, we will describe and analyse the main 
variables that affect the farmers or households' decision for any of the three types of diversification 
groups or for non-diversification. Secondly, we will discuss the effect of lagged variables on the 
direction of diversification as a response to the low coffee price scenario. 
 
The results of the multivariate probit regressions are shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. We see that all 
types of capital have something to contribute to the choice. In each category we find variables with 
significant effects. Variables related to the coffee market also significantly affect choices. 
 
The choice of diversification per se can be investigated by looking at the first column. It shows that 
in municipalities with a higher variance of coffee prices, or lower prices as such (i.e. higher 
margins), producers chose against diversification. Those who made this choice were otherwise 
characterized by their older age, the fact that they had more labour and less land at their disposal, 
their being located at lower altitudes and in larger municipalities with less specialization into coffee 
growing, similar to what we showed in the earlier tables. 
 
If a choice was made for some form of diversification, low and variable prices prevailing before 
2005 discouraged a move into coffee-extra activities and favoured the growing of other agricultural 
crops. 
 
Those who turned to additional coffee activities, such as drying and roasting, typically had opposite 
characteristics to those who did not diversify at all. Not only did the effects of prices work out in 
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the opposite direction, this also applied to the effects of location (more at a higher altitude, in 
smaller specialized municipalities) and to household characteristics (headed more often by younger 
heads with less labour and more land at their disposal). These opposite movements are also 
reflected by the robustly negative estimate for the correlation between the error terms of the two 
latent variables (-0.69). 
 
A choice for off-farm work was made by households that were in many ways similar to the non-
diversified ones in that such a choice was made by households at lower altitudes that had little land 
and were located in communities not specialized in coffee. They deviated, however, in that off-farm 
work was more often chosen by female-headed households and by those well connected by 
infrastructure. Coffee prices as such did not play a role in this choice. A further deviation was that 
there is a strong and negative residual correlation with the first choice of non-diversification. 
 
Finally, additional agricultural crops were chosen by households with more land and little labour, 
situated at higher altitudes (just like coffee-extra), and facing low coffee prices, that were typically 
male-headed. The residual correlation with coffee-extra was also positive (and was the only 
positive score). 
 
Table 6.7. Multivariate probit estimation for non-diversified, diversified within coffee, agricultural 
and non-agricultural groups without lagged variables. 
Group of variables Variable Non-diversified Coffee-extra Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Natural capital Altitude  2.050 (0.018)** -1.115 (0.025)** -1.298 (0.001)***  0.587 (0.119) 
 Altitude1 -1.260 (0.008)***  0.883 (0.001)***  0.655 (0.001)*** -0.373 (0.048)** 
Human capital Gender  0.236 (0.065)*  0.035 (0.678)  0.621 (0.000)*** -0.603 (0.000)*** 
 Age of farmer  0.022 (0.001)*** -0.018 (0.000)***  0.001 (0.889) -0.008 (0.050)* 
 Age-inverse   10.99 (0.131) -7.397 (0.210)  2.344 (0.635) -5.814 (0.211) 
 Education -0.024 (0.796) -0.010 (0.885) -0.034 (0.565)  0.001 (0.990) 
 Education squared  0.008 (0.572) -0.079 (0.422)  0.002 (0.858)  0.005 (0.584) 
 Family labour  0.108 (0.000)*** -0.151 (0.000)*** -0.065 (0.004)***  0.009 (0.651) 
Physical capital Total land -0.009 (0.021)**  0.010 (0.000)***  0.004 (0.000)*** -0.004 (0.009)*** 
 Type of road  0.099 (0.534) -0.411 (0.001)*** -0.026 (0.781)  0.300 (0.001)*** 
Social capital Coffee farmers -98.99 (0.000)***  123.9 (0.000)***  18.65 (0.159) -25.52 (0.030)** 
 Total population  2.959 (0.001)*** -4.951 (0.000)*** -1.433 (0.051)*  0.598 (0.292) 
Market Variance of coffee price  6.539 (0.085)* -6.867 (0.016)*** -2.127 (0.450)  1.946 (0.443) 
 Price margin  1.120 (0.008)*** -2.402 (0.000)***  0.833 (0.002)***  0.384 (0.104) 
  Constant  -4.101 (0.000)***  3.036 (0.000)*** -0.676 (0.084)*  0.619 (0.087)* 
Observation numbers  1,794    
Likelihood -3,027    
Correlations: Non-diversified  -0.690 (0.000)*** -0.239 (0.000)*** -0.612 (0.000)*** 
                   Coffee-extra    0.099 (0.044)**  0.033 (0.498) 
                   Agriculture    -0.251 (0.000)*** 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and ***, refer to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
         1 Altitude squared and divided by 1,000. 
 
Summarizing, we saw a group of households at lower altitudes, better connected and with 
relatively little land, that turned to off-farm work if female-headed and otherwise stick to just 
growing coffee. At higher altitudes, and less well connected, households went for coffee-extra if the 
prices were good and the community was more specialized; they turned to other agricultural 
activities if this was not the case. The low and volatile prices before 2005 have deterred households 
from diversification, and especially from undertaking more coffee-related activities. 
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The results in Table 6.7 show that both internal and external characteristics of the households 
matter for the choice of activity and extent of diversification. We now move to the second 
estimation, in which the earlier choices of the households were included as additional explanatory 
variables. This should allow for all kinds of conservative effects, like specific capital built up in a 
job, or in extra-coffee activities; or the costs of switching from one type to another. 
 
Table 6.8. Multivariate probit estimation for non-diversified, diversified within coffee, agricultural 
and non-agricultural groups with lagged variables. 
Group of 
variables 
Variable Non-diversified Coffee-extra Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Natural capital Altitude  2.334 (0.014)** -1.122 (0.032)** -1.283 (0.001)***  0.323 (0.459) 
 Altitude1 -1.352 (0.010)**  0.823 (0.004)***  0.645 (0.001)*** -0.249 (0.260) 
Human capital Gender  0.334 (0.024)**  0.012 (0.892)  0.631 (0.000)*** -0.800 (0.000)*** 
 Age of farmer  0.023 (0.002)*** -0.019 (0.000)***  0.001 (0.830) -0.009 (0.061)* 
 Age-inverse   10.78 (0.220) -7.041 (0.272)  2.500 (0.612) -7.593 (0.187) 
 Education -0.055 (0.883)  0.006 (0.935) -0.045 (0.451) -0.039 (0.544) 
 Education squared  0.008 (0.613) -0.011 (0.280)  0.004 (0.688)  0.011 (0.265) 
 Family labour  0.109 (0.001)*** -0.158 (0.000)*** -0.064 (0.005)***  0.012 (0.602) 
Physical capital Total land -0.009 (0.058)*  0.009 (0.000)***  0.004 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.003)*** 
 Type of road  0.067 (0.704) -0.317 (0.015)** -0.016 (0.867)  0.312 (0.002)*** 
Social capital Coffee farmers -79.96 (0.012)**  97.23 (0.000)***  16.00 (0.237) -50.64 (0.001)*** 
 Total population  2.693 (0.009)*** -4.197 (0.000)*** -1.381 (0.063)*  0.894 (0.189) 
Diversification Lag non-diversified  0.784 (0.002)*** -0.455 (0.003)***  0.161 (0.277) -0.029 (0.875) 
 Lag coffee-extra -0.352 (0.124)  0.798 (0.000)***  0.150 (0.210)  0.100 (0.544) 
 Lag agriculture  0.630 (0.001)*** -0.200 (0.104) -0.052 (0.663) -0.333 (0.009)*** 
 Lag non-agriculture -0.940 (0.000)*** -0.349 (0.001)***  0.003 (0.972)  2.272 (0.000)*** 
Market Variance of coffee price  3.300 (0.497) -3.855 (0.220) -1.904 (0.511)  2.134 (0.458) 
 Price margin  0.453 (0.389) -1.764 (0.000)***  0.888 (0.002)***  0.415 (0.138) 
  Constant  -4.313 (0.000)***  2.757 (0.000)*** -0.839 (0.039)**  0.571 (0.228) 
Observation numbers  1,794    
Likelihood -2,555    
Correlations: Non-diversified  -0.722 (0.000)*** -0.313 (0.000)*** -0.449 (0.000)*** 
                    Coffee-extra    0.096 (0.068)*  0.037 (0.531) 
                    Agriculture    -0.345 (0.000)*** 
   Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and ***, refer to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
            1 Altitude squared and divided by 1,000. 
 
The results are surprising in that many of the coefficients of Table 6.7 reappear in Table 6.8. The 
effects of household-level endowments (age, family size, farm size, etc.) were of the same 
magnitude, even if now we controlled for the earlier choices, and found these to be significant. 
 
There are strong conservative influences of the earlier choices, notably when these were off-farm, 
or in coffee-extra. Also, the chances of being non-diversified in 2005 were higher if producers were 
non-diversified in 2001. These choices in favour of continuity negatively affected choices for 
diversification, and significantly so for those who had off-farm work. Those who had other crops 
than coffee in 2001 typically became non-diversified in 2005, and had a smaller chance to enter 
into off-farm work. 
 
The addition of these earlier choices led to smaller effects of the prices on the choices made in 
2005. The size of the coefficients roughly halved, contrary to our expectations. This indicates that 
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these price conditions (variance and level) may have been permanent rather than particular for the 
crisis period. 
 
The above models show diversification as a response to endowments and (changing) conditions, 
and amount to a reduced form approach, as the actual returns to each type of diversification were 
not included in the model. Theory suggests that households choose that type of diversification that 
gives them the highest return to their assets (Reardon et al., 1992; Ellis, 2000a). 
 
We had no data on the total household income and therefore cannot go into detail on this particular 
question. We did have data, however, on the coffee income and could investigate how the choice 
affected this particular part of the income. We will evaluate the effect of the general diversification, 
the earlier choice of diversification type and the predicted probabilities taken from the multivariate 
probit model on the annual coffee income in the next section. 
6.6. The effect of diversification on the annual coffee income 
6.6.1. Models specification 
 
Model 2 evaluated the effect of internal and external factors on the annual coffee income. As the 
dependent variable was a continuous one, we used OLS regressions. For this model, we carried out 
three regressions. Regression 1 considered also the lagged variable of general diversification in 
2001. Regression 2 considered the lagged variables of the four dependent variables, measured in 
2001 as explanatory variables. To conclude, regression 3 took into account the prediction for the 
four equations included in Model 1 (non-diversified, coffee-extra, agricultural, and non-agricultural 
diversification with the lagged variables) as explanatory variables. This procedure allowed us to 
test whether the type of diversification was related to the annual coffee income. In the three OLS 
regressions of Model 2, we considered explanatory variables that were measured in different years 
(see the description of the variables in Table 6.2). The specific output for each of the two models 
specified above are presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
The first explanatory variable we considered in this regression was the altitude. Because the higher 
the altitude, the higher the qualities of coffee drink, we hypothesized that growers located at a 
higher altitude would receive a better price, resulting in a higher coffee income. The age of the 
coffee trees was considered as part of the factor explaining the annual coffee income. We expected 
a positive relationship between the age of the coffee plants and the income. The same relationship 
between annual coffee income and yield was also expected. 
 
In the group of human capital, the first variable included was the age of the coffee growers. It was 
hypothesized that older growers would be able more often to report a higher coffee income. The 
variable of being indigenous was the second kind of human capital considered here. We considered 
that if the heads of households are indigenous, their coffee income would be lower. This is because 
the rural Mexican indigenous communities are normally found in mountainous and hilly conditions, 
which were not fully captured by the other variables. 
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Other variables considered as part of the human capital were literacy and education. To be able to 
get more complex technology to produce, process and market coffee, it is easier if growers can 
read. This possibility increases with the education level. So, as being unable to read limits growers 
in their ability to understand newspapers, use the Internet and understand figures, we 
hypothesized that being illiterate negatively affects one’s coffee income, whereas education may 
have a positive effect. 
 
Land ownership was another variable we considered as part of the factor explaining the level of 
coffee income. In Mexico, three types of land tenancy occur: private, ejidal and communal. The 
distribution of land took place at the beginning of the last century, to the effect that the private 
properties were the better ones in terms of fertility, location and slope. We hypothesized that 
coffee growers with ejidal and communal land would have a lower annual coffee income. 
 
Following up on the results of the choice model, we considered the lagged of diversified, non-
diversified, coffee-extra, agricultural and non-diversified variables, plus four predicted variables 
from the earlier model as explanatory ones. We used predicted values of the contemporaneous 
portfolio (rather than actual values), as the current portfolio choice may have been affected by the 
coffee income. The effects of these earlier or current choices on the income were not easily 
predictable, as they depended on how the choice itself corrected the influence of the other 
variables. 
 
In the market domain, three factors explaining the annual coffee income were considered. The first 
of them was the ratio of the number of intermediaries to that of coffee farmers. A higher ratio can 
lead to more competition among intermediaries; more competition will therefore be in line with a 
higher coffee price. Consequently, we expected that a higher ratio would correspond to a higher 
annual coffee income. The second variable in this group was the municipal coffee price, which 
obviously should be positively related to the coffee income. The last variable considered here was 
the variance of coffee prices at the municipal level, measured from 2001 to 2004. We considered 
that a greater variation in the coffee price would induce lower levels of investment, since coffee 
growers are risk averse. Accordingly, we expected a negative relationship between the variance of 
the coffee price and the annual coffee income. This effect might be reversed if higher variances 
deter risk-averse farmers from entering into coffee growing, so that only those remain who can 
afford some variability of prices. These ‘insiders’ are then rewarded by higher than average 
returns. The positive income effect would then be the compensation for the disutility of variable 
prices. 
6.6.2. Results of factors influencing the annual coffee income 
 
We used the natural logarithm of the annual coffee income as a dependent variable. To test the 
effect of diversification on the income from coffee production, we performed three OLS regressions: 
regression 1 included the lagged variable of general diversification; regression 2 included the 
lagged of coffee-extra, agricultural, and non-agricultural variables; and regression 3 included the 
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predictions of non-diversified, coffee-extra, agricultural, and non-agricultural diversification 
obtained in the multivariate probit model. Results are shown in Table 6.9. 
 
We recall from Table 6.6 that households diversified in coffee reported an annual coffee income 
that was 16,379 Mexican pesos higher than that reported by the non-diversified households. 
Similarly, households diversified into coffee-extra plus agriculture registered an average annual 
coffee income that was 5,125 higher than that of the households diversified into coffee-extra only. 
On the other hand, households diversified into coffee-extra plus non-agricultural activities, and 
those households participating in the three types of diversifications simultaneously, had a lower 
average annual coffee income than the non-diversified ones had. Indeed, measured by the coffee 
income alone, coffee households seemed to have had an economic incentive to diversify into 
coffee-extra and a combination of coffee-extra and agricultural activities, but not into non-
agricultural activities. 
 
The regressions reported in Table 6.9 attributed the coffee income to a range of explanatory 
variables. In the group of natural capital, the altitude and the yield were the only variables of 
importance for the annual coffee income. An altitude below 940 metres above sea level showed a 
positive effect on the annual coffee income, whereas an altitude higher than 940 showed a 
negative effect on the annual coffee income. This is a surprising result, as we expected that an 
even higher altitude would positively affect the coffee income through a better coffee quality. The 
size of the effect is small, however. The yield of coffee orchards is positive correlated to the level of 
the annual coffee income: the yield increased by one quintal per hectare, which led to an increase 
of 6.2% in the annual coffee income. 
 
In general, households classified as diversified in 2001 enjoyed a 19.7% higher annual coffee 
income than the non-diversified ones. The results from regression two confirm that this is mostly 
due to the households that were engaged in coffee-extra diversification in 2001. 
 
The predicted values of the diversification into coffee-extra and agriculture, obtained from model 1, 
show a positive effect on the yearly annual coffee income. While this is an obvious result for 
specialization into coffee-extra, it is not for the diversification into other forms of agriculture. 
 
The variables relating to the coffee market positively correlated with the annual coffee income. An 
increase of the coffee price of 10 Mexican pesos per quintal will increase the annual coffee income 
by 2%. The findings related to the ratio intermediaries/farmers at the municipal level and the 
individual coffee price suggest that when the households are located in municipalities with a better 
institutional environment for coffee, their annual coffee income will be higher. 
 
Regarding the variance of the coffee prices at the municipal level, the result shows a positive effect 
on the annual coffee income. This may confirm a selection effect leading to higher incomes for 
those that took the chance. This result contradicts the effects of the other variables included in the 
market domain. One explanation for this to happen is that the municipalities with a higher variance 
constitute a better environment for marketing coffee. In fact, the number of coffee producers and 
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the ratio of intermediaries to farmers per municipality are positively correlated with the price 
variance. 
 
Table 6.9. Factors determining the log of the yearly coffee income (OLS estimates). 
Group of variables Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Natural capital Altitude  0.406 (0.157)  0.378 (0.187)  0.994 (0.001)*** 
 Altitude1 -0.185 (0.195) -0.189 (0.187) -0.529 (0.000)*** 
 Age of coffee plants  0.013 (0.360)  0.015 (0.285)  0.016 (0.265) 
 Yield  0.063 (0.000)***  0.063 (0.000)***  0.062 (0.000)*** 
Human capital Age of farmer  0.006 (0.048)**  0.006 (0.049)**  0.007 (0.019)** 
 Age-inverse  0.083 (0.981) -0.211 (0.952) -0.939 (0.788) 
 Indigenous -0.301 (0.000)*** -0.319 (0.000)*** -0.379 (0.000)*** 
 Literacy  0.188 (0.013)**  0.193 (0.010)**  0.185 (0.013)** 
 Education -0.040 (0.431) -0.044 (0.391) -0.025 (0.620) 
 Education squared  0.032 (0.000)***  0.032 (0.000)***  0.030 (0.000)*** 
Physical capital Land property -0.100 (0.038)** -0.118 (0.015)** -0.162 (0.001)*** 
Diversification Lag of diversification  0.197 (0.001)***   
 Lag of non-diversified  -0.067 (0.502)  
 Lag coffee-extra   0.192 (0.016)**  
 Lag agriculture  -0.090 (0.252)  
 Lag non-agriculture  -0.039 (0.491)  
 Prediction non-diversified   -0.187 (0.603) 
 Prediction coffee-extra    0.607 (0.000)*** 
 Prediction agriculture    0.867 (0.001)*** 
 Prediction non-agriculture   -0.113 (0.240) 
Market issue Ratio intermediaries/farmers  0.021 (0.005)***  0.022 (0.003)***  0.031 (0.000)*** 
 Coffee price  0.002 (0.000)***  0.002 (0.000)***  0.002 (0.000)*** 
 Variance of coffee price  6.957 (0.000)***  6.376 (0.000)***  7.077 (0.000)*** 
  Constant   6.942 (0.000)***  7.087 (0.000)***  6.335 (0.000)*** 
Observation numbers  1,676  1,676  1,666 
R square   0.543  0.546  0.560 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
         1 Altitude squared and divided by 1,000. 
 
According to the results included in the prior section, the higher the variance, the lesser the 
willingness of the coffee growers to diversify into coffee-extra. It seems that municipalities that 
register a higher variability of the coffee price also are the ones to provide more opportunity for 
producers to sell raw coffee (the unprocessed product) at a higher price. Thus, this coffee producer 
will register a higher yearly coffee income. 
 
The overall results from the OLS regressions indicate that coffee-producing households with more 
assets have a higher annual coffee income than their counterparts and that diversification matters 
in improving the coffee-producing households’ welfare. 
6.7. Conclusion and policy recommendation 
 
The main results of this research indicate that coffee households may have responded to the low 
coffee price scenario by increasing their diversification. As a potential response to the fall in coffee 
prices, coffee producers tend to increase their diversification in general. In particular, from 2001 to 
2005, they have increased their agricultural diversification and coffee-extra and reduced their non-
agricultural diversification. 
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By introducing lagged variables related to diversification in 2001 and applying a multivariate probit 
regression, we were able to capture the households’ response to low coffee prices (and possibly to 
other effects that we ignored). By doing so, internal and external factors captured the changes in 
the households’ decision-making regarding diversification. 
 
The overall results indicate that an improved institutional environment for coffee induces more 
diversification into coffee-extra activities, while it reduces the likelihood that coffee-producing 
households engage in agricultural and non-agricultural diversifications or no diversification at all. 
 
With respect to the factors that are important in the coffee households’ decision-making about 
diversification into the specific groups of activities, our results were similar to those reported by 
other researchers (Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Barrett et al., 2001; Van den Berg, 2010). They 
also argued that a male head of the household and the number of coffee farmers at the municipal 
level reduced the likelihood that households would engage in non-agricultural activities. 
 
Results from our multivariate probit model suggest that the worse the conditions for pure coffee 
production, the greater the probability that coffee-producing households will decide to diversify by 
means of agricultural activities. At the same time, they will be less willing to vertically integrate 
their coffee production. 
 
Coffee-producing households located in more accessible places have higher annual coffee incomes 
than those households located in more isolated locations. Hence, public services, such as improving 
the accessibility to coffee-producing communities, are very important in increasing the annual 
coffee income. 
 
By diversifying their livelihood, coffee households try to change their orientation from raw coffee 
production to a more integrated approach, to meet the demands of the final consumer. In doing so, 
they try to meet the market's changing demands and adapt to the current economic situation. In 
this context, public concern should shift from simply providing the necessary support for traditional 
coffee producers to acquiring the new skills and services that a diversified household demands. 
 
The diversification involves many specific investment areas that need to be covered by public or 
private sectors. Thus, the government and policy makers have to work at creating an institutional 
environment, technology and a rural infrastructure in accordance with the new demand. 
Additionally, the government should facilitate the improvement of the institutional environment for 
the private sector to provide inputs and services according to the emerging needs of the diversified 
sector. 
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Chapter 7. Discussion and conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In Mexico, the majority of coffee farmers have small-scale operations and lack incentives to 
become organized as coffee producers. Also, smallholder coffee growers are very diverse (often 
drawing from various indigenous groups) and live widely dispersed; their leaders therefore have a 
difficult job organizing them. Conducting small transactions, on the other hand, often with limited 
physical accessibility and in areas with poor communication, means that farmer organizations face 
many challenges to meet the growers’ needs. For this reason, it is very costly and time-consuming 
for small-scale coffee growers to engage in cooperatives, and often there is not enough economic 
incentive to be part of them. However, producer organizations can be a solution to the limited 
bargaining power of smallholders. As theory tells us, producer organizations can also help with 
reducing transaction costs (Ruben et al., 2007b). 
 
The liberalisation of the Mexican coffee sector has brought both drawbacks and benefits to some of 
the major players.  The free market has made large-scale processors and exporters prosperous, 
and multinational coffee firms have also adapted well to the current institutional environment. By 
contrast, small and medium-scale farmers have gradually lost their ability to compete and 
participate in the coffee market, as they now face many more constraints. In this way, the main 
gaps left by the decrease in state participation in the coffee sector have been covered by private 
agents. Some of them have benefited by dominating not only in the policymaking sphere but also 
in the establishment of the institutional environment operating in this industry. 
 
Taken together, all the topics we have worked on in this thesis justify the relevance of this 
research, the main aims of which were to investigate the institutional setting prevailing in the 
Mexican coffee sector and its structural changes over time. Relevant topics to discuss the 
institutional performance included: the contract arrangements and trade performance, the factors 
influencing the growers´ willingness to join a cooperative, the effects of cooperation on market 
instability, the influence of cooperation on the growers’ welfare, and coffee producers’ response to 
the falling coffee price through their engagement in diversification activities. 
 
We organized the thesis into seven chapters; four of them are empirical ones. Chapter 1 contains a 
general introduction of the research and presents the organization of the thesis. Chapter 2 
describes the importance, structure and organization of the coffee sector. Chapters 3 analyses and 
presents information regarding the contract arrangements between traders and the traders’ 
performance in the Mexican coffee supply chain. Chapter 4 deals with main factors influencing 
farmers’ decision to get organized in a cooperative and the effect of this organization on the 
welfare of coffee households. Chapter 5 provides some evidence of the effect of price instability on 
cooperation, and the influence of cooperation on the predictability of the local coffee price. Chapter 
6 presents some evidence of the coffee growers’ response to the fall in coffee prices through the 
adoption of more diverse ways of earning a livelihood. Chapter 7 provides a discussion and 
conclusions about the main results reached in this research. In this concluding chapter, we will 
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present some overall policy implications based on the general answers to our main questions. 
Through these concluding remarks, we would like to draw attention to the role of the government 
and policymakers in supporting the reorientation of the coffee policy and institutional settings 
required to improve the performance of the coffee sector and the livelihoods of the producers. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will continue as follows. Section 7.2 summarizes and discusses the 
main findings and their scientific relevance with respect to the topics addressed in this research: 
contract arrangement and trader performance, factors influencing cooperation, cooperation and 
price instability, and diversification as a response to the low coffee price. Section 7.3 deals with 
policy implications of our results. At the end, in Section 7.4, we will present some limitations we 
faced during this work and offer some thoughts on future research. 
7.2. Summary and discussion of the main findings 
 
In Chapter 2, we have shed light on the structure of the coffee sector and its changes over time. 
Our results suggest that there have been many causes to make these institutional changes happen. 
Currently, minifundia are more widespread in the coffee sector that they used to be under the 
quota system. Over the last two decades, the size of coffee growers in the Mexican coffee sector 
has decreased. 
 
As has been argued by some scholars (Renard, 2008, Giovannucci and Juárez, 2006), the coffee 
supply chain is being controlled by multinational firms, that determine the rules of the market both 
at the domestic and the international level. On the other hand, there is no strong grower 
organization to provide counter balance to the multinationals in the policy making arena. This 
situation asks for government intervention in establishing an institutional environment, including 
market information and services, to assist small- and medium-scale coffee growers in increasing 
their income. 
 
Small- and medium-scale coffee producers are facing many difficulties to survive as coffee 
growers; many of them can only continue as coffee producers because of the various government 
programmes supporting the coffee sector. Indeed, in an evaluation done by FAO (2007), it was 
found that 30% of the interviewed coffee producers affirmed that if not for the coffee programmes, 
they would no longer be part of the coffee sector. Thus, recent public policies developed in the last 
two decades actually have prevented more producers from exiting the coffee sector, but they did 
little for the improvement of the yield, production, coffee quality and reliability of the coffee sector. 
 
As in most food commodities, the long-term trend in coffee prices is downward, suggesting that 
global supply reductions could have beneficial short- and long-term effects. According to ICO 
statistics (2009), in recent years international coffee prices have shown a fluctuation of around 
50% annually , whereas during the regulated period, prices fluctuated approximately 15% around 
their average defined price (Sasha and Breger, 2010). This situation puts growers and other 
partners in the coffee supply chain in a difficult position when it comes to making investments and 
planning activities. 
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Contrary to other studies (Bussolo et al., 2007) that tell us that agricultural liberalization has been 
beneficial for the poor, we found that this is not the case for the Mexican coffee sector. Small-scale 
coffee growers have been harmed by the coffee price variability and the lack of opportunities to 
participate in the domestic and international market. 
 
The path and differences occurring between the rural and international coffee prices have varied 
from period to period. Under the controlled system, coffee growers participated in the international 
price to a lesser extent than they do under the free market. Yet nowadays, coffee growers are 
paying for everything they need in producing, processing and marketing the product; this situation 
translates to a huge difference with what they used to do under the quota system. In this chapter, 
we argued that farmers were better off under the quota system than they are under the free 
market. In those days, the government, through its various agencies, was providing almost all the 
requirements producers had. For this reason, even when the share of coffee growers in the export 
price was small, they were receiving a relatively larger amount of money that they receive under 
the current situation. 
 
In the actual organization of the Mexican coffee sector, many agents have been involved. Some of 
the most central participants in the coffee arena are the ministries of agriculture at the federal and 
regional levels, associations of firms (processors and exporters), grassroots grower organizations 
and farmer cooperatives. Yet, according to our findings, clearly the most prominent actors have 
been the multinational firms, as they have been able to set up many types of market arrangements 
that best fit their interests, at the different locations and with both small- and medium-scale 
processors. 
 
By participating in the IRO, buying, negotiating, processing and selling, coffee producer 
organizations are filling some of the gaps left by the disappeared INMECAFE. Farmer cooperatives 
and grassroots grower organizations help producers to negotiate resources from the government 
budget, connect and negotiate relations with international agencies, and provide services to 
improve farmers’ competitiveness (e.g. technical assistance, quality improvement, and building the 
infrastructure to process the product). Yet, the analysis done in this chapter indicates that not 
much progress has been made in that respect. In part, the lack of results is also a consequence of 
the fact that not many coffee producers are participating in organizations and that they have less 
capital and resources to invest in the coffee industry. 
 
During the last two decades, many government programmes have been developed to support the 
coffee sector. They have been set up with the aim to keep the coffee industry working and to 
guarantee economic activity for landholders located in many coffee-producing regions. However, 
our analyses indicate that there is no clear evidence of a recovery of the yield and production in 
this sector. The average coffee yield has dropped from 10.6 quintals per hectare in 1996 to 7.5 
quintals per hectare in 2008 (Akaki and Huacuja, 2006; SIAP, 2010).36 
                                            
36 A quintal is 245 kg of cherry coffee, 57.5 kg of parchment coffee, 80 kg of natural dry or 46 kg of green coffee. 
Chapter 7 
150 
 
 
In Chapter 3, we dealt with the main objectives of identifying the factors explaining the 
contractual choices of traders working in the Mexican coffee supply chain, and assessing the 
performance of coffee traders in four coffee-producing regions. The major results indicated that 
being a roaster and selling cherry coffee negatively affects traders’ use of contracts, whereas being 
vertically integrated has a positive effect on contracting. The findings also suggest that selling 
cherry coffee, participating in a competitive environment and having contracts positively influence 
intermediaries’ performance, while being a roaster has a positive effect on the gross margin. 
 
Our outcomes are in line with what Avalos-Sartorio (2006a) has indicated, in the sense that the 
liberalization would benefit producers and consumers by increasing the primary selling price and 
reducing the final buying price. Our results are also in agreement with the logic specified by Fischer 
et al. (2009), that functioning in a competitive environment is a factor that may increase the 
probability of contractual agreements between agents, as they have to secure the provision of the 
product and the market in which that product will be sold. 
 
The results we obtained in this chapter are coincident with those found by other scholars such as 
Winter-Nelson and Temu (2002), who specified that the costs of marketing output fell substantially 
with liberalization, but that the transaction costs associated with financing the production rose. 
These results are also in line with the ones reported by Mose (2007) and Schroeter and Azzam 
(1991), who concluded that the lack of competition leads to higher marketing margins, which 
decreases the efficiency in the supply chain. However, there are differences in terms of the 
commodity that was studied and the context in which the research was done. Yet, we found that 
marketing margins diminish as competition increases between intermediaries, as was expected. 
From this result we can say that if liberalization increases competition, this also brings benefits to 
coffee growers because they receive higher farm gate prices. 
 
One of our results shows that coffee agents have engaged in different activities as a response to 
the transition from a state-led commodity chain to a liberalized environment. Some of them 
decided to integrate vertically in order to reduce transaction costs and achieve higher efficiency in 
the market, relying on a larger volume of product to increase their profits; others invested in 
assets that allowed them to add value to their product and to have larger margins per units of 
product sold. Also, by doing so, traders avoid having to enter into contractual agreements with 
other agents. This result is in line with the argument of Shervani et al. (2007), that under high 
asset specificity and high uncertainty, the firms will embrace a highly integrated channel in all 
cases to obtain more benefits from their investment. As part of the analysis, we conclude that 
there are risks and uncertainty issues in the coffee sector that lead traders to engage in practices 
like selling cherry coffee. 
 
We also found that the lack of supporting market institutions, like credit bureaus, proper 
infrastructure and clear regulations for the business have resulted in inefficient markets. The latter 
indicates that there is room for government intervention. In order to have a more efficient supply 
chain, these costs have to be reduced by giving technical support and increasing the skills of 
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traders (regarding marketing, branding, managing their own business), by improving access to 
information, credit, and by providing the proper infrastructure to diminish transaction costs. 
 
By analysing intermediaries´ behaviour and performance, we were able to determine that 
marketing margins diminished as competition between traders increased. This means that 
liberalization has indeed brought trader entry into the market, which resulted in lower marketing 
margins. Credit constraints and uncertainty have made most traders neglect investing in new 
technologies and machinery. We can therefore conclude that there has been liberalization but no 
real modernization in the Mexican coffee sector. Consequently, we argue that for the Mexican 
supply chain to become competitive, huge investments and improvements have to be made, both 
in technology and the institutional environment at all stages of the coffee supply chain. 
 
In Chapter 4, we identified the variables that contribute to the coffee growers´ willingness to 
become a member of a cooperative. Furthermore, we examined the significance, relative 
importance and direction of variables influencing the per capita coffee income. Our results showed 
that a farmer's age, gender (male), a farmer's active participation in the National Coffee System, 
the literacy rate, participation in training events, farm size, communal land property, the 
availability of electricity, a higher altitude, the number of farmers in the municipality and the 
proportion of organized farmers in the municipality all favour cooperative affiliation. On the other 
hand, housing conditions, the proportion of farmers in the municipality and selling to intermediaries 
negatively affect the prospects for cooperative membership. Regional differences regarding coffee 
production conditions also showed a significant result in influencing the likelihood that a farmer 
joins a cooperative. 
 
Our findings are in line with what the theory has stated (Karli et al., 2006; Levay, 1983), but we 
did find some additional factors that positively or negatively influence the coffee growers´ 
willingness to join a cooperative. In addition, we discovered that being a cooperative member not 
always helps coffee growers to receive a higher coffee price. Membership of a cooperative helps to 
increase the coffee price the greater the involvement in processing and selling more downstream of 
the supply chain. Indeed, our results show a negative effect of cooperative participation on the 
average price for delivering natural dry coffee. This implies that cooperative´s members enjoy a 
comparative advantage in coffee marketing only if some additional processing services can be 
included as part of the work done by the cooperative. Here, a more specific study needs to be done 
to determine the direction of causality, e.g. whether growers selling natural dry coffee receive a 
lower price because they have joined a cooperative or that the lower prices are an incentive to join 
the cooperative. If the latter is the case, it is possible that even when producers are joining 
cooperatives, it does not help enough in receiving a higher price than their counterparts receive. 
 
Overall, in several respects, our results are broadly in line with findings from earlier studies (Basu 
and Chakraborty, 2008; Francesconi, 2009; Karli et al., 2006; Ruben and Lerman, 2005; Tanguy 
and Alemayehu, 2009; Tanguy et al., 2008) that rely on different methods to address similar 
questions regarding cooperative affiliation. On the effect of farmer age and gender, we can confirm 
the findings by Karli et al. (2006) and Tanguy et al. (2008, 2009), that register a positive effect of 
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farmer age and male membership on cooperative membership. This implies that Mexican coffee 
cooperatives represent a relatively older population and maintain a largely male-biased 
membership composition. In a similar vein, the positive influence of literacy on cooperative 
participation is confirmed, in line with results reported by Tanguy et al. (2009). The positive effect 
of a farmer's access to the National Coffee System reflects the fundamental importance of public 
support, concordant with similar findings by Karli et al. (2006) for Turkish cooperatives. 
 
With regard the factors that are important for defining the per capita coffee income, we discovered 
an overall positive effect of cooperative participation on household welfare. This tends to be 
mediated by their improved access to external infrastructure (roads, but mainly electricity) that 
enables further progress in coffee processing. Only when the coffee cooperatives support upgrading 
and value-adding activities, significant price advantages can be generated. Thus, it seems that 
investing in processing plants helps producers to receive a higher coffee price. These results are in 
line with the finding by Tanguy and Alemayehu (2009) and Francesconi (2009), that cooperatives 
have much to do with reducing transaction costs related to a small production size and volume. 
 
One way in which farmer organizations can help their members is by operating a centralized 
infrastructure to process the coffee. Centralized processing allows these organizations to maintain 
standards and a consistent quality necessary for sales to the specialty market, or to develop good 
and long-standing relationships with their buyers. This may even be conducive to coffee growers’ 
entry to the organic and fair trade market. We agree with what Stephanie and Seth (2005) have 
stated, that cooperatives and grassroots organizations can support farmers who live too far from 
centralized buying or processing centres; they can help with an affordable, efficiently processed, 
transported and marketed product. We were able to derive this conclusion as we include some 
variables (e.g. road, electricity) as a proxy for remote places where coffee households are located. 
 
Cooperatives have to be as efficient as other intermediaries working in the same market to bring 
economic benefits to their members and their neighbouring growers; otherwise they bring losses to 
all of them. If coffee cooperatives work efficiently, they can push the coffee price upwards. Thus, 
the welfare of organized (and some non-organized) growers might increase as well. These unions 
also have to work on improving the coffee quality and then bargain for a better coffee price. 
 
Further research regarding the long-term effects of rural organization on farm household welfare 
and bargaining power, comparing matched samples of members and non-members living in the 
same region, enabled us to shed light on the enduring effects of cooperative membership. Our 
material suggests that under the current wave of market liberalization in Mexico, many coffee 
cooperatives have received some government subsidies that enable them to overcome difficulties 
in processing, marketing and supply chain upgrading. 
 
In Chapter 5, we evaluated cooperation as a response to market uncertainty and the effect of 
cooperation on the coffee market instability. The results indicate that there is no clear link between 
cooperative participation and the predictability of local coffee prices. However, when we controlled 
for gender, the education of the head of household, communication, land property, altitude, farm 
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size, the number of coffee farmers in the municipality, the variance of farm size at the municipal 
level, and the variability of the coffee prices, we found clear evidence that the variability of the 
coffee prices positively affects farmer’s likelihood of becoming a member of an organization. The 
results also indicate that membership of a farmer organization helps producers to increase their 
coffee price and income. 
 
The overall results indicate that the degree of education and whether the producers owned ejidal or 
communal land increased the probability of their participation in a cooperative. This result is in line 
with the findings of Karli et al. (2006), that education positively influences farmers’ willingness to 
become a cooperative member. However, we found a negative correlation of private land 
ownership with cooperative affiliation. From this result we can derive that middle-class coffee 
producers were those more likely to participate in cooperatives. Similar results have been reported 
by Francesconi (2009) and Tungay & Spielman (2009) for studies done in Ethiopia. This result is 
also in line with the theory (Karli et al., 2006) and with what we found in Chapter 4. 
 
In accordance with the theory, too, is our finding that this better income for organized coffee 
growers, besides having a higher productivity and production, may be the reason why they join a 
cooperative. By doing so, they integrate vertically with a processing stage and thereby achieve 
higher prices for their product. On the other hand, it would be easier for coffee intermediaries to 
deal with organized farmers than with individual ones; in this respect, traders reduce transaction 
costs and are able to pay higher coffee prices to their suppliers. However, in line with what Milford 
(2004) has stated, purchasing prices are normally higher in areas where cooperatives are present 
than in areas where such organizations are not operating. Yet, we also found places where 
cooperatives are working inefficiently, and here the coffee price tends to be lower accordingly. 
 
The higher variance in the coffee prices from 2001 to 2004 induced more cooperation, whereas the 
higher the mean of the coffee prices was in this period, the lower the willingness was to cooperate. 
It seems that selling coffee as an individual grower provided more opportunities to earn from the 
temporary high coffee prices. This conclusion is opposite to what Gjiolberg and Steen (1999) have 
argued, in the sense that for many coffee farmers, price volatility can be handled more efficiently 
through processing and selling the coffee collectively rather than doing so individually. Anyway, 
coffee growers can have access to a better price in two ways. One is to sell more downstream of 
the supply chain and have more negotiation power vis-à-vis their buyers, which can become 
possible by joining a cooperative. The other way is to sell through the future market mechanism, 
which is much more accessible for small- and medium-sized growers – when they take part in a 
cooperative. 
 
Apart from the above similarities and differences between our results and what other scholars have 
found, in Chapter 5 we furthermore shed light on the analysis of information we gathered from 
different sources and at different points in time. In this way, we were able to build a panel 
database, using the prices at international, national and village levels. To this we added the prices 
over a period of eight years that we subsequently related with the households´ characteristics of 
coffee growers included in the 2004 survey. Moreover, the research done in this chapter is rather 
Chapter 7 
154 
 
unique in that it addressed the effect of the variability of coffee prices on cooperation as well as the 
vice versa effect. In this research, we were able to avoid the recursive effect of the relationship 
between the local coffee prices and cooperation, as we used the organization in 2001 and in 2004 
and the variability of prices in two periods (2001–2004 and 2005–2008). 
 
The investigation done in this chapter showed that while farmers appear to opt for cooperative 
membership more often when faced with a higher price variability (and lower prices), this does not 
seem to affect the price variance itself. Cooperative membership does lead to higher incomes from 
coffee, however. The lack of effect on price variability can be ascribed to the fact that farmers do 
not sell all their coffee to cooperatives and that the share of organized farmers is relatively small. 
Hence, membership does not affect local prices that much. Even when the participation in coffee 
cooperatives is not translated into a reduction of market instability, the higher individual coffee 
price and coffee income received by organized coffee farmers make enough of a difference to 
motivate producers to join an organization. 
 
In short, we do not see the expected relationship between residual variances of the coffee price 
and the level of organization, or at least the expected effect of the level of organization, on the 
market stability in our model specification. The lack of effect of the degree of organization on the 
predictability of the local coffee price might also be attributed to the small shares of sales of 
cooperative members who go through the cooperative. Anyhow, our results suggest that the work 
done by cooperatives did indeed influence the market characteristics. As Milford (2004) has 
mentioned, cooperatives may provide access to government funds, increase innovation as they 
introduce new production technologies and approaches, and help members to increase their 
knowledge. In this way, cooperative members, too, are able to enjoy a higher coffee price and 
income than their counterparts in the same coffee-producing region. 
 
The existing organizations of small- and medium-scale coffee producers are not well prepared for 
attending to the needs of the social sector. These unions ought to increase their financial and 
organizational management capacity to operate in a more successful way; they also need to have 
skilled staff of their own to be able to conduct profitable businesses. These organizations lack the 
methods and operational capacity to reduce the high operational costs, to control transaction costs 
and to achieve economies of scale in the processing, storage, transporting and marketing of the 
produce (Stephanie and Seth, 2005). 
 
Our findings indicate that the government’s aims and intentions to increase cooperation might 
increase the farmers’ economic benefits. Even though politicians, government and non-
governmental agencies may provide support to coffee cooperatives, this does not directly benefit 
the very poor coffee producers. However, we maintain that those poor farmers can expect clear 
benefits from cooperative through the spillover effects. Accordingly, our results may contribute to 
the improvement of programmes supporting the Mexican coffee sector. 
 
In Chapter 6, we analysed the coffee households´ response to a low coffee price by means of 
diversification and the effect of this on their annual coffee income. Our results indicated that a 
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better institutional environment for coffee production, like the number of coffee farmers and the 
coffee-price margin at the municipal level, is positively correlated to the coffee farmers’ decision to 
engage in coffee-extra activities. Those factors – combined with some natural, human and physical 
kinds of capital – are effectively capturing the benefits generated by the households’ response to a 
low coffee price scenario through an increase in their livelihood. Results from our multivariate 
probit model suggest that the worse the conditions for pure coffee production are, the greater the 
chance that coffee-producing households will decide to diversify their agricultural activities. At the 
same time, farmers will be less willing to vertically integrate with coffee. 
 
With respect to the factors that are important in the coffee households’ decision to diversify into 
the specific groups of activities, our results were similar to those reported by other scholars 
(Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Barrett et al., 2001; Van den Berg, 2010). Our results indicated that 
a male head of the household and the number of coffee farmers at the municipal level reduced the 
likelihood that the households would engage in non-agricultural activities. 
 
By introducing lagged variables related to the diversification in 2001 and applying a multivariate 
probit regression, we were able to capture the households’ response to low coffee prices (and 
possibly some other effects that were ignored). By doing so, internal and external factors capture 
the changes in the households’ decision-making regarding diversification. Overall results show that 
both internal and external characteristics of the households matter with respect to the choice of 
activity and the extent of the diversification. Our result are in line with the argument of Ellis (2000) 
and Reardon et al. (1992), that not only households’ factor endowments, such as land and labour, 
help people shape their strategies, but public infrastructures such as roads and electricity help as 
well. 
 
Beside those results and their coincidence with the theory, we shed light on the introduction of 
lagged variables in the analysis. By including lagged variables, we could find the long-term effect of 
diversification on households´ livelihood and coffee income. We found consistent evidence that a 
general diversification and coffee-extra activities in 2001 had a significant, positive effect on the 
annual coffee income in 2005. Clearly, the fall in the coffee price during the 2001–2004 period 
made farmers proceed with their diversification. If periods of low coffee prices will recur under the 
prevailing domestic and international organization of the coffee sector, this will result in an increase 
of diversified households in coffee-producing areas in the years to come. 
 
According to theory, and depending on the assets endowment owned by the coffee households, if 
growers do not have access to additional land, they have two options to diversify (on-farm). Firstly, 
they can introduce another crop that can be farmed in the same coffee plantation, such as oranges, 
wood trees, bananas and ornamental plants. Secondly, they can remove coffee trees to establish 
any other crop or livestock that is feasible in the same natural conditions. Our results indicate that 
households diversify into one, two or all three groups of activities defined in this chapter. That is 
part of the correlation we found among the various options of diversification. This correlation came 
from the competition in resource allocation that is usual in coffee households and from the 
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complementarity between the various diversification groups, which showed a positive correlation in 
the latter case. 
 
By introducing a number of variables at the municipal level, we were able to test the effect of the 
institutional environment on the households´ livelihood; and by introducing the coffee price margin 
between municipal and export prices, it was also possible to capture the effect of structural 
differences with regard to diversification among municipalities. The overall results derived from our 
investigation indicate that an improved institutional environment for coffee induces more 
diversification within coffee-extra activities and reduces the chance that coffee-producing 
households engage in agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Consequently, if the government 
wants to preserve the coffee sector as a productive contributor to the whole economy, forestry and 
diversity preservation, it is advisable to create the needed institutional environment for coffee and 
to provide better public services mainly for those farmers living in remote areas. However, as the 
coffee production represents invested capital, many farmers did not abandon or remove their 
coffee trees (Calo and Wise, 2005), even when they engaged in other economic activities. Thus, 
under the recurrent periods of low coffee prices, coffee growers reduced their maintenance of the 
coffee orchard and used part of their available assets endowment for other activities. According to 
Reardon et al. (1992) and Ellis (2000b), this process means changing the use of the assets 
available and reallocating labour to other activities, such as off-farm wage labour, self-employment 
or migration. 
 
The diversification involves many specific investment areas that need to be covered by public or 
private sectors. Thus, the government and policymakers have to work at creating an institutional 
environment, technology, and a rural infrastructure according to the new demand emerging in the 
Mexican coffee-producing regions. Additionally, the government should impose clear rules for the 
private sector to make it provide inputs and services according to the emerging needs of the 
diversified sector. 
 
As the results included in Chapter 6 show, creating a better institutional environment and reducing 
uncertainty in the coffee market can help coffee producers to increase their confidence in coffee 
(the adoption of coffee-extra activities). As a result, there will be less pressure on coffee growers 
to pursue other sources of income besides coffee. As the data tell us, coffee producers have 
recently been depending less on coffee and more on other income sources, such as wage labour, 
other economic activities and subsidy programmes. 
 
One important conclusion we can derive from our results is that the diversification of farmers’ 
livelihood contributes to the increasing capabilities of the coffee households. This means that the 
policies needed are the ones that reduce constraints to diversification and widen its possibilities. In 
this sense, we agree with what theory tells us: initiatives that are effective in creating better 
conditions for diversification in remote areas, which many coffee-producing regions in Mexico are, 
are urgently needed. Among the most important of them are those concerning rural credit, the 
provision of technology and information, risk-reducing markets, access to rural services, an 
increase of communication and the provision of skills and education (Ellis, 1998). 
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7.3. Policy implications 
 
Following the reforms since the eighties in Mexico, the government’s role in agricultural markets 
(including coffee) has changed dramatically. As Avalos-Sartorio (2006a) has stated, policymakers 
during the eighties expected that the move to a market-based agricultural economy would bring 
efficiency because it would generate a better link between domestic and international prices. It was 
expected that the liberalization would benefit both producers and consumers by increasing the 
selling price and reducing the buying price. 
 
The current government participation in the coffee sector is focused on a deregulation of the 
market, to allow agents involved in the supply chain to participate freely. Because of this, it is 
necessary for the government to provide public goods and to develop clear rules for governing the 
free market. If a good institutional environment and the most needed public services are provided, 
the coffee market will become less uncertain. So, as the theory suggests, more impartial 
government participation and economic support targeting rural areas are required to improve the 
performance of the coffee sector. 
 
According to the OECD (2007), Mexico’s agricultural sector requires public investment to improve 
inspection services, information about markets and information technology, and research and 
technological development. This kind of investments should be directed toward the sector as a 
whole and not specifically toward a particular crop or system, as is happening in the coffee sector. 
In the same vein, institutions should supply information, advice and alternative conflict resolution 
mechanisms, encouraging parties to cooperate and behave in a trustworthy manner. Thus, by 
creating a better institutional environment, the government would be able to assist many partners 
in the supply chain. 
 
Apart from removing barriers to vertical integration, it is necessary to provide opportunities to 
small- and medium-scale processors and intermediaries for doing business in the coffee sector. 
This may imply, for instance, the provision of suitable insurance or intermediary facilities that 
small-scale individual producers cannot provide themselves. This is also an important topic when a 
future investigation is required in order to assess the relative benefits to producers of alternative 
government interventions. 
 
The coffee sector requires some centralized planning while the most important characteristics of 
each state and coffee-producing area must be taken into account as well. Before applying any 
economic resource to support the coffee sector, it is advisable to identify the most appropriate 
instruments; this should be done in constant interaction with the main partners in the coffee 
sector. The procedure for detecting their needs has to include the definition of objectives and goals 
on both the short and the long term. It is important to provide subsidies at the most appropriate 
time and use the instances that best fit in with the local and regional conditions and the specific 
type of work to be done. As one of the interviewed producers leaders said: ‘Good planning is only 
possible when we look beyond the increase in production and we look ahead by means of five year 
programmes at least’. 
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Even while everybody thinks it very important to invest in coffee orchards and processing plants to 
recover the dynamics that coffee used to have, many coffee growers do not do so. This reflects the 
fact that they do not rely much on the future of this crop. As one representative of a grassroots 
farmers’ organization told us: ‘Producers are uncertain about the near future of coffee. We feel that 
there isn’t any good plan for the sector for the coming twenty years, and to invest under this 
uncertainty means a lot of risk’. Coffee growers feel that there is no secure coffee market and the 
institutional setting is very weak, or at least it is not in line with the demands for the social sector 
participating in this crop. 
 
Coffee production, more than many other crops, is an environmentally friendly crop that depends 
much on the natural conditions. The conservation of natural resources has been one of the most 
important justifications to keep the coffee sector working, but additionally, this sector helps in 
preserving the social and economic characteristics of many poor rural provinces and households in 
Mexico. 
 
Coffee continues to be one of the most important crops in the country. This product has great 
importance in terms of natural, social and economic issues, as one of national leaders has stated. 
Nevertheless, any decision with regard to supporting coffee has to be based on all the important 
factors pertaining to this sector. Our research results suggest that the support given to this sector 
by the Mexican government is not provoking the expected responses in terms of yield and total 
production. 
 
Because of the great importance of the coffee sector, we advise to continue supporting it but not 
only with subsidies directly to coffee. It is necessary to provide subsidies to those small 
stakeholders and their families who live in coffee-producing regions. Subsidies can be justified 
because of the maintenance of natural resources besides coffee production. Thus, these kinds of 
producers will have the option to diversify their livelihood without losing government support. By 
doing so, other goals may be reached, such as increasing rural non-agricultural activities without 
damage to the natural conditions, creating more employment opportunities, reducing emigration, 
and enhancing the economic conditions of all coffee-producing areas. In agreement with some of 
the institutions representing the government in the coffee sector, we suggest support to rural 
development rather than an effort to increase the coffee production. 
  
Nowadays, the smallholders related to coffee production are no longer primarily farmers, but 
instead rely on a wide array of livelihoods, including coffee production. They have to do so in order 
to better ensure their living. This is a very different situation from the one prevailing during the 
quota system era, when many of the small-scale coffee growers were relying solely on coffee 
production for their maintenance. According to our results, one way of increasing opportunities for 
the coffee households is to increase human capital (e.g. skill and education), improve the 
infrastructure to open up opportunities for investment and for the provision of better 
communications (Davis, 1999). 
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The Mexican government has developed several programmes to support the coffee sector since 
1989, but unfortunately, little improvement has been registered in some of the most important 
national indicators during the last two decades. Therefore, some questions that remain without 
answer are: who has been the main beneficiary of the money that federal and state governments 
have devoted to coffee? Why have policymakers not found a more effective way to apply subsidies 
in order to attain a greater impact in the coffee sector? Answering these questions require a full 
evaluation of the real impact of the money transferred to the coffee sector. 
 
The current coffee policy has allowed the survival of the small-scale coffee growers, but it has not 
been able to trigger the recovery of this supply chain. It is unclear how the main bottlenecks of the 
coffee sector should be attended to; here, more comprehensive and wider studies need to be done 
to shed further light in terms of the policy impact and the effect on the coffee sector. These kinds 
of studies have been done, but they mostly focused on a particular programme, not on an 
evaluation of the entire coffee policy and its effects on the main partners of this sector. To be able 
to conduct a full-fledged evaluation of the coffee policy, an updated National Coffee Census 
database has to become available. 
 
Another potential pathway to improve the Mexican coffee sector is to invest in improving the 
productivity, quality and efficiency in marketing coffee. In that case, academic and government 
institutions have much to do in research, the transference of technology, the training of skills and 
the creation of the required institutional environment to become more competitive in the 
international sphere. 
 
Other important fields for the government to work on are the generation and provision of market 
information. Timely informing, with enough market details, can help investors, including coffee 
growers, to engage in better planning with regard to the maintenance and improvement of coffee 
orchards. The government and other instances can also promote the development of microfinance 
programmes, to give producers access to capital and the opportunity to invest in non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas. 
 
Our findings suggest that the government’s aims and intention to increase cooperation might 
increase farmers’ economic benefits. Even though the government, state and non-governmental 
agencies that support coffee cooperatives do not always directly benefit the very poor coffee 
producers, we maintain that those poor and non-organized growers actually can benefit from a 
cooperative by enjoying the spillover effects. 
 
By diversifying the livelihood of coffee households, coffee growers are trying to change their 
orientation from being pure, raw coffee producers towards a more integrated approach aimed at 
meeting the demands of the final consumer. In doing so, they try to meet the changing market 
demands and adapt to the current economic situation. In this context, public concerns should shift 
from simply providing the necessary support for traditional coffee producers to attaining the new 
skills and services that a diversified household demands. Consequently, accurate and updated 
information about the actual and future coffee prices is vitally important. That type of information 
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is also needed for the selection of possible crops to be farmed by coffee growers. Research and 
technology – not only regarding coffee but also regarding other crops – are essential to help coffee 
households in the decision making with respect to resource allocation. 
 
Findings from Chapter 2 and 3 show that there is a need for a better organization in the coffee 
sector to bring higher economic benefits to all agents participating in the coffee supply chain. Not 
all the partners in the coffee sector have a similar opportunity to do business. The biggest investors 
are the ones who have more room for higher earnings because they have more capital and 
information at their disposal. On the other hand, having clear ways to enforce contracts between 
intermediaries may help to reduce transaction costs and to control opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The empirical evidence of Chapter 5 shows that coffee growers are responding to a low coffee price 
scenario. The findings regarding diversification provide evidence that if there is information and 
other support to adopt new agricultural and non-agricultural activities in the coffee-producing 
regions, more resources will be re-allocated to reach a wider-based livelihood. Then coffee 
households will become more resilient. 
7.4. Main limitations and future research agenda 
 
Most of the earlier studies on the Mexican coffee sector have been done by using cross-sectional 
data. As such, those studies have not been able to control for causality and for possibly 
unobservable variables. We have the opportunity to carry out some more detailed studies with 
regard to the institutional environmental, cooperation and diversification because we can make use 
of already existing databases and complement them with new interviews with the same actors. In 
addition we will be able to apply many other statistics and econometric techniques to get better 
results. 
 
Given the available field data used in this thesis, we can only draw conclusions about relevant 
coffee activities and are unable to infer full household income effects. In terms of cooperation, we 
will need to compare the total income for organized and non-organized coffee producers under the 
same circumstances. Cooperative affiliation may lead to an improved input efficiency and lower 
average input costs, which positively affect the net farm income, but these effects are not fully 
included in the data set. Thus, information regarding the benefits a cooperative brings to members 
and the spillover effect needs to be taken into account when we proceed to evaluate the total effect 
of cooperation. In addition, we need to obtain detailed information with regard to public services, 
total investment, skill and technology, to deliver further on the role that cooperatives are playing in 
coffee-producing areas. 
 
The analysis we conducted in Chapter 3 requires a wider range of locations and a higher number of 
intermediaries to be interviewed. By doing so at two or three points in time, we will be able to 
apply panel data to get a clearer result with regard to contracts, competition, the effect of the 
institutional environment on the margin, and the influence of coffee policy in the whole supply 
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chain. Furthermore, by having a wide range of intermediaries contributing to the database, it will 
be possible to calculate the price margin between each of the stages of the supply chain. 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we faced the limitation of not having panel data, too. As a result of that, we 
could not fully control for the possible causality effect of some farm household characteristics on 
the likelihood of diversification. Nor could we control for the causality effect the cooperation has on 
the coffee growers’ welfare. Including panel data will enable us to get better results from the 
application of random effect regressions as well. Having data on more than one point in time will 
allow us to conduct a much clearer evaluation of the effect of cooperation on the instability of the 
coffee price and vice versa. 
 
Regarding Chapter 6, we faced the limitation of not having the information about the cost-benefit 
that each of the diversification option produce; we had information about the total coffee income 
but not about the total annual income of households. Therefore, it was impossible to carry out an 
evaluation of the effect of the strategies of diversification on coffee growers’ welfare. Specific 
information about the characteristics of non-diversified coffee producers was very much limited. In 
the future, it will be helpful to design a survey to evaluate the diversification from a wider 
perspective and to control for the institutional and structural differences among coffee-producing 
regions. In this vein, other factors such as industrialization, distance to the market and land 
quality, that may influence diversification, can be included as part of the analysis. 
 
To be able to give better advice to policymakers and to the various government and governmental 
instances involved in the coffee sector, an evaluation is needed on the effects of differences in the 
institutional environment between states and between similar producing countries on the 
performance of the coffee sector. In the same vein, setting up an international team for the 
investigation of the institutional settings will enable us to make comparisons and investigate 
contrasts amongst countries and states and, at the same time, apply the actual and updated 
theory regarding the role of institutional variables. 
 
In any case, this research produces valuable results for the policymaking regarding the institutional 
environment created to assist the Mexican coffee sector. Information included in the contractual 
arrangements and trader performances are considered very useful for designing policies related to 
the institutional environment. The cooperation issues discussed are highly important and the 
results we obtained can be taken up by the cooperatives’ leaders and grassroots farmers’ 
organizations in order to improve the cooperatives’ performance. The findings on diversification 
shed light on the factors playing a role in the households´ decision-making process and the likely 
effect diversification will have in the long run; although limited, those results are useful when 
considering the public policies related to resource allocation and service provision in rural areas. 
 
After analysing the theoretical models and theories we applied in this research, we conclude that 
we faced several limitations in our work. When we checked the main findings we obtained in this 
thesis, we understood that there is the need for further research related to the topics included. 
Such topics are, for instance the institutional environment and the causes and effects for changes 
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to happen; intermediaries’ performance; contract arrangements and their effect on a reduction of 
transaction costs; cooperation and the benefits for organized and non-organized coffee producers 
located in the same surroundings; diversification and its effect on the total income of households 
and so on. Together, those challenges make a good agenda for future research. 
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Appendix 2. Panel regression of the local price against the international coffee price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      2879 
Group variable: edo_mpio                        Number of groups   =       432 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4685                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1409                                        avg =       6.7 
       overall = 0.3504                                        max =         8 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   2193.40 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    copricdo |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    omildpri |   .4740242   .0101214    46.83   0.000     .4541865    .4938618 
       _cons |   5.251773   1.164859     4.51   0.000     2.968692    7.534855 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  10.051253 
     sigma_e |  15.287837 
         rho |  .30180435   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 1. Coffee-producing states in Mexico. 
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Appendix 3. Factors explaining the individual coffee price (OLS regression) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1246 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,  1230) =   12.11 
       Model |  3777881.47    15  251858.765           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  25577368.8  1230  20794.6088           R-squared     =  0.1287 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1181 
       Total |  29355250.3  1245  23578.5143           Root MSE      =   144.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    coffeepr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    predcoop |   115.3077   32.21821     3.58   0.000     52.09894    178.5164 
     orgmun1 |  -43.44129   11.37164    -3.82   0.000    -65.75126   -21.13132 
    electric |   3.970518   11.36432     0.35   0.727    -18.32508    26.26612 
    altitude |   .0157161     .05343     0.29   0.769    -.0891079    .1205402 
    altitu2d |  -.0162489   .0274336    -0.59   0.554    -.0700708     .037573 
    processe |    41.6868   10.88371     3.83   0.000     20.33411    63.03949 
    farmsize |   1.236846    .578294     2.14   0.033     .1022939    2.371397 
    intefarm |   12.79151   2.326256     5.50   0.000     8.227642    17.35538 
    farm1000 |  -4.707509   1.968846    -2.39   0.017    -8.570177   -.8448419 
    mean14mx |   .1068672   .0519545     2.06   0.040     .0049379    .2087965 
     chiapas |   -7.49885   20.70021    -0.36   0.717    -48.11049    33.11279 
    veracruz |  -15.19435   14.57168    -1.04   0.297    -43.78245    13.39374 
      oaxaca |   2.342882   22.01251     0.11   0.915    -40.84334     45.5291 
      puebla |  -103.8572   19.21376    -5.41   0.000    -141.5526   -66.16186 
     nayarit |  -58.38327   20.05033    -2.91   0.004     -97.7199   -19.04664 
       _cons |    426.612   34.17955    12.48   0.000     359.5554    493.6687 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Summary 
 
Mexico made a change from a controlled economy to a free market during the nineteen eighties 
and nineties. The country joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 and signed 
the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the United States of America in 1992. 
By doing so, the Mexican government broke radically with previous import substitution policies and 
embarked on trade liberalization. As part of these changes in the economy, participation of the 
state in credit, marketing and other agricultural services was hugely reduced, starting at the 
beginning of the nineteen nineties. This particularly affected the coffee sector. 
 
Coffee was first introduced into Mexico in the late nineteenth century. In this country, coffee is 
important, as it provides employment and income to almost half a million households, while some 
one million workers are hired each year for the harvest. There are around 500,000 coffee growers, 
who together own more than 760,000 hectares. Mexico produces more than 5.5 million quintals per 
harvesting season.37 The involvement of indigenous peoples and poor public services available in 
coffee-producing regions give this sector a special characteristic in terms of technology and culture. 
Around 98% of the coffee orchards in Mexico is farmed under shade trees, which provide a very 
important wood mass that favours environmental preservation. 
 
As a consequence of the disappearance of the economic clauses of the International Coffee 
Agreement in 1989, a dismantling of coffee boards and other governmental bodies operating in 
producer countries began. In the Mexican coffee sector, after the demise of the Mexican Coffee 
Institute in 1993, the function of the industry’s representative organization has been covered first 
by the Mexican Coffee Council and then by the Coffee Product System and the Mexican Coffee 
Association. The former was operating from 1993 to 2004 and the latter have been in place since 
2004. 
 
Consequently, in this thesis the main aims are to investigate the institutional setting prevailing in 
the Mexican coffee sector and its structural changes over time. The specific topics we examine are 
the contract arrangements and trade performance, the factors influencing the growers´ willingness 
to join a cooperative, the effects of cooperation on price variability, the influence of cooperation on 
the growers’ welfare, and coffee producers’ response to the falling coffee price through their 
engagement in diversification activities. 
 
To accomplish the main objectives of this thesis, we have used primary and secondary data. We 
did fieldwork in two periods: one from May to July 2008, during which we conducted interviews 
with the main stakeholders in the Mexican coffee supply chain, and another from November 2009 
to February 2010, when we conducted a survey among coffee intermediaries in four coffee-
producing regions. Secondary data were collected from research institutes and other organizations 
participating in the agricultural and coffee sectors. Additional information was obtained from 
representatives of governmental and non-governmental instances. As benchmark information we 
                                            
37 One hundred pounds of green coffee is a quintal. 
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used two coffee grower surveys: the 2004 survey, which included 1,396 coffee producers, and the 
2005 survey, which included 2,294 coffee producers from the eight and five largest coffee-
producing states, respectively. 
 
In Chapter 2 we shed light on the structure of the coffee sector and its changes over time. Our 
results suggest that there have been many causes for the institutional change, but the most 
important one is the alignment of the Mexican economy with world policies. Small-scale coffee 
growers have been harmed by the coffee price variability and the lack of opportunities for 
participation in the domestic and international market. This situation asks for government 
intervention in establishing an institutional environment, including the provision of market 
information and services, to assist coffee growers in increasing their income. Public policies 
developed in the last two decades have been preventing more producers from exiting the coffee 
sector; but they did little for the improvement of the yield, production, coffee quality and reliability 
of the coffee sector. 
 
International coffee prices have shown a fluctuation of around 50% annually in recent years, 
whereas during the regulated era prices fluctuated 15% around their average defined price. This 
situation made it difficult for growers and other partners in the coffee supply chain to carry out 
investment and planning activities. Statistics shows that producer prices as share of the 
international price were lower under the controlled system than under the free market regime. 
However, in Chapter 2 we argue that farmers could still be better off under the quota system than 
they are under the free market regime because back then the government met almost all the 
requirements producers had. 
 
Even though there has been a considerable adjustment to the current institutional environment, some 
actors are at a disadvantage while others gain from this new competitive environment. To mitigate 
the effect of the quick withdrawal of the Mexican state, during the nineteen nineties the federal 
government started some subsidy and compensation programmes. However, government 
participation in the coffee sector is much smaller than it was under quota system. Nowadays, the 
state is a kind of mediator between the larger private processor and exporting companies on the 
one hand, and the social sector of coffee growers and small-scale processors on the other. 
 
Now that we have an overall picture of the changes in the institutional setting and structure of the 
Mexican coffee sector, we deal in Chapter 3 with the main objectives of the study. The objectives in 
this chapter are to identify the factors explaining the contractual choices of traders engaged in the 
coffee supply chain, and to assess the performance of coffee traders in four coffee-producing 
regions. 
 
The data used in our analysis were obtained by conducting face-to-face interviews with 53 
intermediaries in 4 coffee-producing regions of the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz. We used the 
gross marketing margins (the difference between selling and buying prices) as an indicator of 
traders’ performance, since they can give an indication of how traders perform given the 
minimization of their variable costs. A logit regression was performed to find variables affecting the 
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intermediaries’ decision to have a contract (or not) with their buyer. To assess the performance of 
traders in the Mexican coffee sector, we performed an ordinary least squares regression. 
 
Major results indicate that being a roaster and selling cherry coffee negatively affects traders’ use 
of contracts, whereas being vertically integrated has a positive effect on contracting. The findings 
also suggest that selling cherry coffee, participating in a competitive environment and having 
contracts positively influence intermediaries’ performance, while being a roaster has a positive 
effect on the gross margin. We found that marketing margins diminish as competition increases 
between intermediaries, as was expected. Based on this result, we can say that if liberalization 
increased competition, this also brought benefits to coffee growers in the form of higher farm gate 
prices. 
 
Some of our results, also included in Chapter 3, show that coffee agents have engaged in different 
activities in response to the transition from a state-led commodity chain to a liberalized 
environment. Some of them decided to vertically integrate in order to reduce transaction costs and 
achieve more efficiency in the market, relying on a larger volume of product to increase their 
profits; others invested in assets that allowed them to add value to their product and to have 
larger margins per units of product sold. 
 
Credit constraints and uncertainty have made most traders neglect investing in new technologies 
and machinery. Therefore, we can conclude from the results of this chapter that there has been 
liberalization but no real modernization in the Mexican coffee sector. Consequently, we argue that 
for the Mexican supply chain to become competitive, huge investments and improvements have to 
be made both in technology and the institutional environment at all stages of the coffee supply 
chain. 
 
In order to assess the effect of the institutional environment on the coffee growers/households´ 
behaviour in Chapter 4, we identify the variables that contribute to the coffee growers´ willingness 
to become a member of a cooperative and examine the significance, relative importance and 
direction of variables influencing the per capita coffee income. 
 
The study done in this chapter relies on information from the Coffee Census database and from a 
large-scale coffee field survey conducted in 2004. In the survey, 1,396 coffee farmers from the 
eight coffee-producing states of Mexico were included. To address the research questions, we relied 
on three different procedures. First, a probit model analysis was performed that identified the 
individual, family, farm and regional factors influencing the likelihood of cooperative participation. 
Secondly, we performed a multinomial logistic regression to identify the variables that play a role 
in defining the type of coffee delivered by producers. Thirdly, we performed three ordinary least 
square regressions. In these we used pooled and non-pooled samples of organized and non-
organized producers to identify the factors influencing the per capita coffee income and the 
possible differences between cooperative and individual coffee farmers. 
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Results show that some individual, family, farm and regional factors favour cooperative affiliation; 
whereas housing conditions, the proportion of farmers in the municipality and selling to 
intermediaries negatively affect cooperative membership. Regional differences regarding coffee 
production conditions also show a significant result in influencing the likelihood of a farmer joining 
a cooperative. 
 
Overall, in several respects our results are broadly in line with findings from earlier studies that 
address similar questions regarding cooperative affiliation. We did find some additional factors, 
however, that positively or negatively influence the coffee growers´ willingness to join a 
cooperative. In addition, we discovered that being a cooperative member not always helps coffee 
growers to receive a higher coffee price. Our results show a negative effect of cooperative 
participation on the average price for delivering natural dry coffee. This implies that cooperatives´ 
members enjoy a comparative advantage in coffee marketing only if a number of processing 
activities can be included in the work done by the cooperative. 
 
As part of the results obtained in Chapter 4, we discovered overall positive effects of cooperative 
participation on household income. This tends to be mediated by their improved access to external 
infrastructure – roads, but mainly electricity – that makes further progress in coffee processing 
possible. In this chapter, we argue that cooperatives have to be as efficient as other intermediaries 
working in the same market to bring economic benefits to their members and their neighbouring 
growers, otherwise they bring losses to all of them. If coffee cooperatives work efficiently, they can 
push up the coffee price. Thus, the welfare of organized (and some non-organized) growers might 
increase as well. 
 
Following the analysis of the coffee growers’ cooperatives, in Chapter 5 we evaluate cooperation as 
a response to market uncertainty and the cooperation effect on the coffee market instability. Main 
data used in this chapter were collected in a survey of the eight main producer states in Mexico in 
2004 and complemented with information included in the Coffee Census database. Both, the 2004 
survey and the Census, include individual, family, farm, market, and regional characteristics. In 
addition, we used municipal data on prices for eight years, constructing a panel with data coming 
from a government instance databases. As part of the analysis, several ordinary least square and 
probit model regressions were executed. 
 
The results indicate that there is no clear link between cooperative participation and the 
predictability of local coffee prices. However, when controlling for individual, family, farm, market 
and regional factors, we found clear evidence that the variability of the coffee prices positively 
affects a farmer’s likelihood of being a member of an organization. Also, the results indicate that 
membership of a farmer organization helps producers to increase their coffee price and income. 
 
The higher variance in the coffee price from 2001 to 2004 induced more cooperation, whereas the 
higher the mean of the coffee price was from 2001 to 2004, the lower the willingness was to 
cooperate. It seems that selling coffee as an individual grower gives a better chance to earn from 
the temporary high coffee prices than selling by a cooperative does. 
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The investigation done in this chapter shows that while farmers appear to opt more often for 
cooperative membership when faced with a higher price variability – and lower prices –, this does 
not seem to affect the price variance itself. Cooperative membership does lead to higher incomes 
from coffee, however. Even though the participation in coffee cooperatives is not translated into 
reduced price instability, the increase in the individual coffee price and coffee income that 
organized coffee farmers experience is big enough to motivate producers to join an organization. 
 
Apart from the above similarities and differences between our results and what other scholars have 
found, in Chapter 5 we furthermore shed light on the analysis of information we gathered from 
different sources and at different points in time. In this way, we were able to build a panel 
database, using the prices at international, national and village levels. To this we added the prices 
over a period of eight years that we subsequently related with the households´ characteristics of 
coffee growers included in the 2004 survey. Moreover, the research done in this chapter is rather 
unique, in that it addressed the effect of the variability of coffee prices on cooperation as well as 
the reverse effect. 
 
Continuing with the coffee growers’ response to changes in the institutional environment, in 
chapter 6 we evaluate the farmers´ willingness to diversify into coffee-extra, agricultural and non-
agricultural activities as a response to the low coffee price or to structural differences at the village 
level. The analysis in this chapter is based on data from a representative survey conducted in 
2005, which provides information on 2,294 coffee-producing households of 5 main coffee-
producing states of México. The survey information was complemented with data from the Mexican 
Coffee Census. Additionally, we obtained the number of coffee intermediaries who were registered 
at the municipal level in 2005 from the Mexican Coffee Council. From the Informatics Agricultural 
and Livestock System, we obtained the coffee price at the municipal level in the 2001–2004 period, 
and we included information regarding the total population at the municipal level obtained from the 
National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics. 
 
The data were analysed using two distinct econometric models. The first model analysed the 
specific choice that households make regarding the three diversification groups. To the three 
options we added the default choice of non-diversification so as to avoid a potential selection bias. 
Since we considered four options at the same time as dependent variables, with three of these not 
being mutually exclusive, we ran a multivariate probit. The second model evaluated the effect of 
internal and external factors on the annual coffee income. As the dependent variable was a 
continuous one, we used OLS regressions. 
 
Probably, the fall in the coffee price during the 2001–2004 period made farmers take further steps 
with diversification. In the multi-variate probit regressions, we found correlations between the 
various options of diversification. This correlation might come from the competition for resources 
within the coffee households and from the complementarity of various diversification groups. In the 
latter case, this results in a positive correlation. 
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Our results in Chapter 6 indicate that a better institutional environment for coffee production, like 
the number of coffee farmers and the coffee-price margin at the municipal level, is positively 
correlated with the coffee farmers’ decision to engage in coffee-extra activities. Our results suggest 
that the worse the conditions for pure coffee production are, the greater the chances are that 
coffee-producing households will decide to diversify their agricultural activities, and at the same 
time, there will be less willingness to vertically integrate with coffee. 
 
By introducing a number of variables at the municipal level, we were able to test the effect of the 
institutional environment on the households´ livelihood; and by introducing the coffee price margin 
between municipal and export prices, it was also possible to capture the effect of structural 
differences with regard to diversification among municipalities. The overall results derived from our 
investigation indicate that an improved institutional environment for coffee induces more 
diversification within coffee-extra activities and reduces the chance that coffee-producing 
households engage in agricultural and non-agricultural activities. 
 
Beside those results and their coincidence with the theory, we shed light on the introduction of 
lagged variables in the analysis. By including lagged variables, we could find the long-term effect of 
diversification on households´ livelihood and coffee income. We found consistent evidence that a 
general diversification and coffee-extra activities in 2001 had a significant, positive effect on the 
annual coffee income in 2005. 
 
With the overall results presented in this thesis, we contribute to the existing literature by 
providing theoretical and empirical evidence on the institutional environment and policy changes 
and their effect on the coffee traders and coffee growers/households´ behaviour. The main findings 
show that the institutional environment creates differential opportunities among partners in the 
coffee sector; they differ substantially in the way they do business in coffee. Cooperative 
involvement does not always help growers to increase their welfare, neither does it help in 
reducing the instability of the coffee price. That households responded to the low coffee price 
periods with an increase in diversification was evident. 
 
This research produces valuable results to be taken into account in the policymaking aimed at 
assisting the Mexican coffee sector. Information included in the contractual arrangements and 
trader performances can prove very useful for designing policies related to the institutional 
environment. The issue of cooperatives is of great importance; the results we obtained can be 
taken up by the cooperative leaders and grassroots farmers’ organizations in order to improve their 
cooperative’s performance. The findings on diversification shed light on the factors playing a role in 
the households´ decision-making process and the likely effect of diversification in the long run; 
when considering public policies related to resource allocation and service provision in rural areas, 
those results are limited but useful at the same time. 
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Samenvatting 
 
In de jaren tachtig en negentig van de vorige eeuw is de Mexicaanse economie van een gestuurde 
economie veranderd in een vrije markt economie. Het land sloot zich in 1986 aan bij de Algemene 
handelsovereenkomst inzake tarieven en handel en ondertekende in 1992 de Noord-Amerikaanse 
Vrijhandelsovereenkomst met de Verenigde Staten en Canada. Door deze acties brak de 
Mexicaanse regering radicaal met het voorheen gebruikelijke beleid over importsubstitutie en 
startte het met een liberalisering van de handel. Deel van deze veranderingen in de economie was 
een enorme vermindering van de deelname van de staat aan de kredietverlening, marketing en 
andere dienstverlening ten behoeve van de landbouw, die werd ingezet aan het begin van de jaren 
negentig. In het bijzonder de koffiesector werd hierdoor getroffen. 
 
Koffie werd voor het eerst in Mexico geïntroduceerd aan het eind van de 19e eeuw. Koffie is 
belangrijk in dit land; het voorziet in de werkgelegenheid en het inkomen van bijna een half 
miljoen huishoudens; ongeveer een miljoen arbeiders worden jaarlijks ingehuurd om de oogst 
binnen te halen. Er zijn ongeveer 500.000 koffieboeren, die gezamenlijk meer dan 760.000 hectare 
land bezitten. Mexico produceert per oogstseizoen meer dan 5,5 miljoen quintals.38 De 
betrokkenheid van inheemse volkeren en de zwakke openbare dienstverlening in 
koffieproducerende regio’s verlenen aan deze sector een specifiek karakter in termen van  
technologie en cultuur. Ongeveer 98% van de koffieplantages wordt gecultiveerd onder 
schaduwbomen, die een voor het natuurbehoud zeer belangrijke houtmassa vormen. 
 
Als gevolg van het verdwijnen van de economische clausules van het Internationale Koffieakkoord 
in 1989 kwam er een ontmanteling op gang van de toezichthoudende organen en andere 
overheidsinstellingen voor koffie die in de producerende landen functioneerden. Na het ter ziele 
gaan van het “Instituto Mexicano del Café” in 1993 werd in de Mexicaanse koffiesector de functie 
vertegenwoordigende organisatie voor de bedrijfstak eerst overgenomen door de “Consejo 
Mexicano del Café”, en vervolgens door het “Sistema Producto Café” en de “Asociación Mexicana 
del Café”. De Koffieraad vervulde deze functie van 1993 tot 2004, en sindsdien wordt dit werk 
verricht door de laatstgenoemde organisaties. 
 
Bijgevolg zijn de voornaamste doelen in deze dissertatie om de heersende institutionele setting in 
de Mexicaanse koffiesector te onderzoeken en de structurele veranderingen die daarbinnen in de 
loop der jaren hebben plaatsgevonden. De specifieke onderwerpen waar we ons op gericht hebben 
zijn: de contractovereenkomsten en handelsprestaties, de factoren die van invloed zijn op de 
bereidheid van boeren om zich bij een coöperatie aan te sluiten, de effecten van coöperatie op de 
prijsbestendigheid, de invloed van coöperatie op de welvaart van de boeren, en de reactie van 
koffieproducenten op de dalende koffieprijs door middel van activiteiten om te diversifiëren. 
 
Om de hoofddoelen van dit proefschrift te bereiken hebben we gebruik gemaakt van zowel primaire 
als secundaire gegevens. We hebben in twee periodes veldwerk verricht. De eerste periode liep van 
                                            
38 Honderd pond groene koffie staat gelijk aan een quintal. 
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mei tot juli 2008, waarin we de belangrijkste stakeholders in de Mexicaanse koffietoeleveringsketen 
hebben geïnterviewd. De andere periode liep van november 2009 tot februari 2010, waarin we een 
enquête hebben gehouden onder tussenhandelaren in vier koffieproducerende regio’s. We 
verzamelden secondaire gegevens van onderzoeksinstituten en andere organisaties die deel 
uitmaken van de landbouw- en koffiesectoren. We verkregen aanvullende informatie van 
vertegenwoordigers van zowel overheidsinstellingen als non-gouvernementele instellingen. Als 
informatiestandaard gebruikten we twee enquêtes onder koffieboeren: de enquête van 2004, 
waaraan 1.396 koffieboeren uit de 8 grootste koffieproducerende staten meededen, en de enquête 
van 2005, waaraan 2.294 koffieboeren uit de 5 grootste koffieproducerende staten deelnamen. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we licht geworpen op de structuur van de koffiesector en de veranderingen 
die zich daarin in de loop van de tijd hebben voltrokken. Onze resultaten suggereren dat er vele 
oorzaken zijn aan te wijzen voor de institutionele verandering, maar de meest belangrijke is het op 
één lijn brengen van de Mexicaanse economie met het wereldwijde beleid. Kleinschalige 
koffieboeren hebben schade ondervonden van de veranderlijke koffieprijs en het gebrek aan 
kansen om deel te nemen aan de interne en internationale markt. Deze situatie vraagt om 
overheidsingrijpen, in de vorm van de inrichting van een institutionele omgeving die koffieboeren 
moet helpen bij het vergroten van hun inkomen, de levering van marktinformatie en diensten 
daarbij inbegrepen. Het overheidsbeleid van de afgelopen twee decennia heeft weliswaar meer 
producenten ervan weerhouden om de koffiesector de rug toe te keren, maar het heeft weinig 
bijgedragen aan het verbeteren van de opbrengst, de productie, de kwaliteit van de koffie of de 
betrouwbaarheid van de koffiesector. 
 
De laatste jaren hebben de internationale koffieprijzen een fluctuatie laten zien van ongeveer 50% 
per jaar, terwijl de prijzen in de periode van regulatie 15% rondom hun gemiddelde vastgestelde 
prijs fluctueerden. Deze situatie maakte het moeilijk voor boeren en andere partners in de 
koffietoeleveringsketen om investeringen te doen en activiteiten te plannen. De statistieken laten 
een kleiner aandeel van koffieboeren in de internationale prijs zien onder het gecontroleerde 
systeem dan het nu is onder de vrije markt. Niettemin hebben we in Hoofdstuk 2 beargumenteerd 
dat boeren het beter hadden ten tijde van het quotasysteem dan ze het nu hebben op de vrije 
markt, omdat de overheid destijds tegemoet kwam aan alle behoeften die producenten hadden. 
 
Hoewel men zich in aanzienlijke mate heeft aangepast aan de huidige institutionele omgeving, zijn 
sommige actoren in het nadeel terwijl anderen van deze nieuwe, competitieve omgeving profiteren. 
Om het effect van de snelle teruggang in de directe interventies van de Mexicaanse staat te 
temperen, heeft de federale overheid in de jaren negentig een aantal subsidies en 
compensatieprogramma’s in het leven geroepen. Toch is de overheidsinmenging in de koffiesector 
een stuk minder dan het was ten tijde van het quotasysteem. De staat is tegenwoordig een soort 
bemiddelaar tussen enerzijds de grotere private verwerkings- en exportondernemingen en 
anderzijds de en anderzijds het kleinschaliger en vaak armere deel van de sector, bestaande uit 
koffieboeren en kleinschalige verwerkers van koffieboeren en kleinschalige verwerkers. 
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Nu we een totaalbeeld hadden verkregen van de veranderingen in de institutionele setting en structuur 
van de Mexicaanse koffiesector, behandelden we in Hoofdstuk 3 de voornaamste doelstellingen van 
deze studie. Deze doelstellingen zijn het identificeren van de factoren die de contractuele keuzes 
kunnen verklaren die handelaren in de koffietoeleveringsketen maken, en het beoordelen van de 
prestaties van koffiehandelaren in de vier koffieproducerende regio’s. 
 
De data die we in onze analyse hebben gebruikt hebben we verkregen door face-to-face interviews af 
te nemen bij 53 tussenhandelaren in 4 koffieproducerende regio’s in de staten Oaxaca en Veracruz. 
We gebruikten bruto marketing winstmarges (het verschil tussen verkoop- en inkoopprijzen) als een 
indicator van de prestaties van handelaren, omdat die een aanwijzing kunnen geven over de prestaties 
van handelaren bij een minimalisering van hun variabele kosten. We voerden een logistische regressie 
uit om variabelen te vinden die van invloed waren op het besluit van tussenhandelaren om al of niet 
een contract af te sluiten met hun koper. Om te prestaties te kunnen beoordelen van handelaren in de 
Mexicaanse koffiesector voerden we een kleinste kwadraten regressie uit. 
 
De belangrijkste resultaten geven aan dat een roosteraar zijn en het verkopen van koffiebessen beide 
van negatieve invloed zijn op het gebruik van contracten door handelaren, terwijl verticaal 
geïntegreerd zijn een positieve invloed heeft op het sluiten van contracten. Deze bevindingen 
suggereren ook dat het verkopen van koffiebessen, deelname aan een competitieve omgeving en 
werken met behulp van contracten een positieve invloed hebben op de prestaties van tussenpersonen, 
terwijl roosteraar zijn een positief effect heeft op de brutowinst. We vonden dat de marketingmarges 
kleiner worden als de concurrentie tussen tussenpersonen toeneemt, zoals we ook verwachtten. Op 
basis van dit resultaat kunnen we zeggen dat als de liberalisering een grotere concurrentie 
veroorzaakte, dit ook profijt voor de koffieboeren met zich meebracht in de vorm van hogere 
basisprijzen. 
 
Sommige van de resultaten die we presenteerden in Hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat koffiehandelaren 
verschillende activiteiten hebben ondernomen als reactie op de overgang van een staatsgeleide 
goederenketen naar een geliberaliseerde omgeving. Sommigen van hen hebben besloten om verticaal 
te integreren om in de markt de transactiekosten te verminderen en een grotere efficiëntie te 
bereiken, rekenend op een groter productvolume om hun winst te kunnen vergroten. Anderen hebben 
geïnvesteerd in bedrijfsmiddelen die hen ertoe in staat stelden om waarde aan hun product toe te 
voegen en grotere marges te verkrijgen per verkochte producteenheid. 
 
Kredietbeperkingen en onzekerheid hebben ervoor gezorgd dat de meeste handelaren het 
investeren in nieuwe technologieën en machines hebben verwaarloosd. We kunnen daarom uit de 
resultaten van dit hoofdstuk concluderen dat er weliswaar een liberalisering in de Mexicaanse 
koffiesector heeft plaatsgevonden, maar geen echte modernisering. Derhalve bepleiten we dat als 
de Mexicaanse toeleveringsketen concurrerend wil worden dit enorme investeringen en 
verbeteringen vergt, zowel op technologisch gebied als op dat van de institutionele omgeving in 
alle stadia van de koffietoeleveringsketen. 
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Om in Hoofdstuk 4 het effect te beoordelen van de institutionele omgeving op het gedrag van 
koffieboeren of koffiehuishoudens, hebben we de variabelen geïdentificeerd die bijdragen aan de 
bereidheid van koffieboeren om lid te worden van een coöperatie. Ook hebben we de betekenis, 
het relatieve belang en de richting onderzocht van variabelen die het hoofdelijk inkomen uit koffie 
beïnvloeden. 
 
De studie die we in dit hoofdstuk hebben uitgevoerd is gebaseerd op informatie afkomstig uit de 
database van de Koffiecensus en van een grootschalige veldenquête over koffie, gehouden in 2004. 
De enquête ging over 1396 koffieboeren uit de acht koffieproducerende staten van Mexico. We 
gebruikten drie verschillende procedures om de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. Allereerst 
werd een probit modelanalyse uitgevoerd die de individuele, familiegebonden, boerderijgebonden 
en regionale factoren identificeerde die van invloed zijn op de waarschijnlijkheid van participatie in 
een coöperatie. Ten tweede voerden we een multinomiale logistische regressie uit om de 
variabelen vast te stellen die een rol spelen in de bepaling van het type koffie dat producenten 
aanleveren. Ten derde voerden we drie kleinste kwadraten regressies uit. Hierin gebruikten we 
samengevoegde en niet samengevoegde steekproeven van georganiseerde en niet-georganiseerde 
producenten om de factoren vast te stellen die van invloed zijn op het per capita inkomen uit koffie 
en de mogelijke verschillen tussen coöperatieve en individuele koffieboeren. 
 
De resultaten laten zien dat sommige individuele, familiegebonden-, boerderijgebonden- en 
regionale factoren lidmaatschap van een coöperatie bevorderen, terwijl de woonomstandigheden, 
het aandeel van boeren in een gemeente en de verkoop aan tussenhandelaren de vooruitzichten 
van zo’n lidmaatschap negatief beïnvloeden. Regionale verschillen met betrekking tot de 
voorwaarden voor koffieproductie laten ook een significant resultaat zien als het gaat om invloed 
op de kansen dat een koffieboer zich zal aansluiten bij een coöperatie. 
 
Over het geheel genomen zijn onze resultaten globaal in meerdere opzichten in overeenstemming 
met bevindingen uit eerdere studies die soortgelijke vragen over coöperatieve affiliatie 
beantwoorden. Wel vonden we echter aantal aanvullende factoren, die de bereidheid van 
koffieboeren om zich bij een coöperatie aan te sluiten negatief of positief beïnvloeden. Verder 
hebben we ontdekt dat het boeren niet altijd helpt om lid van een coöperatie te zijn als het gaat 
om het ontvangen van een hogere koffieprijs. Onze resultaten laten een negatief effect zien van 
deelname aan een coöperatie op de gemiddelde prijs voor de levering van droge koffie. Dit 
impliceert dat coöperatieleden op het gebied van marketing een relatief voordeel genieten, maar 
alleen als een aantal verwerkingsactiviteiten opgenomen kunnen worden in het werk dat door de 
coöperatie wordt uitgevoerd. 
 
Als onderdeel van de resultaten die we in Hoofdstuk 4 hebben verkregen, ontdekten we over het 
algemeen positieve effecten van deelname aan een coöperatie op het inkomen van huishoudens. 
Vaak is hierop hun verbeterde toegang tot de externe infrastructuur van invloed, – toegang tot een 
wegennet maar vooral tot elektriciteit -, dat verdere vooruitgang in de verwerking van koffie 
mogelijk maakt. In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteerden we dat coöperaties net zo efficiënt dienen te 
zijn als andere tussenschakels die werkzaam zijn in dezelfde markt, willen ze hun leden en 
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naburige boeren economisch profijt brengen. Zo niet, dan bezorgen ze hen allemaal verlies. Als 
koffiecoöperaties efficiënt werken, dan kunnen ze de koffieprijs omhoog stuwen. Op deze manier 
zou ook de welvaart van georganiseerde (en sommige niet-georganiseerde) boeren kunnen stijgen. 
 
Na deze analyse van de coöperaties van koffieboeren hebben we in Hoofdstuk 5 de coöperatie 
beoordeeld als antwoord op de onzekerheid in de markt; ook hebben we het effect van coöperatie 
op de instabiliteit van de koffiemarkt bekeken. De belangrijkste data die we in dit hoofdstuk 
hebben gebruikt zijn verzameld in een enquête die werd afgenomen in de acht voornaamste 
producerende staten van Mexico in 2004, aangevuld met informatie afkomstig uit de database van 
de Koffiecensus. In beide, zowel in de enquête van 2004 als in de Census, waren eigenschappen 
opgenomen met betrekking tot het individu, de familie, het boerenbedrijf, de markt en de regio. In 
aanvulling daarop gebruikten we verder de gegevens van gemeenten over de prijzen gedurende 
acht jaar, door een panel samen te stellen op basis van gegevens van databases van 
overheidsinstanties. Als deel van de analyse voerden we diverse kleinste kwadraten regressies en 
probit modelregressies uit. 
 
De resultaten geven aan dat er geen duidelijk verband bestaat tussen coöperatieve deelname en 
de voorspelbaarheid van de lokale koffieprijzen. Niettemin hebben we, toen we controleerden op 
individuele, familie- en boerderijgebonden factoren en markt- en regionale factoren, wel duidelijk 
bewijs gevonden dat de onbestendigheid van de koffieprijzen een positieve invloed heeft op de 
waarschijnlijkheid dat een boer lid is van een organisatie. De resultaten geven ook aan dat het 
lidmaatschap van een boerenorganisatie producenten helpt om hun koffieprijs en inkomen te 
verhogen. 
 
De grotere verschillen in de koffieprijs van 2001 tot 2004 heeft meer coöperatie teweeg gebracht, 
terwijl de bereidheid tot coöperatie in deze periode afnam naarmate de gemiddelde koffieprijs 
hoger was. Het lijkt erop dat het verkopen van koffie als ongebonden boer een betere kans 
oplevert om te verdienen aan de tijdelijk hoge koffieprijzen dan verkoop door een coöperatie doet. 
 
Het onderzoek dat we in dit hoofdstuk deden laat zien dat, hoewel boeren vaker lijken te opteren 
voor lidmaatschap van een coöperatie als ze te maken krijgen met een grotere fluctuatie in de prijs 
en met lagere prijzen, dit geen invloed lijkt te hebben op die prijsfluctuatie. Niettemin resulteert 
lidmaatschap van een coöperatie wel degelijk in een hoger inkomen. Zelfs wanneer de deelname 
aan een koffiecoöperatie zich niet vertaalt in een afname van de marktinstabiliteit, is de stijging 
van de individuele koffieprijs en het inkomen dat georganiseerde koffieboeren uit koffie ontvangen 
groot genoeg om producenten te motiveren lid te worden van een coöperatie. 
 
Behalve de voornoemde overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen onze resultaten en wat andere 
onderzoekers hebben gevonden, werpen we verder in Hoofdstuk 5 licht op de analyse van 
informatie die we op diverse tijdstippen uit verschillende bronnen hebben verzameld. Op deze 
manier waren we in staat om een panel database op te bouwen, door gebruik te maken van prijzen 
op internationaal-, nationaal- en dorpsniveau. Hier voegden we de prijzen aan toe over een periode 
van acht jaar, die we vervolgens relateerden aan de eigenschappen van de huishoudens van 
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koffieboeren die deel hadden genomen aan de enquête van 2004. Het onderzoek dat in dit 
hoofdstuk is gedaan is bovendien tamelijk uniek omdat het zich zowel richt op het effect van de 
veranderlijkheid van de koffieprijzen op coöperatie als op het omgekeerde effect. 
 
Als vervolg op ons onderzoek naar de reactie van koffieboeren op veranderingen in hun 
institutionele omgeving hebben we in Hoofdstuk 6 de bereidheid van de boeren geëvalueerd om te 
diversifiëren door middel van aanvullende koffie-, landbouw- en niet-landbouwactiviteiten, als 
antwoord op de lage koffieprijs of structurele verschillen op dorpsniveau. De analyse in dit 
hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op gegevens afkomstig van een representatieve enquête die is uitgevoerd 
in 2005, en die informatie geeft over 2294 koffieproducerende huishoudens in 5 van de 
belangrijkste koffieproducerende staten van Mexico. De informatie uit de enquête werd aangevuld 
met gegevens afkomstig van de Mexicaanse Koffiecensus. Bovendien kregen we het aantal 
tussenhandelaren in koffie die in 2005 op dorpsniveau geregistreerd stonden van de Mexicaanse 
Koffieraad. Van het Informatica, Landbouw en Veestapel Systeem kregen we de koffieprijs op 
dorpsniveau gedurende de periode van 2001 tot 2004. We voegden ook informatie toe over de 
totale bevolking op gemeentelijk niveau, verkregen van het Nationaal Instituut voor Statistiek, 
Geografie en Informatica. 
 
We analyseerden de data met behulp van twee afzonderlijke econometrische modellen. Het eerste 
model analyseerde de specifieke keuze gemaakt door huishoudens met betrekking tot de drie 
diversificatiegroepen. We vulden de drie opties aan met de keuze bij gebrek aan beter van non-
diversificatie, om een mogelijke selectievertekening te vermijden. Omdat we tegelijkertijd vier 
opties in beschouwing namen als afhankelijke variabelen, waarvan er drie elkaar niet wederzijds 
uitsloten, brachten we een multivariate probit analyse ten uitvoer. Het tweede model evalueerde 
het effect van interne en externe factoren op het jaarlijkse inkomen uit koffie. Omdat de 
afhankelijke variabele doorlopend was, maakten we gebruik van standaard lineaire regressies. 
 
Het is aannemelijk dat de neergang van de koffieprijs van 2001 tot en met 2004 boeren ertoe heeft 
aangezet om verdere stappen te zetten met hun diversificatie. We vonden in de multivariate probit 
regressies correlaties tussen de verschillende opties om te diversifiëren. Deze correlaties kunnen 
zijn voortgekomen uit de concurrentie om hulpbronnen binnen de koffiehuishoudens en uit de 
complementariteit van verschillende diversificatiegroepen. In het laatste geval heeft dit 
geresulteerd in een positieve correlatie. 
 
Onze resultaten in Hoofdstuk 6 geven aan dat een gunstiger institutionele omgeving voor 
koffieproductie, zoals het aantal koffieboeren en de koffieprijsmarge op gemeentelijk niveau, 
positief correleert met het besluit van koffieboeren om zich met aanvullende koffieactiviteiten bezig 
te gaan houden. Onze bevindingen suggereren dat hoe slechter de voorwaarden voor pure 
koffieproductie zijn, des te groter de kans is dat koffieproducerende huishoudens zullen besluiten 
om hun landbouwactiviteiten te diversifiëren. Tegelijkertijd zal men minder bereid zijn om verticaal 
in de koffieproductieketen te integreren. 
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Door een aantal variabelen in te voeren op gemeentelijk niveau waren we in staat om het effect te 
testen van de institutionele omgeving op de bestaansmiddelen van huishoudens. En door de marge 
in de koffieprijs in te voeren tussen gemeentelijke- en exportprijzen, was het ook mogelijk om het 
effect te vangen van structurele verschillen ten aanzien van de diversificatie tussen gemeentes 
onderling. De eindresultaten van ons onderzoek geven aan dat een verbeterde institutionele 
omgeving voor koffieproductie leidt tot meer diversificatie binnen aanvullende koffieactiviteiten en 
de kans vermindert dat koffieproducerende huishoudens zich bezighouden met landbouw- en niet-
landbouwactiviteiten. 
 
Naast deze resultaten en hun overeenstemming met de theorie, hebben we licht geworpen op de 
invoering van lagged variabelen in de analyse. Door lagged variabelen op te nemen konden we een 
lange termijneffect vinden van diversificatie op de bestaansmiddelen en het inkomen uit koffie van 
huishoudens. We vonden consistent bewijs dat een algemene diversificatie en aanvullende 
koffieactiviteiten in 2001 een significant, positief effect hadden op het jaarlijks inkomen uit koffie in 
2005. 
 
Met het totaal aan resultaten dat we in dit proefschrift hebben gepresenteerd dragen we bij aan de 
bestaande literatuur middels de aanlevering van theoretisch en empirisch bewijs over de 
institutionele omgeving en beleidsmatige veranderingen, en over het effect daarvan op het gedrag 
van koffiehandelaren en koffieboeren/huishoudens. De belangrijkste bevindingen laten zien dat de 
institutionele omgeving onderscheidende kansen schept onder de verschillende partners in de 
koffiesector; ze verschillen substantieel van elkaar in hun manier van zaken doen in koffie. De 
betrokkenheid van coöperaties helpt de boeren niet altijd om hun welvaart te vergroten, en helpt 
ook niet om de instabiliteit van de koffieprijs te verminderen. Het is duidelijk dat huishoudens op 
de periodes met lage koffieprijzen hebben gereageerd door meer te diversifiëren. 
 
Dit onderzoek heeft waardevolle resultaten opgeleverd, die kunnen worden meegenomen in het 
beleid dat wordt ontworpen om de Mexicaanse koffiesector te ondersteunen. De informatie die 
besloten ligt in contractuele overeenkomsten en de prestaties van handelaren kan van groot nut 
blijken te zijn bij het ontwerpen van beleid dat gericht is op de institutionele omgeving. De kwestie 
rond coöperaties is van groot belang; de door ons verkregen resultaten kunnen worden opgepakt 
door leiders van coöperaties en boerenorganisaties aan de basis om de prestaties van hun 
coöperaties te verbeteren. Onze bevindingen met betrekking tot diversificatie hebben licht 
geworpen op de factoren die een rol spelen in de besluitvorming binnen huishoudens en het 
aannemelijke effect van diversificatie op de lange termijn. Wanneer we het beleid in verband met 
de toewijzing van hulpbronnen en de levering van diensten op het platteland in ogenschouw 
nemen, zijn die resultaten weliswaar beperkt maar ook nuttig. 
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Resumen 
 
México cambió de una economía controlada a una de mercado libre durante los años ochentas y 
noventas. Este país se adhirió al Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles y Comercio en 1986 y firmó el 
Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte con Canadá y los Estados Unidos de América en 
1992. Con lo anterior, el Gobierno mexicano rompió radicalmente con las políticas de sustitución de 
importaciones y se embarcó en la liberalización del comercio. Como parte de esos cambios en la 
política económica, también se inició con una fuerte reducción en la participación del Estado en la 
provisión de crédito, comercialización y otros servicios agrícolas a partir de los noventas. Esto 
afectó particularmente al sector cafetalero. 
 
El cultivo del café fue primeramente introducido a México a finales del siglo diecinueve. En este 
país, el café es importante ya que proporciona empleo e ingresos a casi medio millón de hogares, 
mientras que cerca de un millón de trabajadores son contratados cada año para la cosecha. Hay 
alrededor de 500,000 productores de café, que juntos poseen más de 760,000 hectáreas con este 
cultivo. México produce más de 5.5 millones de quintales por año39. El involucramiento de 
productores indígenas y la baja disponibilidad de servicios públicos le dan a este sector 
características especiales en términos de tecnología y cultura. Alrededor del 98% de las 
plantaciones de café en México se mantienen bajo árboles de sombra, lo cual constituye una 
importante cubierta forestal que favorece la conservación del medio ambiente. 
 
Como consecuencia de la desaparición de las cláusulas económicas del acuerdo internacional del 
café en 1989, se inicia el retiro de la participación gubernamental de la comercialización del café y 
el cierre de otras instancias gubernamentales que operan en apoyo al sector rural. En el sector 
cafetalero mexicano, después de la desaparición del Instituto Mexicano del Café en 1993, la 
representación de la industria del café ha estado siendo cubierta primero por el Consejo Mexicano 
del Café y luego por el Sistema Producto Café y la Asociación Mexicana del Café. El primero estuvo 
operando de 1993 a 2004 y los últimos han estado en funcionamiento desde 2004. 
 
En consecuencia, en esta tesis el énfasis fue el investigar la institucionalidad existente en el sector 
cafetalero mexicano y los cambios estructurales presentes a través del tiempo. Los temas 
específicos que examinamos son: las condiciones de contratación y desempeño de los 
comercializadores, los factores que influyen en la decisión de los productores a formar parte de las 
cooperativas, los efectos de las cooperativas en la variabilidad de precios, la influencia de la 
organización de productores en el ingreso por café de las unidades familiares y la respuesta de 
éstas a la reducción del precio del producto por medio de la diversificación de sus actividades 
económicas. 
 
Para lograr los principales objetivos de esta tesis, hemos utilizado información primaria y 
secundaria. El trabajo de campo fue realizado en dos períodos: uno de mayo a julio de 2008, 
durante éste se entrevistaron a los principales actores de la cadena productiva del café de México, 
                                            
39 Cien libras de café verde es un quintal de café. 
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y otra de noviembre de 2009 a febrero de 2010, en la que se hicieron entrevistas a intermediarios 
del café localizados en cuatro regiones productoras. Se recolectaron datos secundarios de institutos 
de investigación y otras instituciones relacionadas con el sector agrícola y del café. Adicionalmente 
se obtuvo información de representantes de instancias gubernamentales y no gubernamentales. 
Como información básica se usaron dos encuestas realizada a productores cafetaleros: una 
realizada en el 2004, la cual comprende información de 1,396 productores, y una realizada en el 
2005, la cual comprende información de 2,294 productores, de ocho y cinco de los mayores 
estados productores de café, respectivamente. 
 
En el Capítulo 2 se proporciona información sobre la estructura del sector cafetalero y sus cambios 
a través del tiempo. Los resultados sugieren que hubo muchas causas para que los cambios 
institucionales se presentaran, pero la más importante fue la alineación de la política económica de 
México con las políticas mundiales. Los pequeños caficultores se han visto perjudicados por la 
variabilidad de los precios del producto y la falta de oportunidades para su participación directa en 
el mercado nacional e internacional. Esta situación indica que se requiere la intervención del 
Gobierno para el establecimiento de un entorno institucional apropiado, incluyendo la provisión de 
información de mercado y servicios en apoyo a los productores de café en el aumento de sus 
ingresos. Las políticas públicas desarrolladas en las últimas dos décadas han impedido que un 
mayor número de productores salgan del sector de cafetalero; pero poco han incidido en la mejora 
del rendimiento, producción, calidad del producto y viabilidad del sector cafetalero. 
 
Los precios internacionales del café han mostrado una fluctuación de alrededor del 50% anualmente 
en los últimos años, mientras que durante la época regulada, los mismos fluctuaron 15% alrededor de 
su precio medio definido. Esta situación dificulta que los productores y otros agentes participantes en 
la cadena productiva del café lleven a cabo inversiones y la planificación de sus actividades. Las 
estadísticas indican una menor participación de los cafetaleros en el precio internacional durante el 
periodo regulado comparado con el régimen no controlado. Sin embargo, en el Capítulo 2, 
argumentamos que los productores de café mexicanos eran mejor remunerados bajo el sistema de 
cuotas que bajo el libre mercado, porque en ese entonces el Gobierno cubría buena parte de los 
requerimientos que tenían los cafeticultores. 
 
A pesar de que ha habido un ajuste considerable al entorno institucional, algunos actores están en 
desventaja, mientras que otros han logrado beneficiarse de este nuevo entorno. Para reducir el efecto 
de la rápida disminución de la intervención directa del estado mexicano, durante los noventas el 
gobierno federal comenzó a operar algunos subsidios y programas de apoyos. Sin embargo, la 
participación del Gobierno en el sector cafetalero es mucho menor de lo que era bajo el sistema de 
cuotas. En la actualidad, el Estado es una especie de mediador entre los grandes intermediarios 
privados y las empresas exportadoras por un lado, y entre el sector social de productores de café y los 
pequeños procesadores. 
 
Una vez que hemos tenido un panorama general de los cambios que se han presentado en el 
entorno institucional y en la estructura del sector cafetalero mexicano, en el Capítulo 3 se 
plantearon como objetivos principales en este estudio el de identificar los factores que explican las 
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decisiones contractuales de los comerciantes que participan en la cadena productiva del café y 
evaluar el desempeño de los comerciantes de café en cuatro regiones productoras de México. 
 
Los datos utilizados en nuestro análisis se obtuvieron mediante la realización de entrevistas 
directas a 53 intermediarios en 4 regiones productoras de café de los estados de Oaxaca y 
Veracruz. Se utilizó el margen bruto de comercialización (la diferencia entre los precios de compra 
y venta) como un indicador de desempeño de los comercializadores, ya que éste da una indicación 
de cómo los agentes de comercialización se desempeñan buscando una reducción de sus costos 
variables. Se realizó una regresión logit para encontrar las variables que afectan la decisión de los 
intermediarios de contar con un contrato (o no) con su comprador. Para evaluar el desempeño de 
los comerciantes en el sector de café de México, se realizó una regresión de mínimos cuadrados 
ordinarios. 
 
Los principales resultados indican que siendo un tostador y vendiendo café cereza negativamente 
afecta la decisión de contar con contratos, mientras que el estar integrados verticalmente tiene un 
efecto positivo sobre el uso de contratos. Los resultados también sugieren que el vender café 
cereza, participando en un entorno competitivo y el tener contratos positivamente influye el 
desempeño de los intermediarios, mientras que el ser un tostador tiene un efecto positivo sobre el 
margen bruto de comercialización. Como se esperaba, se encontró que los márgenes de 
comercialización disminuyen conforme aumenta la competencia entre intermediarios. De acuerdo 
con este resultado, podemos decir que si la liberalización de la economía aumenta la competencia 
ésta también trae beneficios a los productores por medio de un mayor precio de venta en el área 
de producción. 
 
Algunos de nuestros resultados, también incluidos en el Capítulo 3, muestran que los agentes 
comercializadores de café se han involucrado en diferentes actividades en respuesta a la transición 
de un escenario controlado por el Estado a uno de libre mercado. Algunos de ellos decidieron 
integrase verticalmente con el fin de reducir los costos de transacción y de lograr una mayor 
eficiencia en el mercado, basándose en un mayor volumen de producto para aumentar sus 
ganancias; otros invierten en activos que les permiten agregar valor al café y tener mayores 
márgenes por unidad producto. 
 
Las restricciones para obtener crédito y la incertidumbre han hecho que la mayoría de los 
comerciantes descuiden la inversión en maquinaria y la adopción de nuevas tecnologías. Por lo 
tanto, de los resultados de este capítulo podemos concluir que ha habido liberalización pero no una 
real modernización en el sector cafetalero mexicano. En consecuencia, consideramos que para que 
la cadena productiva del café sea competitiva, se requiere de enormes inversiones y mejoras tanto 
en la tecnología como en el entorno institucional en todas las etapas de la cadena productiva del 
café. 
 
Con el fin de evaluar el efecto del entorno institucional sobre el comportamiento de los 
productores/unidades de producción cafetaleras, en el Capítulo 4 identificamos las variables que 
influyen en el interés de los productores cafetaleros para formar parte de las cooperativas y 
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examinamos la relación, la importancia relativa y la dirección en la que algunos factores influyen el 
ingreso per cápita de café. 
 
El estudio realizado en este capítulo se basa en información de la base de datos del censo nacional 
del café y en una amplia encuesta realizada a productores cafetaleros en el 2004. En la encuesta, 
se incluyeron 1,396 productores de café de los ocho principales estados productores en México. 
Para responder a las interrogantes de esta investigación, nos basamos en tres diferentes 
procedimientos. En primer lugar, se realizó un análisis con un modelo probit para identificar los 
factores individuales, la familiares, de la producción y regionales que influyen en la probabilidad de 
participación en cooperativa. En segundo lugar, se realizó una regresión logística multinomial para 
identificar las variables que son importantes en la definición del tipo de café que los productores 
venden. En tercer lugar, se realizaron tres regresiones mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. En estas 
utilizamos muestras agrupadas y no agrupadas de productores organizados y no organizados para 
identificar los factores que influyen en el ingreso per cápita de café y las posibles diferencias entre 
los agricultores individuales y en cooperativas. 
 
Los resultados muestran que algunos factores individuales, familiares, de la producción y 
regionales favorecen la inserción en cooperativa; mientras que las condiciones de la vivienda, el 
número de cafetaleros en el municipio y la proporción de ventas a intermediarios en el municipio 
afectan negativamente la decisión de adhesión a cooperativa. Las diferencias regionales en cuanto 
a las condiciones de producción de café también muestran una influencia significativa en la decisión 
de los productores de unirse a las cooperativas. 
 
En general, en varios aspectos nuestros resultados concuerdan ampliamente con los hallazgos de 
estudios anteriores que se ocupan de cuestiones similares en cuanto a la participación en 
cooperativa. Sin embargo, en esta investigación encontramos algunos factores adicionales, que 
positiva o negativamente, influyen la decisión de los productores cafetaleros de unirse a las 
cooperativas. Además, descubrimos que el ser miembro de cooperativa no siempre ayuda a los 
productores de café en recibir un mayor precio del producto; nuestros resultados muestran un 
efecto negativo de la participación en cooperativa en el precio promedio cuando se vende café seco 
natural. Esto implica que los miembros de las cooperativas disfrutan de una ventaja comparativa 
en la comercialización de café sólo si la cooperativa realiza varias de las actividades de 
procesamiento. 
 
Como parte de los resultados obtenidos en el Capítulo 4, encontramos en general un positivo 
efecto de la participación en cooperativa en el ingreso de las unidades de producción. Esto tiende a 
ser mediado por un mejor acceso a infraestructura – carreteras, pero principalmente electricidad – 
que también puede ser un factor positivo en el procesamiento de café. Con los resultados de este 
capítulo, podemos sostener que las cooperativas tienen que ser tan eficientes como otros 
intermediarios que trabajan en la misma región a fin de traer beneficios económicos a sus 
miembros y a los productores cafetaleros de la región, de lo contrario traen pérdidas económicas a 
todos ellos. Si las cooperativas de café trabajan de manera eficientemente, pueden hacer que los 
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precios del café aumenten en la región. Así, el beneficio para los productores organizados (y 
algunos no organizados) podría también aumentar. 
 
Continuando con el análisis de las cooperativas de productores de café, en el Capítulo 5 evaluamos 
la participación en cooperativas como respuesta a la variabilidad de los precios y el efecto de las 
cooperativas en la estabilidad de los precios del café. Los principales datos utilizados en este 
capítulo fueron obtenidos de una encuesta realizada en el 2004 a productores cafetaleros de los 
ocho principales estados productores de café en México, dicha información fue complementada con 
datos incluidos en la base del censo nacional del café. Ambos, la encuesta de 2004 y el censo, 
incluyen información individual, familiar, de producción, de mercado y características regionales. 
Además, utilizamos precios de café a nivel municipal registrados durante ocho años y que fueron 
obtenidos de una instancia gubernamental; así se construyó un panel de datos. Como parte del 
análisis, se ejecutaron varias regresiones de modelo probit y mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. 
 
Los resultados indican que no existe una relación clara entre la participación en cooperativa y la 
predicción de los precios locales del café. Sin embargo, cuando se controla por los factores 
individuales, familiares, características de las plantaciones, mercado y regionales, encontramos 
claras evidencias de que la variabilidad de los precios del café afecta positivamente la probabilidad 
de que un productor decida ser miembro de una organización. Además, los resultados indican que 
el pertenecer a una cooperativa ayuda a aumentar el precio y el ingreso de café. 
 
Una mayor variación en el precio del café registrada de 2001 a 2004 indujo más participación en 
cooperativa, mientras que cuanto mayor fue la media del precio del café de 2001 a 2004, más baja 
fue la decisión del productor de incorporarse a las cooperativas. Aparentemente el vender café 
como productor individual proporciona mayores oportunidades de obtener ganancias 
extraordinarias como resultado de aprovechar los precios altos comparado con vender por medio 
de cooperativas. 
 
La investigación realizada en este capítulo muestra que los agricultores optan más frecuentemente 
por pertenecer a las cooperativas cuando se enfrentan con una mayor variabilidad de precios (y 
cuando hay precios menores), esto no parece afectar la variación de precios; sin embargo, el 
pertenecer a las cooperativas conduce a mayores ingresos de café. Aun cuando la participación en 
cooperativas no se traduce en una reducción de la inestabilidad de los precios, el aumento en el 
precio y el ingreso de café para los cafetaleros organizados es lo suficientemente grande como para 
motivarlos a formar parte de las cooperativas. 
 
Aparte de las similitudes y diferencias entre nuestros resultados y los que otros investigadores han 
encontrado, en el Capítulo 5 además proporcionamos un procedimiento diferente en el análisis de 
la información; misma que fue obtenida de diferentes fuentes y en diferentes tiempos. Así, 
construimos una base de datos en panel utilizando los precios internacionales, nacionales y 
municipales. En la base de datos se añadió información de precios correspondientes a un período 
de ocho años, mismos que relacionamos con las características de las unidades de producción 
cafetaleras incluidas en la encuesta del 2004. Por otra parte, la investigación realizada en este 
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capítulo es única en el estudio del efecto de la variabilidad de los precios en la formación de 
cooperativas y viceversa. 
 
Continuando con la respuesta de los productores de café a los cambios en el entorno institucional, 
en el Capítulo 6 evaluamos la decisión de los productores en diversificarse con actividades 
económicas en el sector café, agrícola y no agrícola; ello como respuesta a los precios bajos del 
café o a las diferencias estructurales a nivel municipal. El análisis en este capítulo se basa en los 
datos de una encuesta representativa realizada en 2005, ésta encuesta incluye información de 
2,294 familias productoras de café de los cinco principales estados productores en México. La 
información de la encuesta se complementó con datos del censo nacional de café. Además, 
también fue incluida información en relación al número de intermediarios de café que estaban 
registrados a nivel municipal en el 2005 misma que fue emitida por el Consejo Mexicano del café. 
Del Sistema de Información Agrícola y Pecuarias se obtuvo el precio del café a nivel municipal en el 
período 2001-2004, además de que también se incluyó información poblacional a nivel municipal 
obtenida del Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática. 
 
Los datos se analizaron mediante dos distintos modelos econométricos. El primer modelo analiza 
las decisiones específicas que hacen las unidades de producción en a los tres grupos de 
diversificación definidos en este capítulo. A las tres opciones se le añadió la opción de no 
diversificado con la finalidad de evitar sesgo de selección. Así, como variables dependientes fueron 
consideradas cuatro opciones al mismo tiempo, tres de las cuales no son mutuamente excluyentes; 
por lo anterior, se realizó una regresión de probit multivariado. El segundo modelo evalúa el efecto 
de factores internos y externos en el ingreso anual de café; debido a que la variable dependiente 
es continua se hicieron regresiones de mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. 
 
Probablemente la caída en el precio del café durante el período 2001-2004 hizo que los 
cafeticultores adoptaran una mayor diversificación. En las regresiones de probit multivariado 
encontramos correlaciones entre las diversas opciones de diversificación. Esta correlación podría 
venir de la competencia en la asignación de recursos dentro de las unidades de producción de café 
y de la complementariedad existente entre los diversos grupos de diversificación utilizados en este 
trabajo. En este último caso, se expresa como una correlación positiva. 
 
Nuestros resultados en el Capítulo 6 indican que un mejor entorno institucional para la producción 
de café, como el número de agricultores de café y el margen de precios de café a nivel municipal, 
se correlacionó positivamente con la decisión de las unidades de producción en tener actividades 
extra en el sector cafetalero. Nuestros resultados sugieren que mientras peores son las condiciones 
institucionales para la producción de café mayores son las probabilidades de que las unidades de 
producción cafetaleras se diversifiquen con actividades agrícolas, y al mismo tiempo, habrá menos 
disposición a integrarse verticalmente con el café. 
 
Introduciendo varios factores a nivel municipal, hemos podido probar el efecto del entorno 
institucional en las estrategias de las unidades familiares, y al introducir el margen del precio del 
café a nivel municipal y el margen de exportación, también fue posible capturar el efecto de las 
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diferencias estructurales en cuanto a diversificación en los municipios. Los resultados globales 
derivados de nuestra investigación indican que un mejor ambiente institucional en el sector 
cafetalero induce mayor diversificación dentro de las actividades relacionadas con el café y reduce 
la probabilidad de que las unidades de producción cafetaleras participen en actividades agrícolas y 
no agrícolas. 
 
Adicionalmente a los resultados anteriores y su coincidencia con la teoría, en este capítulo 
generamos un procedimiento de análisis utilizando variables correspondientes a un periodo 
anterior. Incluyendo este tipo de variables fue posible encontrar el efecto a largo plazo de la 
diversificación en las estrategias de diversificación económica y el ingreso de café generado en las 
unidades familiares cafetaleras. Se encontraron consistentes evidencias de que la diversificación en 
general y la diversificación con actividades extra en el café en 2001 tuvieron un efecto significativo 
y positivo en los ingresos anuales provenientes del café en el 2005. 
 
Con los resultados presentados en esta tesis, contribuimos a la literatura existente proporcionando 
evidencias teóricas y empíricas en relación al entorno institucional y los cambios en la política y su 
efecto sobre los comercializadores del aromático y el comportamiento de los productores y las 
unidades de producción cafetaleras. Los principales resultados muestran que el entorno 
institucional crea oportunidades diferenciales entre los múltiples participantes en el sector de 
cafetalero; ello imprime diferencias sustanciales en la forma en que hacen negocio con el café. La 
participación en cooperativa no siempre ayuda a los productores a aumentar su bienestar, ni ayuda 
en la reducción de la inestabilidad de los precios de este producto. Es claro que las unidades de 
producción respondieron a los períodos de precio bajos del café con un aumento en la 
diversificación de sus actividades económicas. 
 
Esta investigación produce resultados valiosos para ser tomado en cuenta en la formulación de 
políticas dirigidas a mejorar el sector cafetalero mexicano. La información incluida en los acuerdos 
contractuales y el comportamiento de los comerciantes pueden resultar muy útiles para el diseño 
de políticas relacionadas con el entorno institucional. El aspecto relacionado con las cooperativas es 
de gran importancia; los resultados obtenidos pueden tomarse como base por los dirigentes de las 
cooperativas y las organizaciones de productores con el fin de mejorar el desempeño de sus 
cooperativas. Las conclusiones sobre diversificación proporcionan información valiosa en relación a 
los factores que tienen importancia en el proceso de toma de decisiones de las unidades de 
producción y el probable efecto de la diversificación en el largo plazo. Los resultados son útiles, 
pero limitados al mismo tiempo, al ser considerados en las políticas públicas relacionadas con la 
asignación de recursos y la prestación de servicios en las zonas rurales. 
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